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Round-2 external reviews (GPT-5.6 + second Claude) converged on the coverage gate being evadable (H1/NEW-1); GPT additionally proved the kit's fidelity target could not run (H2) and the namespace-collision attack that defeats any source-regex fix. This round adopts GPT's required correction in full: - Proofs/Inventory.lean: declaration inventory read from the compiled Lean environment — every constant of every corpus module, fully qualified, unfiltered (compiler auxiliaries and _private mangles pinned too), with kind and axiom cone; own cone walker cross-checked in-process against core collectAxioms (hard error on divergence). - verification/inventory-allowlist.txt: all 218 constants pinned. - inventory_gate.sh: fail-closed diff both directions (UNCLASSIFIED / STALE), INV-COUNT truncation guard, exactly-one-axiom invariant. - check.sh Phase 3b rewritten around the gate + manifest⇔inventory drift checks + CONES⇔inventory cone cross-check (two independent computations must agree). EXCLUDE table gone (sha256/Bytes are ordinary audited entries now). - selftest_audit.sh: 9 adversarial cases against the production gate (attributed/indented/private/instance, namespace collision, smuggled axiom, deleted decl, unmanifested Proofs/ and gen/ modules) + positive control — all defeated (GPT release condition 2). - M1: recursive orphan-olean guard (caught a stray dev artifact on its first run), gen/ dead-file check, corpus-wide single-axiom pin. - L1/NEW-2: acceptIncl_sound drops the redundant hm (derived from hacc.1); cone unchanged. - M2/M3: STATEMENT-MAP counts 230,271/230,016; non-vacuity guard wording narrowed to what the guards actually certify. - README layer table: stale L4/pin-store rows fixed (missed by both round-2 reviewers AND the round-2 revision — found in self-review). - KNOWN-GAPS 12 (audit-gate lineage + residual limits), 13 (round-2 kit target not self-contained); gap 2 count fixed. - RESPONSE-TO-REVIEWERS.md: round-3 disposition of every finding. Kit round 3 additionally ships the complete stdlib-only import closure of pacta.transparency (content-addressed vs pacta 3d81d53), the clean-extraction fidelity transcript (exit 0, 230,271+230,016, zero mismatches), the ATTESTATION GREEN check.sh transcript, and the self-test transcript. The live LTL remains untouched (12 leaves, root bcd15f9d…); attestation stays blocked pending ePrint decision + author review + explicit operator order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
79 lines
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Markdown
79 lines
5 KiB
Markdown
# Known gaps and scope boundaries (honest ledger)
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Deliberate, documented, and none silent. Reviewers should verify this
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list is COMPLETE, not merely that the items are acceptable.
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1. **SHA-256 is opaque** — the single boundary axiom (`LTLAcc.sha256`),
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by design identical to the paper's posture: soundness theorems
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construct collisions, never assume collision resistance.
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2. **No consistency-completeness theorem** (honest ConsRec acceptance).
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Matches the paper (its Theorem 1 is inclusion-only); honest
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consistency behavior is covered by the fidelity harness's honest
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cases (within the 230,016-case consistency agreement with the
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deployed verifier).
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3. **Lemma 2 is mechanized as specializations, not as one general
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theorem.** The paper's Lemma 2 is a single statement quantified over
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an abstract hash-fold `F` and a connected subtree `S`. The corpus has
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no hash-fold datatype/predicate; it proves the needed instances
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directly — whole-tree (`extractMTH_correct`), ConsRec
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(`consRecBinding`), inclusion (`extractIncl_correct`), and the width
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fact (`hnode_preimage_inj`). These suffice for Theorems 2–3. Two
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consequences: (a) the abstract lemma itself is not a mechanized
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object; (b) the path-instance receipt-uniqueness for `Root` (removed
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with the vacuous `root_binding`) is not restored — optional, unused.
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Any paper claim that "Lemma 2 is mechanized" must read "its
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specializations sufficient for Theorems 2–3 are mechanized."
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4. **Signature layer abstract** — Ed25519 EUF-CMA, the poison/evidence
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retention state, and transferability of fork evidence (paper Prop
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1(2)) are not modeled; `fork_distinct` is the Merkle-layer share only.
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5. **Transliteration bridge** — `fidelity/lean_defs.py` mirrors the Lean
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definitions by quoted-source inspection (the Lean defs are
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noncomputable over the opaque hash, so the bridge cannot be #eval'd
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closed). Same inspection bridge the paper's own harness uses.
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6. **Proposition 2 (verdict integrity) out of scope** — per paper §10's
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mechanization list (i–v). It is a property of the consumer tooling's
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construction, enforced and regression-tested in the pacta repo.
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7. **Multi-step pin monotonicity** — mechanized per-step
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(`pinAccept_monotone`); the paper's multi-step chain is its
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reflexive-transitive iterate, not separately mechanized.
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8. **Process history** (candor): three cone pins were guessed (not read)
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during S5.3–S6 and the audit's failure went unnoticed until S7
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because green was claimed from tailed output rather than the exit
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code. No theorem was affected (kernel-checked throughout); pins were
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corrected, the audit surface defined, and the standing rule is now:
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exit code + ALL GREEN, cones read from #print axioms only.
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9. **Asymptotic cost not mechanized.** Paper Theorems 2 and 3 assert the
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extractors run in `O(n)` / `O(n₁)` hash evaluations. The mechanization
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proves functional correctness of the named extractors only — no cost
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semantics, recurrence, or computability-after-hash-instantiation. (The
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extractors are `noncomputable` over the opaque `sha256`.)
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10. **Pin-store initialization from the empty pin not modeled**, and
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`pin_prefix_correct` assumes `0 < n`. Trust-on-first-use / the size-0
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initial state is a separate operation; the theorems cover transitions
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from a positive-size pin. (Related to gap 7's per-step scoping.)
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11. **acceptIncl now named (was review F1).** The consumer's inclusion
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acceptance `m < n ∧ Root … = some r` is now the Lean object
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`acceptIncl`, with `acceptIncl_complete`/`acceptIncl_sound` routing
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completeness/soundness through it, and the fidelity harness exercises
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the out-of-range families (`m ≥ n`). `Root` alone still accepts
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out-of-range `m`; that is by design (it is the reconstruction, not the
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accept predicate).
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12. **Audit-gate lineage** (candor; was round-2 GPT H1 / Claude NEW-1,
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both round-1 "fail-closed" claims were overclaims). The round-2
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coverage gate enumerated declarations with a source regex and was
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evadable (attributes, indentation, private/protected, `instance`,
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nested-namespace basename collisions). Round 3 replaced it with an
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environment-derived inventory (`Proofs/Inventory.lean` +
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`inventory-allowlist.txt`, fully-qualified names, no filtering) and
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`selftest_audit.sh`, which runs the published evasion table plus a
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namespace collision, an axiom smuggle, a stale-entry case, and two
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unmanifested-module cases against the exact production gate.
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Residual honesty: the inventory sees what the compiled environment
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contains; it cannot see source that is never compiled (which the
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dead-file checks cover) or defeat a hostile Lean toolchain.
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13. **Review-kit fidelity target was not self-contained in round 2**
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(GPT H2: missing load-time imports made `run_fidelity.py` unrunnable
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from the kit). Round 3 ships the complete stdlib-only import closure
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of `pacta.transparency`, content-addressed against pacta commit
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`3d81d53`, plus the clean-extraction transcript with exit code.
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