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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
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convert salt to use an HMAC instead of SHA to harden against length extension attacks
(as reccommended by reviewer)
This commit is contained in:
parent
9910547e21
commit
6d655c8085
4 changed files with 45 additions and 35 deletions
21
Cargo.lock
generated
21
Cargo.lock
generated
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@ -521,6 +521,16 @@ dependencies = [
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"cfg-if 1.0.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "crypto-mac"
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version = "0.9.1"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "58bcd97a54c7ca5ce2f6eb16f6bede5b0ab5f0055fedc17d2f0b4466e21671ca"
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dependencies = [
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"generic-array",
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"subtle",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "csv"
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version = "1.1.5"
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@ -957,6 +967,16 @@ dependencies = [
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"proc-macro-hack",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "hmac"
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version = "0.9.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "deae6d9dbb35ec2c502d62b8f7b1c000a0822c3b0794ba36b3149c0a1c840dff"
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dependencies = [
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"crypto-mac",
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"digest",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "humantime"
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version = "1.3.0"
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@ -1452,6 +1472,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"cipher",
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"digest",
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"gam",
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"hmac",
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"llio",
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"locales",
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"log",
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@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ llio = {path="../llio"}
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# passwords
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sha2 = {path = "../engine-sha512"}
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hmac = "0.9.0"
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digest = "0.9"
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# bcrypt
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@ -59,6 +60,4 @@ mbbb = []
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deterministic = []
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# this flag adds CI tests to the build
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ci = []
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# selects the salt strategy; defaults to salt_v2 if salt_v1 is not present
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salt_v1 = []
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default = ["mbbb"]
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@ -15,6 +15,19 @@ pub(crate) const PDDB_VERSION: u32 = 0x00_00_00_01;
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub(crate) const PDDB_A_LEN: usize = 4 * 1024 * 1024;
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/// range for the starting point of a journal number, picked from a random seed
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/// the goal is to reduce info leakage about the age of structures relative to each other
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/// in various basis in case of partial disclosure of passwords (especially the system password)
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub(crate) const JOURNAL_RAND_RANGE: u32 = 1_000_000;
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/// fixed offset for system journal entries. If we get "unlucky" and a new system record has
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/// a low journal number, and then a basis entry has a lower journal number, we could conclude
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/// that this basis data is younger (because journal numbers start at a value and count up).
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/// By introducing a fixed offset on the system basis records, a lower offset on a basis entry
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/// is no longer such a surprising outcome (I hope...).
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#[allow(dead_code)]
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pub(crate) const JOURNAL_SYS_OFFSET: u32 = 100_000;
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/// A number between (0, 1] that defines how many of the "truly free" pages we
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/// should put into the FSCB. A value of 0.0 is not allowed as that leaves no free pages.
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/// A value of 1.0 would allow an attacker to deduce the real size of data because all
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@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use aes_gcm_siv::{Aes256GcmSiv, Nonce, Key, Tag};
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use aes_gcm_siv::aead::{Aead, NewAead, Payload};
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use aes::{Aes256, Block};
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use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, NewBlockCipher, generic_array::GenericArray};
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use hmac::NewMac;
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use root_keys::api::AesRootkeyType;
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use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
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use core::mem::size_of;
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@ -1341,7 +1342,8 @@ impl PddbOs {
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/// Derives a 256-bit AES encryption key for a basis given a basis name and its password.
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/// You will also need to derive the AAD for the basis using the basis_name.
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pub(crate) fn basis_derive_key(&self, basis_name: &str, password: &str) -> [u8; AES_KEYSIZE] {
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use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha512, Sha512Trunc256};
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use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha256, Sha512Trunc256};
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use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
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use digest::Digest;
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use backend::bcrypt::*;
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@ -1358,41 +1360,16 @@ impl PddbOs {
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}
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plaintext_pw[72] = 0; // always null terminate
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log::info!("making hasher");
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let mut hasher = Sha512::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
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hasher.update(&bname_copy);
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hasher.update(&plaintext_pw);
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/*
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v1 salt: takes Sha512 hash of {basis name, plaintext password}, and uses the bits of the hash
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to sequence through a lookup table of salt values. It was noted that this process actually could
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reduce entropy, and it's complicated and hard to analyze without necessarily adding any security.
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v2 salt: takes Sha512 hash of {basis name, plaintext password, salt region}, and uses the first
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16 bytes as the salt to the bcrypt algorithm. This is much "simpler" and hopefully easier to analyze
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for problems. We use the full salt region only because we already have it, we could, of course,
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go to a shorter string if for some reason that was a better idea.
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*/
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#[cfg(feature="salt_v1")]
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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// 2. now derive the actual salt by using indices from the digest to progressively
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// index into the salt table.
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log::info!("creating salt");
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// uses an HMAC keyed with the salt array to generate a compressed version of
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// the basis name and plaintext password, which forms the Salt that is fed into bcrypt
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let scd = self.static_crypto_data_get();
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let mut salt = [0u8; 16];
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log::info!("got scd");
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#[cfg(feature="salt_v1")]
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for (index_bytes, dst) in digest.chunks(2).into_iter().zip(salt.iter_mut()) {
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let index = u16::from_le_bytes(index_bytes.try_into().unwrap()) as usize % scd.salt_base.len();
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*dst = scd.salt_base[index];
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log::info!("index: {}, dst: {}", index as usize % scd.salt_base.len(), *dst);
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}
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#[cfg(not(feature="salt_v1"))]
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hasher.update(&scd.salt_base);
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#[cfg(not(feature="salt_v1"))]
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let digest = hasher.finalize();
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#[cfg(not(feature="salt_v1"))]
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for (&src, dst) in digest.iter().zip(salt.iter_mut()) {
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let mut mac = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_varkey(&scd.salt_base).expect("Couldn't build HMAC");
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mac.update(&bname_copy);
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mac.update(&plaintext_pw);
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let result = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
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for (&src, dst) in result.iter().zip(salt.iter_mut()) {
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*dst = src;
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}
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log::info!("derived salt: {:x?}", salt);
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