mrwulf
4e5c39b93c
GPT-5.6 live-site review + Fable live verification: - verify.py §4: was fail-OPEN — no openssl ⇒ signatures 'skipped' ⇒ still 'OK'. Now fail-CLOSED (exit 2 unless --structural-only, which is explicitly labelled a reduced check). --receipt was Merkle-path-only; now verifies the receipt's STH signature, key fingerprint, log_id, tree_size agreement, leaf_hash-vs-entry, and history membership before the inclusion proof. --all now also checks latest-sth == final history head and size == leaf count, and constant log_id. Adversarially tested: fail-closed exit 2; forged unsigned-root receipt REJECTED (was the 'inclusion VALID' hole); honest receipt + full run still exit 0. - README §8: I had written 'the first deployed transparency log to carry proofs of its own honesty' this session — an overclaim (the corpus proves properties of the accumulator MODEL, not operator honesty). Now: 'kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its inclusion/consistency reasoning', 'first' softened to 'unaware of a precedent'. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.4 KiB
Lean Transparency Log — published mirror
This repository is the git-published face of a transparency log of
formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs
of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their
documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic
Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of entry 13 (2026-07-16)
the log also attests its own accumulator machinery — a kernel-checked
mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries
kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its own
inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject
ltl-accumulator-verified;
scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty,
signing, or execution provenance). Current head: tree size 13, root
3488a2d0….
Layout:
| Path | Content |
|---|---|
entries/NNNNNN.json |
one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history) |
entries/<component>.attestation.json |
the newest attestation per library, for convenience |
receipts/<component>.receipt.json |
inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head |
sth-history.jsonl |
every Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
latest-sth.json |
the current head |
provider.ed25519.pub |
the provider's public key (the sole trust anchor) |
verify.py |
standalone verifier, Python standard library only |
Verify everything locally, no installation:
python3 verify.py --all
python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json
The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation): https://ltl.zkdefi.org
The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials: https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent
Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust source at a pinned commit (clone it — the git hash is the content hash — and build it yourself; compilers are declared trusted base). The log deliberately retains early leaves recording a failed audit run: an append-only trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized, proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf.