there is currently no method to detect USB power connect
in this board. Considering adding a simple circuit to enable
this. This design is not meant to be battery powered but
it is possible that an aftermarket modification would introduce
a battery, in which case, vbus detection does become A Thing.
this one is a little bit tricky. The lite version of baosec
forgoes the off-chip TRNG to save cost. Thus, there is an
"anti-feature" in the configuration, and so in this case
the dabao version of the server has to be selected despite
the baosec flag.
- oem-baosec-lite board support
- more flash memory types
- transparent polarity switching on reset line
The reset line in particular is having its polarity switched
because the I/Os pull-up by default, and we'd like the reset
line for peripherals to be asserted on reset (this prevents
glitching on e.g. displays while the CPU boots).
baosec-lite strategy is to use the OEM board type, and then diff
off of the baosec target.
The assumption is that if you're building for a baosec-lite target,
you're committing to re-doing the bootloader from the stock bootloader
and pivoting into a full-custom baosec-lite build.
This assumption allows us to "hard code" more of the baosec-lite
differences, instead of having to leave other board options available
for a more portable firmware.
I decided i feel too uncomfortable doing any state changes based
on unvalidated data. I can't see a downside to moving the check
to only after the signature has been verified.
one minor issue with this implemnetation is it requires dev
images to have an anti-rollback counter that matches or exceed
the last signed image seen.
This is more of a developr ergonomics issue - this will certainly
lead to some surprise by developers who are trying to take
production devices and "downgrade" them to an old dev tree
that has an old anti-rollback firmware number in it.
However, I think this is navigable and probably the simplicity
of not having an "escape" path for dev-signed imgaes is worth it.
All a developer has to do is to set the anti-rollback version
number to be equal to or greater than what was reported in
the device.
this is a sanity check number that can be used by firmware
to vet a counter value before incrementing to it. it's particularly
useful to thwart wear-out attacks agaisnt anti-rollback firmware
versions, i.e. by specifying an extremely high anti-rollback number
one might be able to cause a reset-to-0 failure and this prevents
that from happening by limiting the maximum value of the the
counter that can be requested.
anti-rollback is a number that is stored in a monatomic counter
inside the device that is compared against the firmware images
presented to the device. If the image version is lower than the
anti-rollback counter, the image is rejected. If the image is
higher, the anti-rollback counter is incremented until it equals
the vesrion in the image.
the receipt mechanism is a method for ensuring that cross-third
party signed images can't be used to dump keys on other third party
images. Every time a boot1 is accepted, a copy of the key block
that was used to accept the third party image is stored in the
receipt block.
If those keys rotate, then the collateral keys are rotated. this
prevents a rotation of third-party images from being used to
dump other third party images.
it does mean that third party signers have to be careful to not
rotate any of their signing keys uninitentially.
Three pieces of inforation are leaked about the root seed:
- whether or not the first 64 bits are all 0
- whether or not the first 64 bits are all 3's
- whether if none of the above are true
It's fairly indirect leakage, and I think it is a relatively
minor price to pay for the confidence it gives that some underlying
library behavior didn't accidentally lead to faulty keygen.
Note that these 64 bits are 64 bits out of tens of thousands
of bits that go into the keygen, because the nuisance keys
and the chaff key are all blended together to create the final
derived root key. Thus the security margin on the key is quite
large and even a full disclosure of these 64-bits is a minor
impact on overall security.
The IFR copy of pubkeys is truly actually indelible because
of the no-exceptions write inhibit byte. Add code to check
against that copy.
Note that the IFR region's downside is the presence of
the write-inhibit byte means the check is complicated
as the full key is striped across two locations, but
this code handles that.
This patch removes the option to scan out-of-tree json files
for locales resolution.
When the time comes to have to incorporate out-of-tree apps
with locales, a method should be devised that doesn't expand
the dependency surface of the project beyond the immediate
repository.
The keystore is a sensitive server, and the one-way counters
have security-critical propoerties. So instead of revealing a
generic one-way counter API to the world, specific, limited
requests to do things are going to be created for the keystore.
In this case, the bootwait flag would be convenient to be able
to set from userspace. The motivation for this requirement is
actually continuous integration - a normal human could just
hold down a button while turning on power, but in CI, I don't
have a robotic thumb (or an alternative electrical signal) to
simulate the nerve-pinch on boot.
Previously I was "cheating" and simulating this by nuking the
loader, which effectively forces a bootwait.
However, in production, this is *not possible* because the JTAG
port is sealed off. Thus, this may be the first of a series
of small PRs to incorporate CI tooling that clears up tech
debt like nuking the loader to get into boot wait.
* Verify checksum of downloaded rust target riscv32imac-unknown-xous_*.zip
* Pin base image to a sha256 digest
* Quote build arg to prevent shell injection attacks
* Run cargo --locked to make sure builds follow Cargo.lock
* Use --proto '=https' for curl to only allow HTTPS protocol to prevent downgrade attacks
* Create non-root user to run cargo commands and build artifacts
Turns out we *can* check this at run-time. I thought originally
once the chip was sealed these became hidden. I was wrong.
So, this means we can actually test to confirm that production
was done correctly and in fact the CM7 and debug ports are sealed
off.
this adds that test.
The info region is a region of RRAM that is used to configure
the chip - boot security, what CPUs can run, access control
lists, etc. There's no secrets in here, but it's very helpful
to inspect for audits and correctness of configuration, so
a routine is added to print it in boot1.