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Merge pull request #786 from betrusted-io/release-ci
Release CI testing
This commit is contained in:
commit
5eec0702f9
5 changed files with 44 additions and 29 deletions
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ use crate::secboot::try_boot;
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// Notes:
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// - "Towards" - not a release yet, but working towards the stated milestone
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// - Eliminating "Towards" is done at the tag-out point.
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const RELEASE_DESCRIPTION: &'static str = "Towards Beta-0";
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const RELEASE_DESCRIPTION: &'static str = "Beta-0";
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static UART_RX: Mutex<RefCell<VecDeque<u8>>> = Mutex::new(RefCell::new(VecDeque::new()));
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ pub fn setup() -> (UsbDeviceState, u32) {
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}
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pub fn shutdown() {
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crate::debug::USE_CONSOLE.store(false, core::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
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crate::USB_CONNECTED.store(false, core::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
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unsafe {
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if let Some(ref mut usb_ref) = crate::platform::bao1x::usb::USB {
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let usb = &mut *core::ptr::addr_of_mut!(*usb_ref);
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@ -72,12 +72,16 @@ pub const BOOT0_TO_BOOT1: SecurityConfiguration = SecurityConfiguration {
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};
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/// This is different from a jump directly to loader/baremetal because the
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/// function codes *must* be for Boot1.
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/// function codes *must* be for Boot1 or Baremetal. Loader is not a valid option.
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pub const BOOT0_TO_ALTBOOT1: SecurityConfiguration = SecurityConfiguration {
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image_ptr: crate::LOADER_START as *const u32,
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pubkey_ptr: crate::BOOT0_START as *const u32,
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revocation_owc: crate::BOOT0_REVOCATION_OFFSET,
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function_codes: &[FunctionCode::Boot1 as u32, FunctionCode::UpdatedBoot1 as u32],
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function_codes: &[
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FunctionCode::Boot1 as u32,
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FunctionCode::UpdatedBoot1 as u32,
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FunctionCode::Baremetal as u32,
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],
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};
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pub const BOOT1_TO_LOADER_OR_BAREMETAL: SecurityConfiguration = SecurityConfiguration {
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@ -286,7 +286,12 @@ pub fn erase_collateral(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String>
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bollard!(die_no_std, 4);
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csprng.as_deref_mut().map(|rng| rng.random_delay());
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// only clear ACL if it isn't already cleared
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if slot_mgr.get_acl(slot).unwrap().raw_u32() != 0 {
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if slot_mgr
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.get_acl(slot)
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.unwrap_or(AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0xFFFF_FFFF)))
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.raw_u32()
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!= 0
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{
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// clear the ACL so we can operate on the data
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slot_mgr
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.set_acl(&mut rram, slot, &AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)))
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@ -347,15 +352,23 @@ pub fn erase_secrets(csprng: &mut Option<&mut Csprng>) -> Result<(), String> {
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match rw_perms {
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RwPerms::ReadWrite | RwPerms::WriteOnly => {
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// only clear ACL if it isn't already cleared
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if slot_mgr.get_acl(slot).unwrap().raw_u32() != 0 {
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if slot_mgr
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.get_acl(slot)
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.unwrap_or(AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0xFFFF_FFFF)))
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.raw_u32()
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!= 0
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{
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// clear the ACL so we can operate on the data
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slot_mgr
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.set_acl(
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&mut rram,
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slot,
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&AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)),
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)
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.expect("couldn't reset ACL");
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match slot_mgr.set_acl(
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&mut rram,
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slot,
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&AccessSettings::Data(DataSlotAccess::new_with_raw_value(0)),
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) {
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Ok(_) => (),
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Err(e) => {
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crate::println!("Couldn't erase ACL: {:?}", e);
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}
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}
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}
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let bytes = unsafe { slot_mgr.read_data_slot(data_index) };
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if bytes.iter().all(|&b| b == 0) {
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@ -109,22 +109,20 @@ impl KeyStore {
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// read key material
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ikm.extend_from_slice(self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap());
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#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
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{
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// analyze part of the key and print some informative statements during hazardous-debug
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// we want to make sure that keys are actually being initialized, erased, or denied
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// look at only 64 bits out of the 256 bit key - it's enough that it's highly unlikely that
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// these 64 bits would match any of the zero/erased values, but not so much that if a
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// dev image is accidentally signed & released that it'd be a serious threat to security
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// as you'd still have 192 bits of secret material
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let root_seed = self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap();
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if root_seed[..8] == [0u8; 8] {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZERO,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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} else if root_seed[..8] == [bao1x_hal::sigcheck::ERASE_VALUE; 8] {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ERASED,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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} else {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.KEYPASS,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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}
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// Analyze part of the key and print some informative statements.
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// We want to make sure that keys are actually being initialized, erased, or denied
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// look at only 64 bits out of the 256 bit key - it's enough that it's highly unlikely that
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// these 64 bits would match any of the zero/erased values, but not so much that if these
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// values are leaked, that it'd be a serious threat to security as you'd still have 192 bits of
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// secret material, not to mention all the additional nuisance keys and chaff keys yet to come.
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let root_seed = self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap();
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if root_seed[..8] == [0u8; 8] {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZERO,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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} else if root_seed[..8] == [bao1x_hal::sigcheck::ERASE_VALUE; 8] {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ERASED,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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} else {
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log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.KEYPASS,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
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}
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// build nuisance key offsets - this is direct readout hardening
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