lean-transparency-log/README.md
mrwulf 4e5c39b93c verify.py fail-closed + full receipt bindings; README drops the 'honesty'/'first' overclaim (review round 10)
GPT-5.6 live-site review + Fable live verification:
- verify.py §4: was fail-OPEN — no openssl ⇒ signatures 'skipped' ⇒
  still 'OK'. Now fail-CLOSED (exit 2 unless --structural-only, which is
  explicitly labelled a reduced check). --receipt was Merkle-path-only;
  now verifies the receipt's STH signature, key fingerprint, log_id,
  tree_size agreement, leaf_hash-vs-entry, and history membership before
  the inclusion proof. --all now also checks latest-sth == final history
  head and size == leaf count, and constant log_id. Adversarially tested:
  fail-closed exit 2; forged unsigned-root receipt REJECTED (was the
  'inclusion VALID' hole); honest receipt + full run still exit 0.
- README §8: I had written 'the first deployed transparency log to carry
  proofs of its own honesty' this session — an overclaim (the corpus
  proves properties of the accumulator MODEL, not operator honesty).
  Now: 'kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its
  inclusion/consistency reasoning', 'first' softened to 'unaware of a
  precedent'.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-16 23:46:28 +02:00

48 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown

# Lean Transparency Log — published mirror
This repository is the **git-published face** of a transparency log of
formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs
of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their
documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic
Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of **entry 13 (2026-07-16)**
the log also attests **its own accumulator machinery** — a kernel-checked
mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries
kernel-checked proofs *about the accumulator model* underlying its own
inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject
[`ltl-accumulator-verified`](https://github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified);
scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty,
signing, or execution provenance). Current head: tree size 13, root
`3488a2d0…`.
Layout:
| Path | Content |
|---|---|
| `entries/NNNNNN.json` | one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history) |
| `entries/<component>.attestation.json` | the newest attestation per library, for convenience |
| `receipts/<component>.receipt.json` | inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head |
| `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
| `latest-sth.json` | the current head |
| `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's public key (the sole trust anchor) |
| `verify.py` | standalone verifier, Python standard library only |
Verify everything locally, no installation:
```bash
python3 verify.py --all
python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json
```
The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation):
**https://ltl.zkdefi.org**
The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials:
**https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent**
Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust **source** at a
pinned commit (clone it — the git hash is the content hash — and build it
yourself; compilers are declared trusted base). The log deliberately
retains early leaves recording a **failed** audit run: an append-only
trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized,
proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the
provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf.