proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py

"""The LTL website, served at the log's base path — one self-contained HTML
page (inline CSS + inline SVG, no external assets: works air-gapped behind
any reverse proxy). Rendered from the LIVE log state, so the graphic and
every number on the page are the accumulator, not a brochure about it."""
from __future__ import annotations

from html import escape
from typing import Any

from pacta.transparency import node_hash

from .transparency_log import LogEntry, TransparencyLog

_STYLE = """
 :root{--ink:#1c2430;--ink2:#5a6675;--line:#dde2e9;--ok:#1e7f4f;--okbg:#e2f2e9;
       --warn:#a86a10;--warnbg:#fdf0da;--accent:#3b4d8f;--accentbg:#eef0f7;--bg:#f8f9fa}
 *{box-sizing:border-box}
 body{font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:66rem;margin:0 auto;padding:2rem 1.2rem 4rem;
      color:var(--ink);line-height:1.6;background:var(--bg)}
 h1{font-size:2rem;margin:.2rem 0 0;letter-spacing:-.01em}
 h2{font-size:1.2rem;margin-top:2.6rem;border-bottom:2px solid var(--line);padding-bottom:.3rem}
 .tagline{font-size:1.05rem;color:var(--ink2);max-width:46rem}
 code,pre{font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;background:#eef0f3;border-radius:4px}
 code{padding:.1rem .3rem;font-size:.9em} pre{padding:.9rem;overflow-x:auto;font-size:.85rem}
 table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;font-size:.93rem;background:#fff}
 td,th{border:1px solid var(--line);padding:.5rem .7rem;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}
 th{background:var(--accentbg)}
 .pill{display:inline-block;border-radius:9px;padding:.08rem .6rem;font-size:.78rem;font-weight:600}
 .ok{background:var(--okbg);color:var(--ok)} .warn{background:var(--warnbg);color:var(--warn)}
 .acc{background:var(--accentbg);color:var(--accent)}
 .muted{color:var(--ink2);font-size:.9rem}
 .card{background:#fff;border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:8px;padding:1rem 1.2rem;margin:.8rem 0}
 .steps{counter-reset:s} .steps .card{position:relative;padding-left:3.2rem}
 .steps .card::before{counter-increment:s;content:counter(s);position:absolute;left:1rem;top:1rem;
   width:1.6rem;height:1.6rem;border-radius:50%;background:var(--accent);color:#fff;
   display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;font-weight:700;font-size:.9rem}
 svg{max-width:100%;height:auto;display:block;margin:1rem auto;background:#fff;
     border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:8px}
 a{color:var(--accent)}
 .legend{display:flex;gap:1.4rem;flex-wrap:wrap;font-size:.85rem;color:var(--ink2);justify-content:center}
 .sw{display:inline-block;width:.8rem;height:.8rem;border-radius:3px;vertical-align:-1px;margin-right:.3rem}
"""


def _leaf_ok(entry: LogEntry) -> bool:
    certificates = ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("certificates")) or []
    return bool(certificates) and all(
        certificate.get("status") == "proven" and certificate.get("axiom_status") == "clean"
        for certificate in certificates
    )


def _svg_tree(entries: list[LogEntry], root_hex: str, signing_backend: str, head_label: str = "Ed25519") -> str:
    """The accumulator, drawn from its real leaves."""
    if not entries:
        return "<p class='muted'>(log is empty)</p>"
    hashes = [bytes.fromhex(entry.leaf_hash) for entry in entries]
    levels: list[list[bytes]] = [hashes]
    while len(levels[-1]) > 1:
        level = levels[-1]
        nxt = [node_hash(level[i], level[i + 1]) for i in range(0, len(level) - 1, 2)]
        if len(level) % 2:
            nxt.append(level[-1])
        levels.append(nxt)
    width, level_gap = 1000, 86
    height = 150 + level_gap * len(levels)
    out = [f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 {width} {height}" font-family="ui-monospace,monospace" font-size="11">']
    positions: dict[tuple[int, int], tuple[float, float]] = {}
    for level_index, level in enumerate(levels):
        y = height - 56 - level_index * level_gap
        span = width / (len(level) + 1)
        for node_index, node in enumerate(level):
            x = span * (node_index + 1)
            positions[(level_index, node_index)] = (x, y)
            if level_index == 0:
                entry = entries[node_index]
                ok = _leaf_ok(entry)
                component = (((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("subject")) or {}).get("component", "?")
                fill, stroke = ("#e2f2e9", "#1e7f4f") if ok else ("#f4f4f6", "#8a93a0")
                out.append(f'<rect x="{x-56}" y="{y-22}" width="112" height="44" rx="5" fill="{fill}" stroke="{stroke}" stroke-width="1.4"/>')
                out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y-6}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#333">leaf {node_index}</text>')
                short = escape(str(component).replace("-ed25519-verified", ""))
                label = short if ok else f"{short} ✗"
                out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+8}" text-anchor="middle" fill="{stroke}">{label}</text>')
                out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+19}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#999" font-size="9">{node.hex()[:10]}…</text>')
            else:
                is_root = level_index == len(levels) - 1
                out.append(f'<rect x="{x-50}" y="{y-15}" width="100" height="30" rx="5" fill="{"#eef0f7" if is_root else "#fff"}" stroke="{"#3b4d8f" if is_root else "#bbb"}" stroke-width="{1.6 if is_root else 1}"/>')
                out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y-2}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#333">{"ROOT" if is_root else "node"}</text>')
                out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+10}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#999" font-size="9">{node.hex()[:10]}…</text>')
                for child in (2 * node_index, 2 * node_index + 1):
                    if (level_index - 1, child) in positions:
                        cx, cy = positions[(level_index - 1, child)]
                        out.append(f'<line x1="{x}" y1="{y+15}" x2="{cx}" y2="{cy-22 if level_index==1 else cy-15}" stroke="#ccc"/>')
    root_x, root_y = positions[(len(levels) - 1, 0)]
    out.append(f'<rect x="{root_x-190}" y="{root_y-72}" width="380" height="34" rx="6" fill="#e2f2e9" stroke="#1e7f4f" stroke-width="1.6"/>')
    out.append(f'<text x="{root_x}" y="{root_y-58}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#1e7f4f" font-weight="bold">Signed Tree Head — {escape(head_label)}({root_hex[:12]}…)</text>')
    out.append(f'<text x="{root_x}" y="{root_y-46}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#1e7f4f" font-size="9">signed by: {escape(signing_backend)} (the proof-attested library itself)</text>')
    out.append(f'<line x1="{root_x}" y1="{root_y-38}" x2="{root_x}" y2="{root_y-15}" stroke="#1e7f4f" stroke-width="1.4"/>')
    out.append("</svg>")
    return "".join(out)


def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str, mirror: str) -> str:
    """The provider public key, displayed in full on the front page. The key
    is the one thing a consumer takes on trust, once - hiding it behind a
    path would invert the page's priorities."""
    key_path = log.log_dir / "provider.ed25519.pub"
    fingerprint = str(metadata.get("ed25519_public_key_fingerprint_sha256", ""))
    if not key_path.is_file():
        return (
            '<div class="card"><span class="pill warn">missing</span> This deployment '
            "does not expose its public key in the log directory - fetch it from the "
            f'<a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror</a> instead.</div>'
        )
    pem = escape(key_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip())
    # The SLH-DSA verification key (additive post-quantum head signature,
    # 2026-08) is published THE SAME WAY: full PEM on the page, raw endpoint,
    # mirror comparison. Heads before tree 14 carry no SLH-DSA signature and
    # verify.py reports them ABSENT — allowed; an append-only log keeps its
    # history.
    slh_path = log.log_dir / "provider.slhdsa.pub"
    if slh_path.is_file():
        import hashlib as _h
        slh_pem = escape(slh_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip())
        slh_fp = _h.sha256(slh_path.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
        slh_block = f"""<hr style="border:none;border-top:1px solid #ddd;margin:.8rem 0">
<p style="margin-top:0"><strong>Second, additive anchor — post-quantum.</strong> Heads from
tree&nbsp;14 on additionally carry a deterministic <strong>SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s</strong> (FIPS&nbsp;205)
signature over the same payload. The Ed25519 signature above remains the one every consumer must
check; this one is checked where tooling allows (OpenSSL&nbsp;≥&nbsp;3.5). Its verify path is the
proof subject of leaf&nbsp;18.</p>
<pre style="margin-bottom:.4rem">{slh_pem}</pre>
<p class="muted" style="margin:.2rem 0 0">SHA-256 fingerprint <code>{slh_fp}</code>
&nbsp;·&nbsp; raw: <a href="{base}/log-slhdsa-public-key"><code>{base or ''}/log-slhdsa-public-key</code></a>
&nbsp;·&nbsp; mirror: <a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.slhdsa.pub">provider.slhdsa.pub</a></p>"""
    else:
        slh_block = ""
    return f"""<div class="card">
<p style="margin-top:0">This key is the <strong>sole cryptographic identity anchor</strong>: it
authenticates that these statements were made by the operator (the same party the artifacts call “the provider”). It does not, by itself, make
those statements true — each attestation's truth additionally rests on the replay, theorem,
extraction and toolchain assumptions stated in that leaf (one signed entry of the tree below). Every tree head and attestation is
signature-checked against this key.
Pin it (save your own copy; from then on trust only what checks against that copy), and compare this copy byte-for-byte with the independently hosted
<a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror copy</a>; they must be identical. The first fetch is trust-on-first-use; the two-host byte-comparison is what bounds it.</p>
<pre style="margin-bottom:.4rem">{pem}</pre>
<p class="muted" style="margin:.2rem 0 0">SHA-256 fingerprint <code>{escape(fingerprint)}</code>
&nbsp;·&nbsp; raw: <a href="{base}/log-public-key"><code>{base or ''}/log-public-key</code></a>
&nbsp;·&nbsp; <code>curl -s https://ltl.zkdefi.org/log-public-key</code></p>
{slh_block}</div>"""


def render_docs(log: TransparencyLog, base_path: str) -> str:
    base = "/" + base_path.strip("/") if base_path.strip("/") else ""
    metadata = log.metadata()
    history = log.sth_history()
    latest: dict[str, Any] = history[-1] if history else {}
    entries = log.entries()
    ed = (latest.get("signatures") or {}).get("ed25519") or {}
    provenance = ed.get("signing_provenance") or {}
    signing_backend = str(ed.get("signing_backend", "openssl"))
    # newest entry per component, with its real proven/total from the leaf
    newest: dict[str, Any] = {}
    for entry in entries:
        if not _leaf_ok(entry):
            continue
        comp = ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("subject") or {}).get("component")
        if comp:
            newest[comp] = entry
    def _counts(entry) -> str:
        certs = ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("certificates")) or []
        total = len(certs)
        proven = sum(1 for c in certs
                     if c.get("status") == "proven" and c.get("axiom_status") == "clean")
        return f"{proven}/{total} proven"
    components = sorted(newest)
    mirror = "https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log"
    rows = "".join(
        f"<tr><td><code>{escape(c)}</code></td>"
        f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/attestation?component={escape(c)}'>attestation</a></td>"
        f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/proof?component={escape(c)}'>inclusion proof</a></td>"
        f"<td><span class='pill ok'>{escape(_counts(newest[c]))}</span></td></tr>"
        for c in components
    )
    slh_signed = ((latest.get("signatures") or {}).get("slh_dsa") or {}).get("status") == "signed"
    head_label = "Ed25519 + SLH-DSA" if slh_signed else "Ed25519"
    tree_svg = _svg_tree(entries, str(latest.get("root_hash", "")), signing_backend, head_label)

    return f"""<!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>LTL — Lean Transparency Log</title><style>{_STYLE}</style></head><body>

<p class="muted" style="margin-bottom:0">zkdefi
· <a href="https://blog.zkdefi.org/">notes</a>
· <a href="https://zkdefi.org/saymrwulf">code</a>
· <a href="https://zkdefi.com/">cv</a></p>
<h1>LTL — the Lean Transparency Log</h1>
<p class="tagline"><strong>One sentence:</strong> a public, append-only Merkle
accumulator (a hash tree that only ever grows) of <em>signed statements that the <a href="https://lean-lang.org">Lean&nbsp;4</a> formal proofs of specific
cryptographic Rust libraries, at specific git commits, re-check by machine with exactly
their documented assumptions</em> — so that you can trust a proof result by checking
<strong>one required signature (Ed25519) and ~{max(1,(latest.get('tree_size') or 1).bit_length())} hashes in
milliseconds</strong>, instead of running a theorem prover for hours.</p>

<h2>The trust anchor — pin this key</h2>
{_trust_anchor_html(log, metadata, base, mirror)}

<h2>The accumulator, live</h2>
{tree_svg}
<p class="legend">
<span><span class="sw" style="background:#e2f2e9;border:1px solid #1e7f4f"></span>verified attestation (all certificates proven, axiom cones boundary-exact)</span>
<span><span class="sw" style="background:#f4f4f6;border:1px solid #8a93a0"></span>historical audit-failure attestation — kept forever; an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day (leaves&nbsp;0–3: an early audit round that failed; leaves&nbsp;4–7 re-attest the same four libraries cleanly)</span>
</p>
<p class="muted">Every box above is computed from the live log at page render — leaf hashes,
internal nodes, the root, and the signature are the real ones. The code that signs the log is itself an entry in the log — and checks its own entry before signing. In detail: before signing this
root, the provider Merkle-verified its own signing library's leaf
(index {provenance.get('signing_library_leaf_index','?')},
certificates {escape(str(provenance.get('signing_library_certificates_proven','?')))})
against this very tree — so the signed tree <em>contains</em> an attestation of the source the
operator reports its signing binary was built from. (An Ed25519 signature cannot by itself prove
which binary generated it; execution provenance is reported, not proven, and the provenance
fields live in the unsigned signature metadata.) Tree size {latest.get('tree_size',0)},
log id <code>{escape(str(metadata.get('log_id',''))[:16])}…</code>.</p>

<h2>What do I download? — the three artifacts, unambiguously</h2>
<p>To benefit from the accumulator you need <strong>exactly three files</strong> per
library, plus optionally the whole mirror. Nothing else.</p>
<table>
<tr><th>#</th><th>Artifact</th><th>What it is</th><th>Where</th></tr>
<tr><td><b>1</b></td><td><code>provider.ed25519.pub</code></td>
<td><strong>The identity anchor.</strong> The provider's public key — the sole cryptographic
identity you pin. It authenticates the operator's statements; their truth rests on each leaf's
stated assumptions. Fetch it from BOTH independent locations and compare; the copies must be
identical.</td>
<td><a href="{base}/log-public-key">this site</a> · <a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror</a></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>2</b></td><td><code>&lt;library&gt;.attestation.json</code></td>
<td><strong>The claim.</strong> Which repo, which exact git commit, which theorems,
which observed axiom cones (the exact set of assumptions each proof ultimately rests on), what machine protection — signed by the provider.</td>
<td>table below, or <a href="{mirror}">mirror</a> <code>entries/</code></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>3</b></td><td><code>&lt;library&gt;.receipt.json</code></td>
<td><strong>The proof of inclusion.</strong> Binds artifact&nbsp;2 into the signed tree:
leaf index, sibling hashes, the Signed Tree Head (STH). A one-page Python core verifies it — printed as Appendix&nbsp;C of the paper; the shipped <code>verify.py</code> wraps that core with full fail-closed binding checks (stdlib hashing; signature checks shell out to the <code>openssl</code> binary).</td>
<td>table below, or <a href="{mirror}">mirror</a> <code>receipts/</code></td></tr>
<tr><td>+</td><td>the full mirror clone</td>
<td><strong>Maximal benefit: become a witness.</strong> Every leaf + every signed head
ever issued + <code>verify.py</code> (Python stdlib + the <code>openssl</code> binary for
signatures; fails closed without them). <code>python3 verify.py --all</code>
recomputes the entire tree and every historical head — you then hold a retained view that can
later EXPOSE a conflicting head shown to someone else. (A single clone cannot by itself prove the
log never split its view toward another consumer; that requires comparing heads across
consumers.)</td>
<td><code>git clone {mirror}</code></td></tr>
</table>

<h2>Attested libraries</h2>
<table><tr><th>component</th><th>artifact 2</th><th>artifact 3</th><th>status</th></tr>{rows}</table>

<p class="muted">One certificate = one machine-checked theorem together with its exact assumption set (its axiom cone).</p>

<h2>Three ways to use it</h2>
<div class="steps">
<div class="card"><strong>Quick check</strong> (any machine, milliseconds): download
artifacts 1–3, then<br>
<code>pacta receipt-verify --attestation … --receipt … --log-public-key provider.ed25519.pub</code>
<br><span class="muted">No Lean, no Rust, no account. The <code>pacta</code> CLI ships in the <a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta repository</a> (<code>pip install .</code> from a clone). Add <code>--sth-store pins.json</code> to remember every Signed Tree Head (STH) you accept — your defense against a split view (the operator showing different histories to different consumers).</span></div>
<div class="card"><strong>Zero-install audit</strong>: <code>git clone {mirror} &amp;&amp; cd lean-transparency-log &amp;&amp; python3 verify.py --all</code>
<br><span class="muted">Standard-library Python plus the system <code>openssl</code> binary (signature checks fail closed without it). You become a witness of the whole history.</span></div>
<div class="card"><strong>Autonomous agent</strong>: the <a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta</a>
tool adds STH pinning, freshness policy, online refresh from this service, risk scoring
(R0–R5, six named residual-risk classes) with policy-gated consequences, and optionally verifies every signature through
the proof-attested Ed25519 code path itself (<code>--require-verified-verifier</code>).</div>
</div>

<h2>API</h2>
<pre>GET {base}/v1/sth                      latest Signed Tree Head
GET {base}/v1/sth-history              the published head history (witness material)
GET {base}/v1/sth-consistency?first=N  consistency proof from your pinned size
GET {base}/v1/proof?component=NAME     inclusion proof (artifact 3, freshly issued)
GET {base}/v1/attestation?component=NAME   the claim (artifact 2)
GET {base}/v1/entries?start=N&amp;end=M    raw leaves
GET {base}/v1/metadata                 log identity
GET {base}/healthz</pre>

<h2>What a verified inclusion means — and what it does not</h2>
<div class="card"><span class="pill ok">means</span> The provider whose key you hold
attests: the Lean proofs of the named repository at the named git commit re-check with
exactly the documented assumptions — and this signed head irrevocably commits that statement to
this view. Consumers who compare heads, or retain the public mirror, can expose any conflicting
view.</div>
<div class="card"><span class="pill warn">does not mean</span> A verified binary. The
proofs cover Rust <em>source</em>; clone the attested commit (the commit id identifies the
committed git tree — not external dependencies, toolchain downloads, or generated artifacts) and
build it yourself — compiler and build are declared trusted base (assumed, not proven)
until the reproducible-builds program lands and retires risk class R5. Every attestation carries its full
residual-risk list — the enumerated assumptions inside its <code>attestation.json</code>. Honesty about the boundary is the product.</div>

<h2>You hold the ruler</h2>
<div class="card">The list of assumptions a certificate is <em>allowed</em> to rest on
is not something this site hands you at verification time — it is a
<strong>requirements card</strong> that lives in <em>your</em> tooling, on
<em>your</em> disk, and that you can read in five minutes or rewrite from first
principles: Lean's three foundational axioms, plus — for the signature tiers only (the top proof layers, where full signature verification is proven) —
named placeholders for SHA-512 and the wire format. Your tooling ignores this
operator's pass/fail labels entirely and re-derives every verdict by comparing the
attestation's <em>observed</em> axiom list (its cone) against <em>your</em> card, name by name.
The operator is trusted to copy down what the proof kernel printed — never to
interpret it.</div>
<div class="card">A card you write yourself will match this log's supply
<strong>exactly</strong> — and that is engineered, not coincidence: the corpus was
shrunk until every remaining axiom justifies its existence. If your card is
<em>stricter</em> (say: "SHA-512 itself must be proven"), there is nothing here to
negotiate — the gap is itemized, never blurred, and you have three honest options:
accept a <em>named</em> line item, walk away, or prove the missing piece and enter it
into this same log. <strong>If your ruler is stricter than our supply, your ruler is
our roadmap.</strong> (The full walk-through is lecture&nbsp;11 of the Jupyter course in the
<a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta repo</a>.)</div>

<h2>The paper</h2>
<div class="card"><a href="{base}/paper"><strong>Accountable Distribution of Machine-Checked
Correctness Evidence: A Transparency Model and the Lean Transparency Log</strong></a>
(PDF, 25 pages, <strong>v0.11 — revised August&nbsp;2026</strong>; the version is printed on the
title page) — the trust decomposition (expensive verification produces an
observation; transparency makes the observation accountable; consumer-local policy decides
acceptance), collision-extracting soundness for inclusion and consistency, scheme-level
accountability GAMES with an explicit composition theorem (head authenticity, position
binding, history binding with a fully proved prefix-transport induction, context-scoped
fork evidence — all discharged by named reductions), the policy boundary where
operator labels can veto but never grant acceptance, and the measured model/deployment
divergence reported as a result rather than hidden — now together with its closure: the
divergence traced to one omitted RFC&nbsp;9162 conjunct (Step&nbsp;7's <code>sn&nbsp;=&nbsp;0</code>),
zero divergences after the one-line restoration, confirmed by a three-way regression.
New in v0.11: the deployment evaluated to its current nineteen-leaf, dual-signed state, an
instantiation section for the SLH-DSA (FIPS&nbsp;205) verify path — eleven certificates,
five uninterpreted hash oracles, exact cones — and a certificate appendix mirroring the
Ed25519 tiers.</div>

<div class="card"><strong>Paper and log, one story.</strong> Since v0.11 the paper
describes this deployment as it runs — nineteen leaves, dual-signed heads, the
post-quantum verify path as leaf&nbsp;18 with its own certificate appendix. The log is
append-only and keeps growing past any paper revision; every number the paper states
stays checkable against the retained history: <code>python3 verify.py --all</code>
re-verifies all of it, paper-era and after, from a clone of the mirror.</div>

<p class="muted">Log heads are signed offline; this service is read-only and holds no
key material. Provider tooling, agent tooling, and the full Jupyter course live in the <a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta repository</a>.</p>
</body></html>"""