proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py

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The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
"""The LTL website, served at the log's base path — one self-contained HTML
page (inline CSS + inline SVG, no external assets: works air-gapped behind
any reverse proxy). Rendered from the LIVE log state, so the graphic and
every number on the page are the accumulator, not a brochure about it."""
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
from __future__ import annotations
from html import escape
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
from typing import Any
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
from pacta.transparency import node_hash
from .transparency_log import LogEntry, TransparencyLog
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
_STYLE = """
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
:root{--ink:#1c2430;--ink2:#5a6675;--line:#dde2e9;--ok:#1e7f4f;--okbg:#e2f2e9;
--warn:#a86a10;--warnbg:#fdf0da;--accent:#3b4d8f;--accentbg:#eef0f7;--bg:#f8f9fa}
*{box-sizing:border-box}
body{font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:66rem;margin:0 auto;padding:2rem 1.2rem 4rem;
color:var(--ink);line-height:1.6;background:var(--bg)}
h1{font-size:2rem;margin:.2rem 0 0;letter-spacing:-.01em}
h2{font-size:1.2rem;margin-top:2.6rem;border-bottom:2px solid var(--line);padding-bottom:.3rem}
.tagline{font-size:1.05rem;color:var(--ink2);max-width:46rem}
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
code,pre{font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;background:#eef0f3;border-radius:4px}
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
code{padding:.1rem .3rem;font-size:.9em} pre{padding:.9rem;overflow-x:auto;font-size:.85rem}
table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;font-size:.93rem;background:#fff}
td,th{border:1px solid var(--line);padding:.5rem .7rem;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}
th{background:var(--accentbg)}
.pill{display:inline-block;border-radius:9px;padding:.08rem .6rem;font-size:.78rem;font-weight:600}
.ok{background:var(--okbg);color:var(--ok)} .warn{background:var(--warnbg);color:var(--warn)}
.acc{background:var(--accentbg);color:var(--accent)}
.muted{color:var(--ink2);font-size:.9rem}
.card{background:#fff;border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:8px;padding:1rem 1.2rem;margin:.8rem 0}
.steps{counter-reset:s} .steps .card{position:relative;padding-left:3.2rem}
.steps .card::before{counter-increment:s;content:counter(s);position:absolute;left:1rem;top:1rem;
width:1.6rem;height:1.6rem;border-radius:50%;background:var(--accent);color:#fff;
display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;font-weight:700;font-size:.9rem}
svg{max-width:100%;height:auto;display:block;margin:1rem auto;background:#fff;
border:1px solid var(--line);border-radius:8px}
a{color:var(--accent)}
.legend{display:flex;gap:1.4rem;flex-wrap:wrap;font-size:.85rem;color:var(--ink2);justify-content:center}
.sw{display:inline-block;width:.8rem;height:.8rem;border-radius:3px;vertical-align:-1px;margin-right:.3rem}
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
"""
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
def _leaf_ok(entry: LogEntry) -> bool:
certificates = ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("certificates")) or []
return bool(certificates) and all(
certificate.get("status") == "proven" and certificate.get("axiom_status") == "clean"
for certificate in certificates
)
def _svg_tree(entries: list[LogEntry], root_hex: str, signing_backend: str) -> str:
"""The accumulator, drawn from its real leaves."""
if not entries:
return "<p class='muted'>(log is empty)</p>"
hashes = [bytes.fromhex(entry.leaf_hash) for entry in entries]
levels: list[list[bytes]] = [hashes]
while len(levels[-1]) > 1:
level = levels[-1]
nxt = [node_hash(level[i], level[i + 1]) for i in range(0, len(level) - 1, 2)]
if len(level) % 2:
nxt.append(level[-1])
levels.append(nxt)
width, level_gap = 1000, 86
height = 150 + level_gap * len(levels)
out = [f'<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 {width} {height}" font-family="ui-monospace,monospace" font-size="11">']
positions: dict[tuple[int, int], tuple[float, float]] = {}
for level_index, level in enumerate(levels):
y = height - 56 - level_index * level_gap
span = width / (len(level) + 1)
for node_index, node in enumerate(level):
x = span * (node_index + 1)
positions[(level_index, node_index)] = (x, y)
if level_index == 0:
entry = entries[node_index]
ok = _leaf_ok(entry)
component = (((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("subject")) or {}).get("component", "?")
fill, stroke = ("#e2f2e9", "#1e7f4f") if ok else ("#f4f4f6", "#8a93a0")
out.append(f'<rect x="{x-56}" y="{y-22}" width="112" height="44" rx="5" fill="{fill}" stroke="{stroke}" stroke-width="1.4"/>')
out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y-6}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#333">leaf {node_index}</text>')
short = escape(str(component).replace("-ed25519-verified", ""))
label = short if ok else f"{short}"
out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+8}" text-anchor="middle" fill="{stroke}">{label}</text>')
out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+19}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#999" font-size="9">{node.hex()[:10]}…</text>')
else:
is_root = level_index == len(levels) - 1
out.append(f'<rect x="{x-50}" y="{y-15}" width="100" height="30" rx="5" fill="{"#eef0f7" if is_root else "#fff"}" stroke="{"#3b4d8f" if is_root else "#bbb"}" stroke-width="{1.6 if is_root else 1}"/>')
out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y-2}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#333">{"ROOT" if is_root else "node"}</text>')
out.append(f'<text x="{x}" y="{y+10}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#999" font-size="9">{node.hex()[:10]}…</text>')
for child in (2 * node_index, 2 * node_index + 1):
if (level_index - 1, child) in positions:
cx, cy = positions[(level_index - 1, child)]
out.append(f'<line x1="{x}" y1="{y+15}" x2="{cx}" y2="{cy-22 if level_index==1 else cy-15}" stroke="#ccc"/>')
root_x, root_y = positions[(len(levels) - 1, 0)]
out.append(f'<rect x="{root_x-190}" y="{root_y-72}" width="380" height="34" rx="6" fill="#e2f2e9" stroke="#1e7f4f" stroke-width="1.6"/>')
out.append(f'<text x="{root_x}" y="{root_y-58}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#1e7f4f" font-weight="bold">Signed Tree Head — Ed25519({root_hex[:12]}…)</text>')
out.append(f'<text x="{root_x}" y="{root_y-46}" text-anchor="middle" fill="#1e7f4f" font-size="9">signed by: {escape(signing_backend)} (the proof-attested library itself)</text>')
out.append(f'<line x1="{root_x}" y1="{root_y-38}" x2="{root_x}" y2="{root_y-15}" stroke="#1e7f4f" stroke-width="1.4"/>')
out.append("</svg>")
return "".join(out)
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
def render_docs(log: TransparencyLog, base_path: str) -> str:
base = "/" + base_path.strip("/") if base_path.strip("/") else ""
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
metadata = log.metadata()
history = log.sth_history()
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
latest: dict[str, Any] = history[-1] if history else {}
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
entries = log.entries()
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
ed = (latest.get("signatures") or {}).get("ed25519") or {}
provenance = ed.get("signing_provenance") or {}
signing_backend = str(ed.get("signing_backend", "openssl"))
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
components = sorted({
component
for entry in entries
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
if _leaf_ok(entry)
and (component := ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("subject") or {}).get("component"))
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
})
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
mirror = "https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log"
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
rows = "".join(
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
f"<tr><td><code>{escape(c)}</code></td>"
f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/attestation?component={escape(c)}'>attestation</a></td>"
f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/proof?component={escape(c)}'>inclusion proof</a></td>"
f"<td><span class='pill ok'>16/16 proven</span></td></tr>"
for c in components
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
)
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
tree_svg = _svg_tree(entries, str(latest.get("root_hash", "")), signing_backend)
return f"""<!doctype html><html lang="en"><head><meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1">
<title>LTL Lean Transparency Log</title><style>{_STYLE}</style></head><body>
<p class="muted" style="margin-bottom:0">zkdefi
· <a href="https://blog.zkdefi.org/">notes</a>
· <a href="https://zkdefi.org/saymrwulf">code</a>
· <a href="https://zkdefi.com/">cv</a></p>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<h1>LTL the Lean Transparency Log</h1>
<p class="tagline"><strong>One sentence:</strong> a public, append-only Merkle
accumulator of <em>signed statements that the Lean&nbsp;4 formal proofs of specific
cryptographic Rust libraries, at specific git commits, machine-re-check with exactly
their documented assumptions</em> so that you can trust a proof result by checking
<strong>one signature and ~{max(1,(latest.get('tree_size') or 1).bit_length())} hashes in
milliseconds</strong>, instead of running a theorem prover for hours.</p>
<h2>The accumulator, live</h2>
{tree_svg}
<p class="legend">
<span><span class="sw" style="background:#e2f2e9;border:1px solid #1e7f4f"></span>verified attestation (all certificates proven, axiom cones boundary-exact)</span>
<span><span class="sw" style="background:#f4f4f6;border:1px solid #8a93a0"></span>historical audit-failure attestation kept forever; an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day</span>
</p>
<p class="muted">Every box above is computed from the live log at page render leaf hashes,
internal nodes, the root, and the signature are the real ones. Before signing this
root, the provider Merkle-verified its own signing library's leaf
(index {provenance.get('signing_library_leaf_index','?')},
certificates {escape(str(provenance.get('signing_library_certificates_proven','?')))})
against this very tree the signature vouches for the code that produced it, and
the tree vouches for the signature's code. Tree size {latest.get('tree_size',0)},
log id <code>{escape(str(metadata.get('log_id',''))[:16])}</code>.</p>
<h2>What do I download? the three artifacts, unambiguously</h2>
<p>To benefit from the accumulator you need <strong>exactly three files</strong> per
library, plus optionally the whole mirror. Nothing else.</p>
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
<table>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<tr><th>#</th><th>Artifact</th><th>What it is</th><th>Where</th></tr>
<tr><td><b>1</b></td><td><code>provider.ed25519.pub</code></td>
<td><strong>The trust anchor.</strong> The provider's public key — the only thing you
take on trust, once. Fetch it from BOTH independent locations and compare; the copies
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
must be identical.</td>
<td><a href="{base}/log-public-key">this site</a> · <a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror</a></td></tr>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<tr><td><b>2</b></td><td><code>&lt;library&gt;.attestation.json</code></td>
<td><strong>The claim.</strong> Which repo, which exact git commit, which theorems,
which observed axiom cones, what machine protection signed by the provider.</td>
<td>table above, or <a href="{mirror}">mirror</a> <code>entries/</code></td></tr>
<tr><td><b>3</b></td><td><code>&lt;library&gt;.receipt.json</code></td>
<td><strong>The proof of inclusion.</strong> Binds artifact&nbsp;2 into the signed tree:
leaf index, sibling hashes, the Signed Tree Head. ~25 lines of stdlib Python verify it.</td>
<td>table above, or <a href="{mirror}">mirror</a> <code>receipts/</code></td></tr>
<tr><td>+</td><td>the full mirror clone</td>
<td><strong>Maximal benefit: become a witness.</strong> Every leaf + every signed head
ever issued + <code>verify.py</code> (stdlib-only). <code>python3 verify.py --all</code>
recomputes the entire tree and every historical head you then hold proof the log
never equivocated within your clone.</td>
<td><code>git clone {mirror}</code></td></tr>
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
</table>
<h2>Attested libraries</h2>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<table><tr><th>component</th><th>artifact 2</th><th>artifact 3</th><th>status</th></tr>{rows}</table>
<h2>Three ways to use it</h2>
<div class="steps">
<div class="card"><strong>Quick check</strong> (any machine, milliseconds): download
artifacts 13, then<br>
<code>pacta receipt-verify --attestation --receipt --log-public-key provider.ed25519.pub</code>
<br><span class="muted">No Lean, no Rust, no account. Add <code>--sth-store pins.json</code> for split-view defense.</span></div>
<div class="card"><strong>Zero-install audit</strong>: <code>git clone {mirror} &amp;&amp; python3 verify.py --all</code>
<br><span class="muted">Standard-library Python only. You become a witness of the whole history.</span></div>
<div class="card"><strong>Autonomous agent</strong>: the <a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta</a>
tool adds STH pinning, freshness policy, online refresh from this service, risk scoring
(R0R5) with policy-gated consequences, and optionally verifies every signature through
the proof-attested Ed25519 code path itself (<code>--require-verified-verifier</code>).</div>
</div>
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
<h2>API</h2>
<pre>GET {base}/v1/sth latest Signed Tree Head
GET {base}/v1/sth-history every head ever signed (witness material)
GET {base}/v1/sth-consistency?first=N consistency proof from your pinned size
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
GET {base}/v1/proof?component=NAME inclusion proof (artifact 3, freshly issued)
GET {base}/v1/attestation?component=NAME the claim (artifact 2)
GET {base}/v1/entries?start=N&amp;end=M raw leaves
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
GET {base}/v1/metadata log identity
GET {base}/healthz</pre>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<h2>What a verified inclusion means and what it does not</h2>
<div class="card"><span class="pill ok">means</span> The provider whose key you hold
attests: the Lean proofs of the named repository at the named git commit re-check with
exactly the documented assumptions and that statement is irrevocably part of the log
every other customer and witness sees.</div>
<div class="card"><span class="pill warn">does not mean</span> A verified binary. The
proofs cover Rust <em>source</em>; clone the attested commit (the git hash <em>is</em>
the content hash) and build it yourself compiler and build are declared trusted base
until the reproducible-builds program (R5) lands. Every attestation carries its full
residual-risk list. Honesty about the boundary is the product.</div>
<h2>The paper</h2>
<div class="card"><a href="{base}/paper"><strong>LTL: Lean Transparency Log</strong></a>
(PDF, 4 pages) the design in full: the trust model (observations, never verdicts),
the self-certifying signature, the deployment with its retained failure leaves, and an
exact account of what a verified receipt does and does not establish.</div>
The LTL website: the accumulator drawn live, artifacts named unambiguously The /docs route is now a real landing site (still one self-contained HTML, inline CSS + inline SVG, zero external assets): - One-sentence definition up top: what the LTL is and the cost asymmetry it exists for (one signature + a few hashes in milliseconds vs hours of theorem proving). - THE GRAPHIC: the accumulator itself, rendered server-side from the LIVE log at page load - real leaf hashes, real internal nodes, the real root and signature. Green leaves are boundary-exact verified attestations; grey leaves are the historical audit-failure entries, labeled "kept forever - an append-only ledger does not erase its bad day". The signature box names the dogfood backend and the provider's self-inclusion check (the signature vouches for the code; the tree vouches for the signature's code). - "What do I download?" - exactly three artifacts, numbered, each with what-it-is and where: (1) provider.ed25519.pub, the sole trust anchor, cross-checkable between this site and the GitHub mirror; (2) the attestation = the claim; (3) the receipt = the proof of inclusion. Plus the maximal-benefit path: clone the mirror, run verify.py --all, become a witness. - Three usage lanes (quick check / zero-install audit / autonomous agent), the API, and the means / does-NOT-mean cards. Rendered against the real 8-leaf log and content-asserted in tests' presence. 54/54 green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:38:37 +00:00
<p class="muted">Log heads are signed offline; this service is read-only and holds no
key material. Provider tooling, agent tooling, and the full course (12 Jupyter
lectures) live in the <a href="https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent">pacta repository</a>.</p>
The log goes public: git-published mirror, online service, witnesses Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust: - PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis: 8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head). - ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history, /v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries, /v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify- without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the existing log). - AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed). - WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives customers the same audit with zero installation. - DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org - reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update cycle, and remote smoke tests. Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning, online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught, standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 14:05:20 +00:00
</body></html>"""