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add key range for collateral
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2 changed files with 22 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ pub const SWAP_KEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(259, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPer
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/// There is a second flag stored somewhere else. Can you find it?
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pub const THE_FLAG_1: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(260, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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// NOTE: COLLATERAL is from 261..265, but it is in the "common" page
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/// `NUISANCE_KEYS` are hashed together with `ROOT_SEED` to derive the core secret.
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/// Their primary purpose is to annoy microscopists trying to read the secret key by
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/// directly imaging the RRAM array. They also exist to reduce power side channels
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@ -216,6 +216,26 @@ pub const BAO2_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(5, PartitionAccess::All, RwPe
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pub const BETA_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(6, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
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pub const DEV_PUBKEY: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::Data(7, PartitionAccess::All, RwPerms::ReadOnly);
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/// Collateral is a data range that is *always* erased every time the system transitions from boot0
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/// to a Baochip-signed boot1. The only condition under which it is not erased is if *all* the boot1 keys
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/// in slots 0, 1, *and* 2 do *not* match the Baochip set.
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///
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/// The purpose of the collateral keys is to ensure that no Baochip-signed images can be used to
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/// decrypt third-party signed images. Thus, the conditions for signing a third-party image with
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/// its own signing keys are as follows:
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///
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/// - It must be a Boot1 image
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/// - Keys 0, 1, and 2 must all be different from the Baochip keys
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/// - The third-party firmware must generate and populate all the COLLATERAL data slots.
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/// - The third-party firmware must incorporate at least one of the keys in slots 261, 262, or 263 into their
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/// root key mechanism.
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/// - Collateral key in slot 264 must be made disclosable through a public inspection mechanism. The purpose
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/// of the inspection is to verify that in fact the collateral keys have been populated with non-zero value
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/// by the third-party firmware, and to verify erase of the key range when necessary. Erasure always
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/// progresses from low slot to high slot, and thus one can infer the erasure state of the collateral by
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/// inspecting the value of the high key slot.
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pub const COLLATERAL: SlotIndex = SlotIndex::DataRange(261..265, PartitionAccess::Fw0, RwPerms::ReadWrite);
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// Notes on defining the boot0 IFR region.
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// RISC-V boot0 region start is defined by IFR slot 6, bits [55:48]
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// RISC-V boot1 region start (which is boot0 end) is defined by IFR slot 6, bits[47:40]
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