mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent.git
synced 2026-09-03 19:53:43 +00:00
104 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
104 lines
5.7 KiB
Python
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"""Customer documentation served at the log's base path — self-contained
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HTML, no external assets (the service must work air-gapped behind any
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reverse proxy)."""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from html import escape
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from .transparency_log import TransparencyLog
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_STYLE = """
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body{font-family:system-ui,sans-serif;max-width:60rem;margin:2rem auto;padding:0 1rem;
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color:#1c2430;line-height:1.55;background:#f8f9fa}
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h1{font-size:1.6rem} h2{font-size:1.15rem;margin-top:2rem}
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code,pre{font-family:ui-monospace,Menlo,Consolas,monospace;background:#eef0f3;border-radius:4px}
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code{padding:.1rem .3rem} pre{padding:.8rem;overflow-x:auto}
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table{border-collapse:collapse;width:100%;font-size:.92rem}
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td,th{border-bottom:1px solid #dde2e9;padding:.4rem .6rem;text-align:left;vertical-align:top}
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.pill{display:inline-block;background:#e2f2e9;color:#1e7f4f;border-radius:9px;
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padding:.05rem .55rem;font-size:.8rem;font-weight:600}
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.muted{color:#5a6675;font-size:.9rem}
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"""
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def render_docs(log: TransparencyLog, base_path: str) -> str:
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base = "/" + base_path.strip("/")
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metadata = log.metadata()
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history = log.sth_history()
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latest = history[-1] if history else {}
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entries = log.entries()
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components = sorted({
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component
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for entry in entries
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if (component := ((entry.leaf.get("attestation") or {}).get("subject") or {}).get("component"))
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})
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provenance = ((latest.get("signatures") or {}).get("ed25519") or {}).get("signing_provenance") or {}
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rows = "".join(
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f"<tr><td><code>{escape(component)}</code></td>"
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f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/attestation?component={escape(component)}'>attestation</a></td>"
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f"<td><a href='{base}/v1/proof?component={escape(component)}'>inclusion proof</a></td></tr>"
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for component in components
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)
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return f"""<!doctype html><html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
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<title>Lean Transparency Log</title><style>{_STYLE}</style></head><body>
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<h1>Lean Transparency Log <span class="pill">read-only</span></h1>
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<p>This service publishes <strong>signed attestations of formal (Lean 4) proof
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verification</strong> for cryptographic Rust libraries, bound into an append-only
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RFC 9162-style Merkle log. Customers verify a signature and a
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≈{max(1, (latest.get('tree_size') or 1).bit_length())}-hash inclusion proof in milliseconds
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— the hours of Lean kernel re-checking happened once, on the provider's side,
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under memory-capped guards.</p>
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<h2>Current state</h2>
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<table>
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<tr><th>log id</th><td><code>{escape(str(metadata.get('log_id', ''))[:32])}…</code></td></tr>
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<tr><th>tree size</th><td>{latest.get('tree_size', 0)} leaves</td></tr>
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<tr><th>latest root</th><td><code>{escape(str(latest.get('root_hash', ''))[:32])}…</code></td></tr>
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<tr><th>root signed by</th><td><code>{escape(str(((latest.get('signatures') or {}).get('ed25519') or {}).get('signing_backend', 'n/a')))}</code>
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— the merkleized, proof-attested Ed25519 library itself; before signing, the provider
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Merkle-verified that library's own leaf (index {provenance.get('signing_library_leaf_index', '?')},
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certificates {escape(str(provenance.get('signing_library_certificates_proven', '?')))}) against this very tree</td></tr>
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<tr><th>attested components</th><td>{len(components)}</td></tr>
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</table>
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<h2>Attested libraries</h2>
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<table><tr><th>component</th><th>claim document</th><th>proof of inclusion</th></tr>{rows}</table>
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<p class="muted">Each attestation names the exact git commit it covers, every certificate
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with its observed axiom cone, and the machine-protection used during replay. The log
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also retains earlier leaves that honestly record a failed audit run — an
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append-only trust ledger keeps its history.</p>
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<h2>API</h2>
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<pre>GET {base}/v1/sth latest Signed Tree Head
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GET {base}/v1/sth-history every head ever signed (witness material)
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GET {base}/v1/sth-consistency?first=N consistency proof from your pinned size
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GET {base}/v1/proof?component=NAME inclusion proof for the newest attestation
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GET {base}/v1/attestation?component=NAME
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GET {base}/v1/entries?start=N&end=M
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GET {base}/v1/metadata log identity
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GET {base}/healthz</pre>
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<h2>Verify without trusting this site</h2>
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<p>Everything is verifiable offline. Clone the mirror repository (published on GitHub
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and on this Forgejo), which contains every leaf, every signed tree head, the provider
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public key, and a standalone <code>verify.py</code> (Python standard library only,
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≈100 lines). It recomputes the entire tree from the leaves, checks every historical
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head against its prefix, verifies the signatures, and checks any inclusion proof:</p>
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<pre>git clone <mirror-url>/lean-transparency-log
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python3 verify.py --all</pre>
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<p>For agents: the <code>pacta</code> tool adds pinning (split-view defense),
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freshness policy, and the option to verify signatures through the
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proof-attested Ed25519 code path itself
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(<code>pacta receipt-verify … --sth-store … --require-verified-verifier</code>).</p>
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<h2>What a verified inclusion means — and what it does not</h2>
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<p><strong>Means:</strong> the provider whose key you hold attests that the Lean proofs
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of the named repository at the named commit re-check with exactly the documented
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assumptions, and this attestation is irrevocably part of the log everyone sees.</p>
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<p><strong>Does not mean:</strong> a verified binary. The proofs cover Rust source;
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you clone the attested commit (the git hash <em>is</em> the content hash) and build it
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yourself — compiler and build remain declared trusted base until the R5
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program (reproducible builds) lands. Every attestation carries the full residual-risk
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list; honesty about the boundary is the product.</p>
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</body></html>"""
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