ltl-accumulator-verified/README.md
mrwulf 9972ab4198 Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit
Round-2 external reviews (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) converged on the
coverage gate being evadable (H1/NEW-1); GPT additionally proved the
kit's fidelity target could not run (H2) and the namespace-collision
attack that defeats any source-regex fix. This round adopts GPT's
required correction in full:

- Proofs/Inventory.lean: declaration inventory read from the compiled
  Lean environment — every constant of every corpus module, fully
  qualified, unfiltered (compiler auxiliaries and _private mangles
  pinned too), with kind and axiom cone; own cone walker cross-checked
  in-process against core collectAxioms (hard error on divergence).
- verification/inventory-allowlist.txt: all 218 constants pinned.
- inventory_gate.sh: fail-closed diff both directions (UNCLASSIFIED /
  STALE), INV-COUNT truncation guard, exactly-one-axiom invariant.
- check.sh Phase 3b rewritten around the gate + manifest⇔inventory
  drift checks + CONES⇔inventory cone cross-check (two independent
  computations must agree). EXCLUDE table gone (sha256/Bytes are
  ordinary audited entries now).
- selftest_audit.sh: 9 adversarial cases against the production gate
  (attributed/indented/private/instance, namespace collision, smuggled
  axiom, deleted decl, unmanifested Proofs/ and gen/ modules) + positive
  control — all defeated (GPT release condition 2).
- M1: recursive orphan-olean guard (caught a stray dev artifact on its
  first run), gen/ dead-file check, corpus-wide single-axiom pin.
- L1/NEW-2: acceptIncl_sound drops the redundant hm (derived from
  hacc.1); cone unchanged.
- M2/M3: STATEMENT-MAP counts 230,271/230,016; non-vacuity guard
  wording narrowed to what the guards actually certify.
- README layer table: stale L4/pin-store rows fixed (missed by both
  round-2 reviewers AND the round-2 revision — found in self-review).
- KNOWN-GAPS 12 (audit-gate lineage + residual limits), 13 (round-2 kit
  target not self-contained); gap 2 count fixed.
- RESPONSE-TO-REVIEWERS.md: round-3 disposition of every finding.

Kit round 3 additionally ships the complete stdlib-only import closure
of pacta.transparency (content-addressed vs pacta 3d81d53), the
clean-extraction fidelity transcript (exit 0, 230,271+230,016, zero
mismatches), the ATTESTATION GREEN check.sh transcript, and the
self-test transcript.

The live LTL remains untouched (12 leaves, root bcd15f9d…);
attestation stays blocked pending ePrint decision + author review +
explicit operator order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00

48 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters

This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.

# ltl-accumulator-verified
Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the paper
"The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper): the Merkle
accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in
the same discipline as the four `*-ed25519-verified` subject corpora.
## Status: **FROZEN for external review** (corpus complete)
All paper-§10 mechanization targets are kernel-checked; the audit surface
is defined and green (`verification/check.sh`, exit 0). See
[STATEMENT-MAP.md](STATEMENT-MAP.md) for the paper↔Lean review surface and
[KNOWN-GAPS.md](KNOWN-GAPS.md) for the honest scope ledger.
Revised after review round 1 (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) and round 2:
the audit surface is now an environment-derived inventory
(`Proofs/Inventory.lean` + pinned allowlist, self-tested by
`selftest_audit.sh`), the review kit's fidelity target is
self-contained, `acceptIncl` routes Theorems 12, fidelity families
extended (230,271 / 230,016). No changes until the external review
completes. The finished certificates' attestation into the LTL is a
separate, explicitly-authorized operator decision.
| layer | content | status |
|---|---|---|
| L1 | bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) | **done** (domsep: axiom-free) |
| L2 | MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination | **done** (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
| L3 | inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) + named acceptance `acceptIncl` | **done** (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
| L4 | frontier binding content (Lemma 2) | **done as specializations** — inlined in the extractor walk (`extractIncl`), whole-tree (`extractMTH`), ConsRec (`consRecBinding`); the standalone `Root` receipt-uniqueness instance was deleted with the vacuous `root_binding` in S3.5 and deliberately NOT restored (optional, unused — KNOWN-GAPS gap 3) |
| L5 | inclusion soundness = EXPLICIT extractor `extractIncl` (Theorem 2) | **done, non-vacuous** |
| L6a | descent extractor `extractMTH` (Theorem 3 step 3 = Lemma 2, whole-tree instance) | **done, non-vacuous** |
| L6b | Theorem 3 (consistency soundness): `consRecBinding` (steps 12) + `extractCons`/`extractCons_correct` (+ `_paper` at the paper's exact quantifiers) | **done, non-vacuous** |
| L6c | pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1): `pinAccept_monotone`, `pin_prefix_correct`, `fork_distinct` | **done, non-vacuous** (per-step; multi-step chain = gap 7) |
## Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)
- `verification/Proofs/` contains ZERO `axiom` declarations; the single
sanctioned axiom site is `verification/gen/` — here, one opaque
function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors,
so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
- `verification/check.sh` is THE button: compiles every file through
`lean-guard` (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock)
and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
- Expected boundary: `propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound` plus
`LTLAcc.sha256` for hash-touching certificates — documented per
certificate in `check.sh`, audited both directions.
The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation
leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.