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mrwulf 9972ab4198 Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit
Round-2 external reviews (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) converged on the
coverage gate being evadable (H1/NEW-1); GPT additionally proved the
kit's fidelity target could not run (H2) and the namespace-collision
attack that defeats any source-regex fix. This round adopts GPT's
required correction in full:

- Proofs/Inventory.lean: declaration inventory read from the compiled
  Lean environment — every constant of every corpus module, fully
  qualified, unfiltered (compiler auxiliaries and _private mangles
  pinned too), with kind and axiom cone; own cone walker cross-checked
  in-process against core collectAxioms (hard error on divergence).
- verification/inventory-allowlist.txt: all 218 constants pinned.
- inventory_gate.sh: fail-closed diff both directions (UNCLASSIFIED /
  STALE), INV-COUNT truncation guard, exactly-one-axiom invariant.
- check.sh Phase 3b rewritten around the gate + manifest⇔inventory
  drift checks + CONES⇔inventory cone cross-check (two independent
  computations must agree). EXCLUDE table gone (sha256/Bytes are
  ordinary audited entries now).
- selftest_audit.sh: 9 adversarial cases against the production gate
  (attributed/indented/private/instance, namespace collision, smuggled
  axiom, deleted decl, unmanifested Proofs/ and gen/ modules) + positive
  control — all defeated (GPT release condition 2).
- M1: recursive orphan-olean guard (caught a stray dev artifact on its
  first run), gen/ dead-file check, corpus-wide single-axiom pin.
- L1/NEW-2: acceptIncl_sound drops the redundant hm (derived from
  hacc.1); cone unchanged.
- M2/M3: STATEMENT-MAP counts 230,271/230,016; non-vacuity guard
  wording narrowed to what the guards actually certify.
- README layer table: stale L4/pin-store rows fixed (missed by both
  round-2 reviewers AND the round-2 revision — found in self-review).
- KNOWN-GAPS 12 (audit-gate lineage + residual limits), 13 (round-2 kit
  target not self-contained); gap 2 count fixed.
- RESPONSE-TO-REVIEWERS.md: round-3 disposition of every finding.

Kit round 3 additionally ships the complete stdlib-only import closure
of pacta.transparency (content-addressed vs pacta 3d81d53), the
clean-extraction fidelity transcript (exit 0, 230,271+230,016, zero
mismatches), the ATTESTATION GREEN check.sh transcript, and the
self-test transcript.

The live LTL remains untouched (12 leaves, root bcd15f9d…);
attestation stays blocked pending ePrint decision + author review +
explicit operator order.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00
verification Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit 2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00
.gitignore revision round 1: address both external reviews (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) 2026-07-11 22:53:47 +02:00
KNOWN-GAPS.md Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit 2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00
README.md Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit 2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00
RESPONSE-TO-REVIEWERS.md Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit 2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00
STATEMENT-MAP.md Review round 3: environment-derived audit surface, self-contained kit 2026-07-12 00:32:18 +02:00

ltl-accumulator-verified

Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the paper "The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper): the Merkle accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in the same discipline as the four *-ed25519-verified subject corpora.

Status: FROZEN for external review (corpus complete)

All paper-§10 mechanization targets are kernel-checked; the audit surface is defined and green (verification/check.sh, exit 0). See STATEMENT-MAP.md for the paper↔Lean review surface and KNOWN-GAPS.md for the honest scope ledger. Revised after review round 1 (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) and round 2: the audit surface is now an environment-derived inventory (Proofs/Inventory.lean + pinned allowlist, self-tested by selftest_audit.sh), the review kit's fidelity target is self-contained, acceptIncl routes Theorems 12, fidelity families extended (230,271 / 230,016). No changes until the external review completes. The finished certificates' attestation into the LTL is a separate, explicitly-authorized operator decision.

layer content status
L1 bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) done (domsep: axiom-free)
L2 MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination done (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L3 inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) + named acceptance acceptIncl done (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound)
L4 frontier binding content (Lemma 2) done as specializations — inlined in the extractor walk (extractIncl), whole-tree (extractMTH), ConsRec (consRecBinding); the standalone Root receipt-uniqueness instance was deleted with the vacuous root_binding in S3.5 and deliberately NOT restored (optional, unused — KNOWN-GAPS gap 3)
L5 inclusion soundness = EXPLICIT extractor extractIncl (Theorem 2) done, non-vacuous
L6a descent extractor extractMTH (Theorem 3 step 3 = Lemma 2, whole-tree instance) done, non-vacuous
L6b Theorem 3 (consistency soundness): consRecBinding (steps 12) + extractCons/extractCons_correct (+ _paper at the paper's exact quantifiers) done, non-vacuous
L6c pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1): pinAccept_monotone, pin_prefix_correct, fork_distinct done, non-vacuous (per-step; multi-step chain = gap 7)

Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)

  • verification/Proofs/ contains ZERO axiom declarations; the single sanctioned axiom site is verification/gen/ — here, one opaque function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors, so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
  • verification/check.sh is THE button: compiles every file through lean-guard (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock) and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
  • Expected boundary: propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound plus LTLAcc.sha256 for hash-touching certificates — documented per certificate in check.sh, audited both directions.

The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.