All the PDDB infrastructure is now in place. The core filesystem is
fairly well tested, but the server APIs are entirely untested. However,
this merge at least gets the clean build into the mainline and will
cause a Precursor to create and format a PDDB. Note: this takes about
15 minutes -- about 7 minutes to erase the memory, 9 minutes to fill it
with random data. This is primarily limited by the raw speed of the
FLASH memory itself.
- check the password with a double-entry on the first boot
- if we see a blank disk, bypass the usual checks and allow the mount
to fail, then, enter the setup routine.
This is one of the truly redeeming features of Rust is that a
major refactor of a core structure like this doesn't leave me
shaking in my boots -- I feel pretty good that this works
since everything passes the CI tests.
The original FS implementation did the "stupid C thing" which
just creates a fixed lenth field and uses null-terminated C
strings. Which actually restricts PDDB entry names to be ascii
as valid UTF-8 can encode single-byte nulls.
The intention was for names to be fully utf-8 compliant, but in
order to do that we have to burn one byte of potential filename
length and encode an overall length field for the name strings.
This change does that, which both makes the code a bit safer
at the expense of losing a character off of the maximum filename
length.
The rootkey enclave actually doesn't check if your password is
correct -- it has no way of knowing because it doesn't know how
the keys will be used. Password checking is delegated to the
requesting process because also the password retry method and
policy depends upon the application, and is a significant amount
of UX plumbing (in fact the rootkeys should have less UX plumbing
than it has right now - this is something to do in the near future).
Add a mechanism in the PDDB to check if a password was entered
correctly, and retry if it isn't. Without this, an incorrect
password would actually trigger a reformat of the PDDB, since
it can't find the system basis structure with a bad password.
takes about 15 minutes to fully initialize a 100MiB PDDB.
time is dominated by the sector erase time (which is fundamental
to the device) and data write rate (also fundamental to the device).
This is going to require users to update their devices before
doing a key initialization.
The problem is that we can't trust the length of data presented
to us to self-sign, so we sign the whole area. In v0.9.2 of the
loader, a check was introduced to check the putative length of
the signed area against the actual length of the signed area,
by encoding the length of the signed area within the signed
region.
This would require the rootkeys algorithm to also encode that
new length at the end of the signed area, but this was never
done. However, this bug was never found during testing probably
because I failed to completely erase the original key provisioning
(I was more fixated on checking that existing keys were not damaged by
firmware updates at the time), and thus did not trigger a full
rootkey provisioning cycle when I did the test. I had only just
caught it now while porting the PDDB from simulation to real
hardware.
probably should have split this into two commits. oh well.
first part introduces a check to see if root keys are initialized,
and if so, tries to mount the PDDB. If it can't mount, it asks
the user if they want to format it. It also updates the progress
of the fromatting.
the second part redoes the salt once again. After some discussion
SHA512/256 is also resistant to length extension attacsk so we
don't need to use the HMAC technique suggested. Would prefer to
reduce the number of algos to analyze, so we're going to a simple
SHA512/256 hash of the salt/basis name/plaintext password to generate
the salt that goes into the bcrypt routine that ultimately generates
the final key used by the system.
trying to avoid a situation where inspection of the system basis
can lead to conclusions about how old the system "should" be.
This is of course slightly upset by the fact that we need to track `Age`
numbers within keys to implement LRU caching algorithms (coming real soon
now), but at least this decouples the pages' low-level journal entry
count from the age parameter.
based on feedback that the current mechanism is overly complicated
and doesn't add any real security, and it's better to stick with
something simple e.g. just a tried-and-true hash of the basics