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commita09100ab4aAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:55:55 2022 +0800 bump lockfile commit53172e1471Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:46:40 2022 +0800 bump verification pins commit36398810ddAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:24:36 2022 +0800 bump version numbers to absorb new syscalls commit062fa6178aMerge:ac4a854e3bcc955aAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:23:31 2022 +0800 Merge branch 'reply-and-receive-next-syscall' into main commitac4a854e49Merge:d1375343e4c298dbAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:22:25 2022 +0800 Merge branch 'main' of github.com:betrusted-io/xous-core into main commit3bcc955abaAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:21:43 2022 +0800 add test code that also benchmarks the new routines. commite4c298db40Merge:f71278b4e2bf7109Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 30 15:16:13 2022 +0800 Merge pull request #289 from betrusted-io/reply-and-receive-next-syscall Reply and receive next syscall commite2bf710939Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:06:51 2022 +0800 services: xous-ticktimer: use reply_and_receive_next() Convert the ticktimer server to use the new reply_and_receive_next_legacy() call. This is an example of how to use this API for future projects. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit0e75b8e479Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:05:26 2022 +0800 test-spawn: rename `Message` to `MessageEnvelope` Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit3218bde2b4Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:04:01 2022 +0800 kernel: implement reply_and_receive_next Implement `ReplyAndReceiveNext` as a syscall. This will reply to a message, pull the next message out of the queue, and then re-queue the server to run. This should make servers much more responsive. This patch has been tested on both hosted and native modes. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitd1375343c1Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 23:34:48 2022 +0800 update release notes commitf71278b422Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 22:04:55 2022 +0800 fix issue #109 - refactor key fill/scan to not crash after pruning After a prune, key fill/scan can crash because there is an assumption that data is always resident in the cache for a small key. This code handles the case where the small key data was evicted during a prune, and reads the data back in just for that key on demand. Furthermore, during a `sync` call, it will pull in the key data that corresponds to the page containing just the small key, allowing that page to be re-composed and replaced in memory. caching is used on the decryption of the small key page so the expensive bit of the call should only happen once per small key bank. tested with pddb-ci and manually in hosted mode. A portion of code was re-written to make it clear that only the length of allocated data is copied to/from disk and memory, instead of the reserved space as the previous code would indicate. The reserved space is guaranteed to be zero because the RAM-based page for composing the small key block is zero-ized prior to operations; left comments reminding me of this in the future so I don't accidentally optimize something out and cause data leakage between small keys because I'm allowing the reserved areas to contain stale data. commite25da3a720Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 22:04:15 2022 +0800 add implemenation of the `prune` debug call this allows us to trigger the cache prune manually, instead of in response to memory backpressure only commit549e67feadAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 22:03:19 2022 +0800 add a `prune` debug call to force a hard-prune of the pddb cache commite045574d39Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:06:51 2022 +0800 services: xous-ticktimer: use reply_and_receive_next() Convert the ticktimer server to use the new reply_and_receive_next_legacy() call. This is an example of how to use this API for future projects. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit23c17d7632Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:05:26 2022 +0800 test-spawn: rename `Message` to `MessageEnvelope` Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitaae5f3737cAuthor: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:04:01 2022 +0800 kernel: implement reply_and_receive_next Implement `ReplyAndReceiveNext` as a syscall. This will reply to a message, pull the next message out of the queue, and then re-queue the server to run. This should make servers much more responsive. This patch has been tested on both hosted and native modes. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitab0c7d3b32Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:03:39 2022 +0800 kernel: server: check buf is some when returning mem Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit46f340324dAuthor: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:02:57 2022 +0800 kernel: rename `Message` -> `MessageEnvelope` This syncs with the latest changes to `xous-rs`. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit911ddb60fcAuthor: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:01:27 2022 +0800 kernel: debug: fix klog on baremetal klog() refers to an outdated `.uart` struct, which has since been renamed to `.serial`. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitd88254b1b1Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:00:35 2022 +0800 xous: add reply_and_receive_next_legacy call This call is used to return values while simultaneously listening for new messages. The -legacy suffix is used to disambiguate scalar values, so we know whether to send Scalar1, Scalar2, or Scalar5 messages. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit64c88f9942Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 21:00:05 2022 +0800 xous: add Message type This type actually contains the message contents, and will be used to return data to the caller. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitd463f9563fAuthor: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 29 20:58:51 2022 +0800 xous: rename Message to MessageEnvelope This reflects the fact that up until now, the `Message` struct has merely been the envelope that surrounds the message. It does not contain any actual Message contents. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit49ce85f9a8Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Wed Jul 6 15:57:10 2022 +0800 ticktimer-server: prepare for using ReplyAndReceiveNext Misc cleanup prior to switching which call we use. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commitbe56af6303Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Wed Jul 6 15:35:22 2022 +0800 xous: add wrapper for reply_and_receive_next This wrapper enables userspace programs to use the new ReplyAndReceiveNext syscall easily. Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit36e6e6c30bAuthor: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Wed Jul 6 15:18:32 2022 +0800 xous: syscall: add ReplyAndReceiveNext call Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commit1e56598b10Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 00:53:32 2022 +0800 chore: fix some typos commit1291b0f00bAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 00:38:27 2022 +0800 add issue # to release note commit7206f24271Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 00:37:47 2022 +0800 update release notes commit2f30e1b50aAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 00:11:03 2022 +0800 implement #269 commit5370c333daAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 29 00:10:42 2022 +0800 add callback for monitoring basis lock/unlock events commit8d42feb051Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Wed Dec 28 19:48:40 2022 +0800 increase heap for mtxcli; add memory usage reporting commitac1df054abAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 26 13:52:44 2022 +0800 absorb 22-bit satp fix commit89500015a7Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 15 17:52:55 2022 +0800 try to fix regression from #284 still hitting cache coherence edge cases. expanding the flush set read by one more way. commit41ea0a37c5Merge:e422740db288d93aAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 15 14:36:40 2022 +0800 Merge branch 'main' of github.com:betrusted-io/xous-core into main commitb288d93abdMerge:8e1d0502d4527b82Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 15 14:00:10 2022 +0800 Merge pull request #284 from betrusted-io/use-thin-lto cargo: use thin-lto commitd4527b8227Author: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> Date: Thu Dec 15 12:26:00 2022 +0800 cargo: use thin-lto Use thin LTO for linking. This shouldn't have too big of an affect on the resulting binary size, and it fixes the build for 1.66.0: = note: rust-lld: error: undefined symbol: core::panicking::panic_str_nounwind::h9b449c0fe03c8dac >>> referenced by compiler_builtins.22a3dcb1-cgu.13 >>> compiler_builtins-b913bacb8fda1c55.compiler_builtins.22a3dcb1-cgu.13.rcgu.o:(compiler_builtins::math::libm::rem_pio2_large::rem_pio2_large::h3db6431f23a281c1) in archive root\lib\rustlib\riscv32imac-unknown-xous-elf\lib\libcompiler_builtins-b913bacb8fda1c55.rlib >>> referenced by compiler_builtins.22a3dcb1-cgu.13 >>> compiler_builtins-b913bacb8fda1c55.compiler_builtins.22a3dcb1-cgu.13.rcgu.o:(compiler_builtins::math::libm::rem_pio2_large::rem_pio2_large::h3db6431f23a281c1) in archive root\lib\rustlib\riscv32imac-unknown-xous-elf\lib\libcompiler_builtins-b913bacb8fda1c55.rlib Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io> commite422740d37Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 23:03:50 2022 +0800 chore: last one. really. commitad79ebf8baAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 23:02:09 2022 +0800 chore: more typos. no really, i can stop at any time. commitb1b6d46d27Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 22:56:37 2022 +0800 chore: more typos probably should not have tried to spell check this, now i'm wasting my time. commit283ea1de0dAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 22:49:25 2022 +0800 chore: fix more typos, add french dictionary to vscode workspace settings commit1d94968b2fAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 22:36:47 2022 +0800 chore: fix typos commite930d88563Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 01:42:00 2022 +0800 placeholder for 0.9.12 release notes commit8e1d05020dAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Tue Dec 13 00:32:11 2022 +0800 add v0.9.11 to the restore.py URL list commitbd230f5bb0Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:51:27 2022 +0800 fix text to speech mode preferences setting never allow the audio system to be turned off for blind people, and disallow 0-volume setting as well. commit38bc254bb9Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:28:33 2022 +0800 fix missing ja/zh translation commit60d4482ce2Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:16:04 2022 +0800 bump lockfile commit56f0843229Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:08:28 2022 +0800 bump verifier numbers commit5370ce396dAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:07:20 2022 +0800 bump all revs due to SoC artifact update commitcac0e57cdaAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:06:31 2022 +0800 change default target commit04b441a234Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:06:19 2022 +0800 add 0.9.11 build artifact commit08cf863ff5Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 16:05:15 2022 +0800 update SoC artifacts for 0.9.11 build commitc32b5d5bacAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 15:31:15 2022 +0800 bump release notes commit80ce119c95Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 15:31:06 2022 +0800 fix RSSI calculations commitedf24d9fc2Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 14:11:19 2022 +0800 clean up on the wifi signal bars commiteb17edc4ecMerge:9a580070435a6ea2Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Mon Dec 12 11:47:18 2022 +0800 Merge pull request #283 from gsora/feat/wifi-signal-bars feat: wifi signal bar commit9a580070a3Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 17:50:51 2022 +0800 revert threaded init question now that deface issue is fixed commitf9cdf31857Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 17:07:29 2022 +0800 bump release notes commit196ceb0d29Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 16:42:03 2022 +0800 fix: avoid thrashing when recomputing previously defaced canvases There was a dubious line that I never felt good about and today I found out why. By flipping every canvas to drawable before doing the intersection computation we also throw away the defacement state, so previously defaced canvases would lose their status bit, causing thrashing of the canvases anytime there is a re-computation of the canvas ordering. This fix caches if a canvas was already defaced, and if it turns out that an on-screen canvas should not be drawable but was already defaced, the setting is re-applied, preventing thrashing. commitdca043d387Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 16:41:53 2022 +0800 improve context swap debug messages commit8d8dd2bd2fAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 16:41:25 2022 +0800 fix typo in unwrap message commitf31afa5125Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 11 16:41:06 2022 +0800 remove unused opcode in shellchat; improve debug output commit6138b65d76Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 23:44:18 2022 +0800 update comments to reflect changes in CI infra commit399124f942Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 22:05:47 2022 +0800 fix hosted mode commit939e13950dAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 18:59:55 2022 +0800 comment out debug in rootkeys implementation section commit2097afc166Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 18:58:06 2022 +0800 add efuse burning flow to rootkeys currently only available for builds that have the `efuse` feature enabled commit19e16aea29Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 18:56:59 2022 +0800 fix jtag fuse burning & add diagnostic messages - msb/lsb swap on efuse bank fixed - hazardous-debug feauter gates added - dry-run for "testing only" added commit4ec866e1d7Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 18:56:12 2022 +0800 add diagnostic seal command commitf5c687a524Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 17:45:30 2022 +0800 clarify user prompt commit2b4e47384eAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 17:44:54 2022 +0800 add fused device support and warnings to precursorupdater commite42c4c7b33Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 16:39:14 2022 +0800 add warnings & support for fused devices burning a generic image to a fused device will surely lead to a brick, so, try to keep a user from shooting themselves in the foot. commitc2f7a63f97Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sat Dec 10 16:39:01 2022 +0800 remove some whitespace to allow for easier debugging commit1f89843122Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 9 12:38:53 2022 +0800 defer init root keys question until status thread starts also defer the preference thread from loading until after the PDDB mount thread is started -- doesn't make sense to start it any earlier than that, since it depends on the PDDB being mounted. commit02f9701546Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 8 17:42:12 2022 +0800 make an explicit dvt feature to simplify flags commit4dd983bfc4Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 8 17:19:05 2022 +0800 adjust security parameters for dvt build commitfc08c3e29dAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 8 17:14:47 2022 +0800 add hazardous-debug to modals bip-39 for convenient key printout during debug. flag is normally off. commitdd82b7f32aAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 8 17:14:21 2022 +0800 add no-codec mode to status this is for DVT builds where the codec isn't supported, needed for efuse testing commita5d341c7a6Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Thu Dec 8 14:09:36 2022 +0800 add a bitstream encryption/recovery tool for fused devices This is useful for recovering bricked devices where the backup key is available. This tool can be used to generate an FPGA image for a device that has been permanently fused to a non-0 backup key. commit4f270f54beAuthor: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Wed Dec 7 22:24:56 2022 +0800 revert debugging on status opcodes commit435a6ea2bdAuthor: Gianguido Sorà <me@gsora.xyz> Date: Wed Dec 7 14:28:07 2022 +0100 feat: wifi signal bar This commit draws a Wi-Fi signal bar with 5 bars (lowest to highest signal), to the right of SSID name. Signal power is calculated from a lowest of -90dBm to a maximum of -30dBm, by increments of 13dBm. commitf84a9d10c7Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 4 18:13:37 2022 +0800 add placeholder for the efuse flow in the rootkey service commit8208a86c08Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 4 18:12:30 2022 +0800 add the UX front-end for backup key burning - instructions for BBRAM flow (refers to wiki) - consent for efuse flow - fix a blocking issue on backup prep (minor problem, just gives users more time to contemplate without a panic) commit3838f3bc15Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Sun Dec 4 18:12:05 2022 +0800 add a pause for context swaps on menu release commit53c9af1033Author: bunnie <bunnie@kosagi.com> Date: Fri Dec 2 23:00:38 2022 +0800 bump readme's
526 lines
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22 KiB
Python
Executable file
526 lines
No EOL
22 KiB
Python
Executable file
#!/usr/bin/python3
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import argparse
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from Crypto.Cipher import AES
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from Crypto.Hash import SHA256
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from Crypto.Random import get_random_bytes
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import binascii
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import logging
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import sys
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from bip_utils import (
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Bip39MnemonicValidator, Bip39MnemonicDecoder
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)
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from pathlib import Path
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"""
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Encrypting a 7-series bitstream.
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Encrypted bitstreams have a slightly different structure than
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normal bitstreams, so to simplify things, we start from a bitstream
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that is "encrypted" with a dummy key. We then decrypt this stream
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and re-encrypt it to the key of choice; by doing this, we can just
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update the file with minimal editing.
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We working with a .bin format, which lacks the informative header
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on the .bit file (and is the type that is burned into the ROM anyways).
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# Decryption
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The ciphertext starts at byte 184. To decrypt:
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* divide into 32-bit chunks
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* reverse the order of the bits in each 32-bit chunk
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* feed into AES in big-endian order
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So, to encrypt:
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* feed bitstream into AES blocks in big-endian order
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* reverse the order of bits in each 32-bit chunk
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* write out in big endian format. This is referred to "as-stored" format.
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This is validate with key=0, IV=0.
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# The HMAC
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The HMAC key is written into the bitstream as follows:
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Two copies of the HMAC key are stored, once in the header, once in the footer.
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Prepare the header:
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* flip the order of bits in every 32-bit chunk of the HMAC key
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* XOR each byte with 0x6C
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* pad an additional 32 bytes of 0x6C
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* pre-pend to bitstream
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Total header length is 64 bytes.
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Determine the last command in the bitstream:
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This is probably the last instance of "00 00 00 04" in the as-stored bitstream.
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You'll know you found it because when looking at a decrypt bitstream, immediately
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after this you will see a SHA-256 padding (1 followed by many 0's then the
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length of the message; note the order that comes out of AES has to be
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bit-flipped for this pattern to be obvious, when staring at the as-stored bitstream
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it's not totally obvious).
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The padding looks something like this as-stored:
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v the '1' bit per SHA requirement, but bit-flipped
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0000 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
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0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0026 d080
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^ length of message in bits
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Compute hash of the bitstream from the very first byte of the header
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to the end of the active bitstream + SHA padding. Call this "hash1".
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Append an additional 256 bytes of 0's after the end of the padding that was
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required to compute hash1.
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Now, prepare the footer:
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* flip the order of bits in every 32-bit chunk of the HMAC key
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* XOR each byte with 0x3A
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* pad an additional 32 bytes of 0x3A
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* append hash1
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Now, compute a hash of the region spanning from the beginning of
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the footer (not including the 0 pad, so starting at the 0x3A sequence)
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to the end of hash1. This means first padding the region, and then
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computing the hash.
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Bit-flip and append this hash to the overall file, and you have now
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an HMAC-ready bitstream. Note that the Xilinx implementation 0's out
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the copy of "hash1" as stored in the bitstream.
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Once prepared, this entire set is encrypted using AES-CBC.
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Note that the number 0x085b98 is immediately before the cipherext data (this is for
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the 35T), and this corresponds to 547,736 words or 2,190,944 bytes, which corresponds
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exactly to a 32-byte SHA-256 digest appended to the end of the entire stream including
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header and footer (including the extra weird 64 bytes at the end), that is, 2190912 bytes.
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An extra 16-bytes of random-looking data appears after this length when you
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"over-decrypt" because the repeating output of the CBC cipher doesn't start until
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one block after the last block.
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Bitstream footer notes:
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00216d90: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
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00216da0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................
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00216db0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ <-- end of FPGA bitstream
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00216dc0: 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a :::::::::::::::: | | <-- hmac key xor with 0x3a
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00216dd0: 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a :::::::::::::::: | |
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00216de0: 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a :::::::::::::::: | |
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00216df0: 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a 3a3a :::::::::::::::: | |
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00216e00: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 HMAC1........... | | <-- where hmac digest #1 was: SHA256(bitstream)
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00216e10: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .......was here. | |____ 96 bytes = 0x300 bits = 0x00C0_0000 bit-reversed
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00216e20: 0000 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ................ | <-- padding for hmac digest #1
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00216e30: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 00c0 0000 ................ |_______ region hashed for hmac digest #2
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00216e40: ae61 607f f1ea 2364 5223 bb1b b7b6 069b .a`...#dR#...... <-- hmac digest #2: SHA256( (hmackey^0x3a | SHA256(bitstream) | SHA_pad) )
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00216e50: 2a48 b7f5 dd28 87e0 e10d 3fd0 66e7 cd15 *H...(....?.f...
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|
For some reason, hmac digest #1 area is zeroed out after its computation?
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
# This is a fixed header for the bitstream, contains sync patterns and configures options such
|
|
# as the bitwidth of the config, voltage, etc. This one configures 66MHz config speed, x1, 1.8V
|
|
# Making a static copy of this header because it contains commands that modify the operation
|
|
# of the FPGA; if we just copy from the incoming bitstream, an attacker may be able to manipulate the
|
|
# setup commands in a way that can affect the encryption settings.
|
|
|
|
# Note: the following pattern is the "bus width" autodetection and is not needed for our design.
|
|
# 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
# 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
# 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBB, 0x11, 0x22, 0x00, 0x44,
|
|
bitstream_header_x1 = [
|
|
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
0xaa, 0x99, 0x55, 0x66, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b,
|
|
0x30, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x01, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x01, 0x60, 0x04,
|
|
]
|
|
# this one selects 66MHz config speed, x2, 1.8V, encryption on, with key from efuse
|
|
bitstream_header_x2 = [
|
|
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
0xaa, 0x99, 0x55, 0x66, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3b,
|
|
0x30, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x01, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x01, 0x60, 0x04,
|
|
]
|
|
bitstream_header_bbram_x1 = [
|
|
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
|
|
0xaa, 0x99, 0x55, 0x66, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x03, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0b,
|
|
0x30, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x12, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x00, 0xa0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x01, 0xc0, 0x01,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x01, 0x60, 0x04,
|
|
]
|
|
# this selects BBRAM for key on a 35T
|
|
bitstream_header_35t_bbram_x1 = [
|
|
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
|
|
0xAA, 0x99, 0x55, 0x66, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40,
|
|
0x30, 0x00, 0xA0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x30, 0x01, 0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x01, 0x60, 0x04
|
|
]
|
|
# then IV key is here 16 bytes
|
|
ciphertext_header = [
|
|
0x30, 0x03, 0x40, 0x01, 0x00, 0x08, 0x5b, 0x98,
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
"""
|
|
Reverse the order of bits in a word that is bitwidth bits wide
|
|
"""
|
|
def bitflip(data_block, bitwidth=32):
|
|
if bitwidth == 0:
|
|
return data_block
|
|
bytewidth = bitwidth // 8
|
|
bitswapped = bytearray()
|
|
i = 0
|
|
while i < len(data_block):
|
|
data = int.from_bytes(data_block[i:i+bytewidth], byteorder='big', signed=False)
|
|
b = '{:0{width}b}'.format(data, width=bitwidth)
|
|
bitswapped.extend(int(b[::-1], 2).to_bytes(bytewidth, byteorder='big'))
|
|
i = i + bytewidth
|
|
return bytes(bitswapped)
|
|
|
|
# assumes a, b are the same length eh?
|
|
def xor_bytes(a, b):
|
|
i = 0
|
|
y = bytearray()
|
|
while i < len(a):
|
|
y.extend((a[i] ^ b[i]).to_bytes(1, byteorder='little'))
|
|
i = i + 1
|
|
|
|
return bytes(y)
|
|
|
|
def patcher(bit_in, patch):
|
|
bitstream = bit_in[64:-160]
|
|
|
|
if len(patch) > 0:
|
|
# find beginning of type2 area
|
|
position = 0
|
|
type = -1
|
|
command = 0
|
|
while type != 2:
|
|
command = int.from_bytes(bitflip(bitstream[position:position+4]), byteorder='big')
|
|
position = position + 4
|
|
if (command & 0xE0000000) == 0x20000000:
|
|
type = 1
|
|
elif (command & 0xE0000000) == 0x40000000:
|
|
type = 2
|
|
else:
|
|
type = -1
|
|
count = 0x3ffffff & command # not used, but handy to have around
|
|
|
|
ostream = bytearray(bitstream)
|
|
# position now sits at the top of the type2 region
|
|
# apply patches to each frame specified, ignoring the "none" values
|
|
for line in patch:
|
|
d = line[1]
|
|
for index in range(len(d)):
|
|
if d[index].strip() != 'none':
|
|
data = bitflip(int(d[index],16).to_bytes(4, 'big'))
|
|
frame_num = int(line[0],16)
|
|
for b in range(4):
|
|
stream_pos = position + frame_num * 101 * 4 + index * 4 + b
|
|
ostream[stream_pos] = data[b]
|
|
|
|
return bytes(ostream)
|
|
else:
|
|
return bitstream
|
|
|
|
def dumpframes(ofile, framestream):
|
|
position = 0
|
|
type = -1
|
|
|
|
command = 0
|
|
while type != 2:
|
|
command = int.from_bytes(framestream[position:position+4], byteorder='big')
|
|
position = position + 4
|
|
if (command & 0xE0000000) == 0x20000000:
|
|
type = 1
|
|
elif (command & 0xE0000000) == 0x40000000:
|
|
type = 2
|
|
else:
|
|
type = -1
|
|
count = 0x3ffffff & command
|
|
end = position + count
|
|
framecount = 0
|
|
|
|
while position < end:
|
|
ofile.write('0x{:08x},'.format(framecount))
|
|
framecount = framecount + 1
|
|
for i in range(101):
|
|
command = int.from_bytes(framestream[position:position + 4], byteorder='big')
|
|
position = position + 4
|
|
ofile.write(' 0x{:08x},'.format(command))
|
|
ofile.write('\n')
|
|
|
|
def try_key_to_bytes(input):
|
|
if len(input.split(' ')) == 24: # 24 words is BIP-39
|
|
# Get if a mnemonic is valid with automatic language detection, return bool
|
|
assert(Bip39MnemonicValidator().IsValid(input))
|
|
# Like before with automatic language detection
|
|
key_bytes = Bip39MnemonicDecoder().Decode(input)
|
|
else:
|
|
key_bytes = int(input, 16).to_bytes(32, byteorder='big')
|
|
return key_bytes
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Re-encrypt 7-series bitstream with a new key")
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-f", "--file", required=True, help="Input filename", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-i", "--input-key", required=True, help="Input key as hex string (big endian, without 0x prefix) or BIP-39 format (as quoted string)", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--hmac", required=False, help="Optional HMAC to use for encrypting bitstreams, as hex string. If not provided, a random one is chosen.", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"--iv", required=False, help="Optional IV to use for encrypting bitstreams, as hex string. If not provided, a random one is chosen.", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-k", "--key", help="Output key in hex or BIP-39 format. If not provided, plaintext is dumped.", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-b", "--bbram", help="direct FPGA to fetch decryption key from BBRAM", default=False, action="store_true"
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-o", "--output-file", help="Output filename base. Generates a .bin and .nky file.", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-d", "--debug", help="turn on debugging spew", default=False, action="store_true"
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-a", "--ascii-frame-file", help="dump ascii frames to this file", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-p", "--patch", help="file containing patch frames, as output by key2bits.py", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-j", "--jtag-commands", help="Make JTAG command sequence for BBRAM programming via jtag-gpio.py", default=False, action="store_true"
|
|
)
|
|
parser.add_argument(
|
|
"-t", "--type", choices=['xc7s50', 'xc7a35t'], default='xc7s50', help="select device target", type=str
|
|
)
|
|
args = parser.parse_args()
|
|
|
|
ifile = args.file
|
|
ofile = Path(args.output_file).stem # strip any suffix off because we create both .bin and .nky
|
|
framefile = args.ascii_frame_file
|
|
|
|
if args.debug:
|
|
logging.basicConfig(stream=sys.stdout, level=logging.DEBUG)
|
|
|
|
patch = []
|
|
if args.patch != None:
|
|
patchfile = args.patch
|
|
with open(patchfile, "r") as pf:
|
|
for lines in pf:
|
|
line = lines.split(',')
|
|
patch += [[line[0], line[1:]]]
|
|
# note: patches must be ordered by frame offset
|
|
|
|
# extract the keys
|
|
key_bytes = try_key_to_bytes(args.input_key)
|
|
logging.debug("input key: 0x{}".format(key_bytes.hex()))
|
|
if args.key is not None:
|
|
new_key = try_key_to_bytes(args.key)
|
|
logging.debug("output key: 0x{}".format(new_key.hex()))
|
|
else:
|
|
new_key = None
|
|
|
|
if args.hmac is not None:
|
|
new_hmac = try_key_to_bytes(args.hmac)
|
|
else:
|
|
new_hmac = get_random_bytes(32)
|
|
|
|
if args.iv is not None:
|
|
new_iv = try_key_to_bytes(args.iv)
|
|
else:
|
|
new_iv = get_random_bytes(16)
|
|
|
|
# format a .nky for the output .bin
|
|
if new_key is not None:
|
|
with open(ofile + ".nky", "w") as newkey:
|
|
if args.type == 'xc7a35t':
|
|
newkey.write("Device xc7a35t;\n")
|
|
else:
|
|
newkey.write("Device xc7s50;\n")
|
|
newkey.write("Key 0 ")
|
|
newkey.write(new_key.hex())
|
|
newkey.write(";\n")
|
|
newkey.write("Key StartCBC ")
|
|
newkey.write(str(binascii.hexlify(bitflip(new_iv))).strip("b").strip("'"))
|
|
newkey.write(";\n")
|
|
newkey.write("Key HMAC ")
|
|
newkey.write(str(binascii.hexlify(bitflip(new_hmac))).strip("b").strip("'"))
|
|
newkey.write(";\n")
|
|
|
|
if args.jtag_commands:
|
|
with open(ofile + ".jtg", "w") as jfile:
|
|
jfile.write("ir, 6, 0b010010, program_key\n")
|
|
jfile.write("dr, 32, 0xffffffff\n")
|
|
jfile.write("ir, 6, 0b010001, isc_program\n")
|
|
jfile.write("dr, 32, 0x557b\n")
|
|
for index in range(0, 8):
|
|
jfile.write("ir, 6, 0b010001, isc_program\n")
|
|
jfile.write("dr, 32, 0x{}\n".format(new_key[index*8:(index+1)*8]))
|
|
jfile.write("ir, 6, 0b010101, bbkey_rbk\n")
|
|
jfile.write("dr, 37, 0x1fffffffff\n")
|
|
for index in range(0, 8):
|
|
jfile.write("ir, 6, 0b010101, bbkey_rbk\n")
|
|
jfile.write("dr, 37, 0x1fffffffff\n")
|
|
|
|
# open the input file, and recover the plaintext
|
|
with open(ifile, "rb") as f:
|
|
binfile = f.read()
|
|
|
|
# search for structure
|
|
# 0x3001_6004 -> specifies the CBC key
|
|
# 4 words of CBC IV
|
|
# 0x3003_4001 -> ciphertext len
|
|
# 1 word of ciphertext len
|
|
# then ciphertext
|
|
|
|
position = 0
|
|
iv_pos = 0
|
|
while position < len(binfile):
|
|
cwd = int.from_bytes(binfile[position:position+4], 'big')
|
|
if cwd == 0x3001_6004:
|
|
iv_pos = position+4
|
|
if cwd == 0x3003_4001:
|
|
break
|
|
position = position + 1
|
|
|
|
position = position + 4
|
|
|
|
ciphertext_len = 4* int.from_bytes(binfile[position:position+4], 'big')
|
|
logging.debug("ciphertext len: %d", ciphertext_len)
|
|
position = position + 4
|
|
|
|
active_area = binfile[position : position+ciphertext_len]
|
|
postamble = binfile[position+ciphertext_len:]
|
|
|
|
iv_bytes = bitflip(binfile[iv_pos : iv_pos+0x10]) # note that the IV is embedded in the file
|
|
logging.debug("recovered iv: %s", binascii.hexlify(iv_bytes))
|
|
|
|
cipher = AES.new(key_bytes, AES.MODE_CBC, iv_bytes)
|
|
plain_bitstream = cipher.decrypt(bitflip(active_area))
|
|
|
|
# now construct the output file and its hashes
|
|
global bitstream_header_x1
|
|
global bitstream_header_bbram_x1
|
|
global bitstream_header_35t_bbram_x1
|
|
plaintext = bytearray()
|
|
with open(ofile + ".bin", "wb") as f:
|
|
if args.type == 'xc7a35t':
|
|
device_header = bitstream_header_35t_bbram_x1
|
|
elif args.bbram:
|
|
device_header = bitstream_header_bbram_x1
|
|
else:
|
|
device_header = bitstream_header_x1
|
|
|
|
for item in device_header: # add the cleartext header
|
|
f.write(bytes([item]))
|
|
|
|
f.write(bitflip(new_iv)) # insert the IV
|
|
|
|
for item in ciphertext_header: # add the cleartext length-of-ciphertext field before the ciphertext
|
|
f.write(bytes([item]))
|
|
|
|
# generate the header and footer hash keys.
|
|
header = int(0x6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C6C).to_bytes(32, byteorder='big')
|
|
keyed_header = xor_bytes(header, new_hmac)
|
|
footer = int(0x3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A3A).to_bytes(32, byteorder='big')
|
|
keyed_footer = xor_bytes(footer, new_hmac)
|
|
|
|
# add the header
|
|
plaintext.extend(keyed_header)
|
|
plaintext.extend(header)
|
|
|
|
# patch the plaintext bitstream, if requested. Also chops the bitstream down to the core size
|
|
# Function chops off last 160 bytes, as there will be re-generated with the new HMAC, and header is skipped
|
|
plain_patched = patcher(plain_bitstream, patch)
|
|
|
|
# insert the bitstream plaintext.
|
|
plaintext.extend(plain_patched)
|
|
|
|
# compute first HMAC of stream with new HMAC key
|
|
h1 = SHA256.new()
|
|
k = 0
|
|
while k < len(plaintext) - 320: # HMAC does /not/ cover the whole file, it stops 320 bytes short of the end
|
|
h1.update(bitflip(plaintext[k:k+16], 32))
|
|
k = k + 16
|
|
h1_digest = h1.digest()
|
|
logging.debug("new digest1 (in stored order): %s", binascii.hexlify(bitflip(h1_digest)))
|
|
|
|
# add the footer
|
|
plaintext.extend(keyed_footer)
|
|
plaintext.extend(footer)
|
|
plaintext.extend(bytes(32)) # empty spot where hash #1 would be stored
|
|
hash_pad = [ # sha-256 padding for the zero'd hash #1, which is in the bitstream and seems necessary for verification
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
|
|
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00,
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|
]
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|
plaintext.extend(hash_pad)
|
|
|
|
# compute the hash of the hash, presumably to prevent length extension attacks?
|
|
h2 = SHA256.new()
|
|
h2.update(bitflip(keyed_footer))
|
|
h2.update(bitflip(footer))
|
|
h2.update(h1_digest)
|
|
h2_digest = h2.digest()
|
|
|
|
# commit the final HMAC to the bitstream plaintext
|
|
plaintext.extend(bitflip(h2_digest))
|
|
logging.debug("new digest2: %s", binascii.hexlify(bitflip(h2_digest)))
|
|
|
|
if new_key is not None:
|
|
logging.debug("new key as used: %s", binascii.hexlify(new_key))
|
|
logging.debug("new iv as used: %s", binascii.hexlify(new_iv))
|
|
# encrypt the bitstream
|
|
newcipher = AES.new(new_key, AES.MODE_CBC, new_iv)
|
|
|
|
# make a frame dump if requested
|
|
if framefile != None:
|
|
with open(framefile, "w") as frameoutput:
|
|
dumpframes(frameoutput, bitflip(plaintext[64:-160])) # strip off hash header and footer before outputting frames
|
|
|
|
# finally generate the ciphertext block, which encapsulates the HMACs
|
|
ciphertext = newcipher.encrypt(bytes(plaintext))
|
|
|
|
# add ciphertext to the bitstream
|
|
f.write(bitflip(ciphertext))
|
|
|
|
# add the cleartext postamble to the bitstream. These are a series of NOP commands to the bitstream engine
|
|
#postamble = bytearray([0x20, 00, 00, 00])
|
|
#for i in range(0,220):
|
|
f.write(postamble)
|
|
else:
|
|
# just dump the plaintext
|
|
logging.info("Note: plaintext dump does not have the correct header to be directly loaded into an FPGA (the header would indicate the body is encrypted, when it is not). The purpose of the dump is for debugging encryption/decryption problems, not generating a loadable image.")
|
|
# if you wanted to fix the above, we'd have to figure out a bitstream_header record that is commensurate with this purpose. Not hard, just annoying and not needed at this time.
|
|
f.write(bitflip(plaintext))
|
|
f.write(postamble)
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
main() |