chore: more typos

probably should not have tried to spell check this, now i'm wasting
my time.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-12-13 22:56:37 +08:00
parent 283ea1de0d
commit b1b6d46d27
3 changed files with 10 additions and 10 deletions

View file

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
///
/// ### `frontend.rs`
/// Defines a set of modules that plug the PDDB into applications (in particular, they
/// attemp to provide a Rust-compatible `read`/`write`/`open` abstraction layer,
/// attempt to provide a Rust-compatible `read`/`write`/`open` abstraction layer,
/// torturing the notion of `Prefix`, `Path` and `File` in Rust to fit the basis/dict/key
/// format of the PDDB).
///
@ -64,12 +64,12 @@
/// for most operations on the PDDB, and thus most externally-visible API calls will be revealed
/// on that structure; in fact many calls on that object are just pass-through of lower level calls.
///
/// A `BasisCach`e consists of one or more `BasisCacheEntries`. This structure manages one or more
/// A `BasisCache` consists of one or more `BasisCacheEntries`. This structure manages one or more
/// `DictCacheEntry` within a `BasisCacheEntry`'s dictionary cache.
///
/// #### `dictionary.rs`
/// The `DictCacheEntry` is defined in this file, along with the on-disk `Dictionary`
/// storage stucture. Most of the methods on `DictCacheEntry` are concerned with managing
/// storage structure. Most of the methods on `DictCacheEntry` are concerned with managing
/// keys contained within the dictionary cache.
///
/// #### `keys.rs`
@ -243,7 +243,7 @@
/// a presented password to a given salt entry. In a traditional user/pass login database, the username is
/// the plaintext key to match the salt. In this case, we would use a nickname used to refer to each Basis
/// to correlate to its salt entry. Thus, we'd have to come up with "garbage" plaintext nicknames
/// for a Basis that are not trivial for a rubber-hose attacker to dismiss as chaffe. I think this is Hard.
/// for a Basis that are not trivial for a rubber-hose attacker to dismiss as chaff. I think this is Hard.
/// The alternative is to "brute force" the entire list of salts, guessing each one in sequence until one
/// is found to decrypt entries in the Basis page table. The problem with this is that bcrypt is designed to
/// be computationally slow, even for valid passwords. The complexity parameter is chosen so that it takes
@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
/// user ever using the PD function because it is too slow. Thus for v1 of the PDDB, we're going to try approach
/// (2), where a common salt is used across all the PDDB passwords, but the salt is /not/ re-used between devices.
/// This choice diminishes the overall security of the system in the case that a user chooses weak passwords, or re-uses
/// passwords, but in exchange for a great improvement in responsivity of the implementation.
/// passwords, but in exchange for a great improvement in responsiveness of the implementation.
///
/// The final implementation uses a slight mod on (2), where the 128-bit common salt stored on disk is XOR'd
/// with the user-provided "basis name". Users are of course allowed to pick crappy names for their basis, and
@ -283,8 +283,8 @@
///
/// A newly created Basis will request a name for the Basis, and a password. It is a requirement
/// that the combination of `(name, password)` be unique; this property is enforced and a system will
/// reject attempts to create identically named, identially passworded Basis. However, one can have
/// same-named Basis that have a different password, or diffently-named Basis with the same password
/// reject attempts to create identically named, identically passworded Basis. However, one can have
/// same-named Basis that have a different password, or differently-named Basis with the same password
/// (this is generally not recommended, but it's not prohibited).
///
/// The `name` field is XOR'd with the device-local `salt` field to form the salt for the password,

View file

@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
}
/// Returns the `salt` needed for the `bcrypt` routine.
/// This routine handles the special-case of being unitialized: in that case, we need to get
/// This routine handles the special-case of being uninitialized: in that case, we need to get
/// salt from a staging area, and not our KEYROM. However, `setup_key_init` must be called
/// first to ensure that the staging area has a valid salt.
fn get_salt(&mut self) -> [u8; 16] {
@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&root_sk);
// hash a derived secret key based on the maximum rollback limit we anticipate less the current global rollback limit (which is 0)
// this allows us to work with a "final" key that generates a private signing key, which can't be predicted to future versions
// given the current key (due to the irreversability of Sha512/256), but once derived to a more recent version can be willfullly
// given the current key (due to the irreversibility of Sha512/256), but once derived to a more recent version can be willfully
// computed to an older version to recover e.g. old data encrypted with a prior key
//
// We don't use the `compute_key_rollback` function because the value of the GLOBAL_ROLLBACK in the KeyROM

View file

@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ mod implementation {
let jtag = jtag::Jtag::new(&xns).expect("couldn't connect to jtag server");
RootKeys {
password_type: None,
// must occupy tihs connection for the system to boot properly
// must occupy this connection for the system to boot properly
jtag,
ticktimer: ticktimer_server::Ticktimer::new().unwrap(),
gam: gam::Gam::new(&xns).expect("couldn't connect to GAM"),