fips205-slhdsa-verified/README.md
mrwulf 84cd00d377 phase 2: SECOND CERTIFICATE — WOTS+ chain loop (Algorithm 8) proven
fips205.wots_loop1_eq (Proofs/WotsSpec.lean): the extracted WOTS+ chain
loop wots_pk_from_sig_free_loop1 = the explicit fold that, at each index
i in [0, LEN), sets the chain address to i and runs chain_free on sig[i]
starting at digit msg[i] for W-1-msg[i] steps, writing tmp[i]. This is
the layer above chain: it CONSUMES chain_free and machine-checks that the
LEN chains are run with the right start indices, step counts, and output
slots — the WOTS+ verification recomputation.

Cone stays clean: [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound,
verify_mono.oracle.f] — the loop uses the REAL Aeneas StepUsize (usize
range, no plumbing axiom) and calls chain_free/index_usize/update, all
real; the try_from / Take-iterator / base_2b input-prep plumbing lives in
the enclosing wots_pk_from_sig_free, NOT in this loop.

Proof mirrors ChainSpec, reusing the generic loop_unfold_bind: usize_succ
+ fwd_succ_usize + hnext_usize (StepUsize iterator step), hbody1 (loop
body as clean do-block), wots_loop1_step (one loop step = one fold step),
wots_loop1_eq (induction, IH under the fatter binds via bind_congr x8).
No sorry; check.sh green over BOTH certificates with the axiom audit.

The chain-proof patterns transferred one-for-one to the next layer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 14:48:39 +02:00

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# fips205-slhdsa-verified
Machine-checked verification campaign for the **SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify
path**, extracted from a pure-Rust implementation into Lean 4 via
Charon/Aeneas — the same pipeline, discipline, and honesty rules as the
four ed25519 campaigns (`dalek/anza/risc0/betrusted-ed25519-verified`).
## STATUS: TWO CERTIFICATES PROVEN — chain (Alg 5) + WOTS+ chain loop (Alg 8)
`verification/check.sh` is **green** (exit 0): the model compiles, the
proofs compile, and the axiom audit passes. **One certificate proven so
far:**
- **`fips205.chain_free_loop_eq`** (Algorithm 5, WOTS+ chaining): the
extracted `chain_free` loop equals the explicit s-fold hash chain, with
the hash address set to i, i+1, …, i+s1 in turn. This rules out —
machine-checked, for the deployed monomorphic SHA2-128s verify path — an
off-by-one loop bound, a wrong address field, and wrong threading. Its
`#print axioms` cone is **exactly** `[propext, Classical.choice,
Quot.sound, verify_mono.oracle.f]` — the three kernel axioms plus the one
hash oracle it touches, and nothing else (no transpiler plumbing; the u32
range machinery was discharged with real definitions). check.sh Phase 3
fails the build if any certificate cone contains anything outside the
kernel three + the five documented SHA-2 oracles.
- **`fips205.wots_loop1_eq`** (Algorithm 8, WOTS+ pk recomputation — the
chain loop): the extracted `wots_pk_from_sig_free_loop1` equals the fold
that, at each index i in [0, LEN), sets the chain address to i and runs
`chain_free` on sig[i] starting at digit msg[i] for W1msg[i] steps,
writing tmp[i]. This is the layer above chain: it consumes `chain_free`
and pins that the LEN chains run with the right start indices, step
counts, and slots. Cone: kernel three + `verify_mono.oracle.f`.
Foundations behind this (2026-07-22/23): the Aeneas-compat patch (additive
monomorphic verify module through a named oracle boundary; charon + aeneas
exit 0); the u32 range-loop de-plumbing (faithful `Step` defs vs pinned
rustc, axiom-clean); fidelity pinned by a differential test in the snapshot
(valid / corrupted / wrong-message).
The remaining layers (WOTS+ pk, XMSS path, hypertree, FORS, apex) are not
yet proven — the pyramid rises one certificate at a time, each audited to
the same boundary.
## Subject
- Upstream: `integritychain/fips205` — pure-Rust FIPS 205 (final standard,
2024-08-13), zero `unsafe`, `no_std`, const-generic parameterization,
modules mirroring the FIPS 205 algorithm structure.
- Pinned at upstream commit `30bac08580aa61f653e5436d1bbacb5ffac446c4`
(2025-09-01), snapshotted with full history at
`saymrwulf/fips205-source` (snapshot head `5dca0db`, whose single
deviation from verbatim is the removal of upstream CI workflows,
documented in that commit). Aeneas-compat patches will land in the
snapshot repo as transparent, individually-justified commits — never
upstream. **No affiliation with, and no changes proposed to, the
upstream project.**
- Parameter set: **SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s** first (the small-signature profile
deployed in the firmware/code-signing lane). The architecture
generalizes; each further parameter set is a separate claim (rigor
invariant R2).
## Scope
**Verify path only.** The extraction cone, mirroring FIPS 205's own
algorithm tree:
```
slh_verify -> slh_verify_internal
-> fors_pk_from_sig
-> ht_verify -> xmss_pk_from_sig -> wots_pk_from_sig -> chain
```
Key generation and signing are out of scope (trusted base), exactly as
ed25519 signing was. The five verify-path hash oracles (`h_msg, f, h,
t_l, t_len` — SHA-2 instantiations; `prf`/`prf_msg` are sign-side only
and never enter the cone) are opaque external models with written
justifications, kept outside every certificate's dependency cone
(honesty invariant H4); their semantics are the standing SHA-2 oracle
boundary documented in [TRUSTED-BASE.md](TRUSTED-BASE.md).
## Gate-0 record (2026-07-22)
Per TARGETS.md ("re-verify before use"), the subject was probed before
this repository was created:
- **Charon**: clean (`charon cargo --preset=aeneas`, roots at the verify
cone, `sha2/sha3/zeroize/rand_core` opaque, features
`slh_dsa_sha2_128s`) — LLBC produced, exit 0.
- **Aeneas**: translated the entire const-generic verify cone to Lean
definitions (`wots.chain` … `slh.slh_verify_internal` all generated),
with exactly **one obstruction class** (3 unique errors): the
`crate::hashers::Hashers` struct of plain **function pointers** cannot
be translated.
- **Phase 1 — DONE (2026-07-22)**: the Aeneas-compat patch landed in
`fips205-source` (snapshot `2d89ee3`): an additive monomorphic SHA2-128s
verify module (`src/verify_mono.rs`) whose hash suite is reached through
named free functions in `verify_mono::oracle` (marked opaque at the
Charon boundary) — the `sha512_*`-shim pattern. Two further compat
refinements: the message-digest input M' passes as a single `&[u8]`
(nested `&[&[u8]]` is untranslatable), and one `let-else` became the
`is_err`/`unwrap` idiom. `verification/extract.sh` now re-derives the
model from the mono root; charon + aeneas both exit 0, and
`verification/check.sh` compiles the result. The generic paths and all
twelve parameter sets are untouched (the only change to existing code is
two lines wiring the module).
## What will be claimed (when the button is green, not before)
One theorem per layer, each a statement about the **extracted** functions
(H3), compiled by `verification/check.sh` with a per-certificate
`#print axioms` audit (H1): chain semantics, WOTS+ pk recomputation,
XMSS path recomputation, hypertree acceptance, FORS pk recomputation,
and the apex — `slh_verify_internal` accepts iff the recomputed
hypertree root equals the pinned public-key root.
**The allowed axiom set, stated precisely:** unlike the ed25519 field and
scalar layers (whose cones are exactly `[propext, Classical.choice,
Quot.sound]`), the hash oracles permeate *every* SLH-DSA layer — `chain`
already calls `F`. So each certificate's cone may contain the three
kernel axioms **plus at most the five named oracles**
(`verify_mono.oracle.{h_msg, f, h, t_l, t_len}`) — and nothing else: the
transpiler-plumbing axioms currently in `FunsExternal.lean` must be
discharged before any certificate ships, and the audit fails the button
if any of them (or anything unlisted) appears in a cone.
## Discipline
Every Lean compile in this repository runs under `verification/lean-guard`
(memory-capped, machine-wide serialized). Extraction is reproducible from
the committed `extract.sh` against the pinned snapshot (R1). What cannot
be proven is named in [TRUSTED-BASE.md](TRUSTED-BASE.md), not hidden (H5).