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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-15 08:30:02 +00:00
fix key commitment check to be constant time
thanks again to Michael Rosenberg for catching this bug and teaching about about how to use the Subtle/.ct_eq() traits to implement constant time equality checks.
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3 changed files with 15 additions and 24 deletions
5
Cargo.lock
generated
5
Cargo.lock
generated
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@ -1527,6 +1527,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"root-keys",
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"sha2",
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"spinor",
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"subtle",
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"susres",
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"ticktimer-server",
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"trng",
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@ -2278,9 +2279,9 @@ checksum = "73473c0e59e6d5812c5dfe2a064a6444949f089e20eec9a2e5506596494e4623"
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[[package]]
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name = "subtle"
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version = "2.4.0"
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version = "2.4.1"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "1e81da0851ada1f3e9d4312c704aa4f8806f0f9d69faaf8df2f3464b4a9437c2"
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checksum = "6bdef32e8150c2a081110b42772ffe7d7c9032b606bc226c8260fd97e0976601"
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[[package]]
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name = "susres"
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@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ cipher = "0.3.0"
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bitfield = "0.13.2"
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aes-gcm-siv = "0.10.3"
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llio = {path="../llio"}
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subtle = {version = "2.4.1", default-features = false}
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# passwords
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sha2 = {path = "../engine-sha512"}
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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use aes::{Aes256, Block, BLOCK_SIZE};
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use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, NewBlockCipher, generic_array::GenericArray};
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use root_keys::api::AesRootkeyType;
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use spinor::SPINOR_BULK_ERASE_SIZE;
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use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
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use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
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use core::mem::size_of;
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@ -1171,33 +1172,21 @@ impl PddbOs {
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let (kenc, kcom) = self.kcom_func(key.try_into().unwrap(), &nonce_comm);
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let cipher = Aes256GcmSiv::new(Key::from_slice(&kenc));
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match cipher.decrypt(
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// Attempt decryption. This is None on failure
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let plaintext = cipher.decrypt(
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Nonce::from_slice(nonce),
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Payload {
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aad,
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msg: &ct_plus_mac,
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}
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) {
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Ok(data) => {
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assert!(data.len() == KCOM_CT_LEN, "authentication successful, but wrong amount of data was recovered");
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if kcom == key_comm_stored {
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Some(data)
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} else {
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log::debug!("Key commitment failed to match on a reputed basis root block");
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None
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}
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},
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Err(e) => {
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// do the commit check again at the same point, even if there is an error, for some semblance of constant time
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// (of course the error messages leak information, if they are forced on)
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if kcom == key_comm_stored {
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log::trace!("Error decrypting page: {:?}", e); // sometimes this is totally "normal", like when we're testing for valid data.
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None
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} else {
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log::trace!("Error decrypting page + commitment error: {:?}", e);
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None
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}
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}
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).ok();
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// Only return the plaintext if the stored key commitment agrees with the computed one
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if kcom.ct_eq(&key_comm_stored).into() {
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plaintext
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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