Most of the changes introduced in this commit were rolled back,
but, there is now a test facility that's hanging out for the PDDB
to help with future debug efforts.
The patch was motivated by a problem observed in FSCB consistency
when it's updated. Ultimately the root cause was traced to a
cache coherence problem and it's fixed by a patch in the spinor
crate.
However, this patch still retains a check that the data is coherent,
in case the flushing routine isn't complete or some other factor
was missed. It also includes a large amount of commented-out code
that keeps a bit of history used to debug the problem -- eventually,
we can just cull that but it's kept around in case we got the
root cause wrong (or there were multiple causes and coherence is
just one of them).
this patch moves us off the branch we had to hop on for cipher
API compatibility to the one that's officially published by
RustCrypto. This closes#168.
turns out, they're pretty useless. I mean, for debugging actual
running code. it tells us basically what we know already which is
99.99% of the time is spent waiting on inter-thread messaging
in hosted mode.
We're trying to bring the AES version up so we can do CBC
(required for FIDO2) but unfortunately the aes-gcm-siv crate
is locked to an outdated version of AES, and this is blocking
on a type that is missing in the `block-ciphers` crate.
For now, we're using a patched version of aes-gcm-siv from
rozbb's repo, which allows us to move forward, but this needs
to be reverted once a new version of the official crate is patched.
A lot of packages are depending on 0.6 api, which requires a crate
that has OS specific TRNG calls. This patch keeps the 0.5 calls
inside the TRNG crate as direct API calls, and migrates to support
a 0.6 api to a patched version of getrandom that supports Xous.
Previous version was v0.0.1.1
New version is v0.0.2.1 (don't ask me why I skipped v0.0.2.0)
The most significant change is that the key derivation for the basis
is now split into two keys. One key is used for the page table ECB
encoding, and a different key is used for the data AES-GCM-SIV encoding.
This is because someone much smarter than me looked at my scheme
and said it is very dangerous to use the same key for two different
types of ciphers. This person is correct, so it had to be rectified.
For the System Basis, the keys are encrypted using the root keys
wrapper API. In this case, we simply create two random keys, one for
the page table, and one for the data region, and wrap them using
the root keys API.
For user secret Basis, the derived keys are sent through HKDF
with two different "info" strings to derive a pair of keys from
a common password.
In case the cryptographer who looked at this is reading along,
note that the basis name is encoded as a fixed-length, 0-padded
record, so, we don't encode the length of the basis in the hash
used to derive the keys. When I explained the scheme I thought
I was using a variable-length basis name to derive the key, but
when I checked the code, it's always 64 bytes long, and bytes
that are not used are 0-padded, so, I think we don't need the
length encoding field.
thanks again to Michael Rosenberg for catching this bug and
teaching about about how to use the Subtle/.ct_eq() traits to
implement constant time equality checks.
Each Cargo.toml now includes a comment which remnids maintainers
of the dependency policy for Xous (that is, nail down every dependency
to the minor number).
Versions are pinned down to the minor number. Yes, this means that
we don't automatically pull in features and bug updates from crates.io,
but it also means we don't pull in new attack surfaces and code that
hasn't been tested or reviewed. I'd like this process to be very deliberate
and not automatic for Xous.
The `rand` crate is almost pinned down to a single version, except
for an odd dependency that's pulled in by hosted mode that depends
on rand 0.8.4 via a subordinate dependency via the `tempfile` crate.
Pondering if it's worth it to try and eliminate that, because the
0.8.4 version doesn't get compiled into any version that touches
real hardware. It just makes it harder to analyze the Cargo.lock
file, mostly. I think I'll leave it as-is.
probably should have split this into two commits. oh well.
first part introduces a check to see if root keys are initialized,
and if so, tries to mount the PDDB. If it can't mount, it asks
the user if they want to format it. It also updates the progress
of the fromatting.
the second part redoes the salt once again. After some discussion
SHA512/256 is also resistant to length extension attacsk so we
don't need to use the HMAC technique suggested. Would prefer to
reduce the number of algos to analyze, so we're going to a simple
SHA512/256 hash of the salt/basis name/plaintext password to generate
the salt that goes into the bcrypt routine that ultimately generates
the final key used by the system.
based on feedback that the current mechanism is overly complicated
and doesn't add any real security, and it's better to stick with
something simple e.g. just a tried-and-true hash of the basics
Trying to find a new approach to making dialog boxes that
are cleaner and don't require as much code repetition. Probably
about to go on a long tangent.