the loader is a little funky, and requires some maintainer hand-holding
due to the split of the page ownership between the root-keys
crate and the graphics-server crate.
Improved docs so I don't forget this detail in the future.
This macro will be removed, since it is no longer necessary. Remove this
macro across the project and replace it with a standard `main()`
function.
Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io>
A lot of packages are depending on 0.6 api, which requires a crate
that has OS specific TRNG calls. This patch keeps the 0.5 calls
inside the TRNG crate as direct API calls, and migrates to support
a 0.6 api to a patched version of getrandom that supports Xous.
change the notification modal to accept the primary message and an
Option of independent text to display as a qrcode
pub fn show_notification(&self, notification: &str, qrtext:Option<&str>) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {}
saves ~64k of runtime, and compilations are faster.
downside is that the gateware patching process seems to run a little bit
slower, perhaps since the loads aren't fully unrolled into individual
instructions.
the actual transition to a new version isn't here. But,
at the very least, the root keys are now derived by hashing
them MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT times, which allows us to create a
key chain based on a global version number that can be incremented
while allowing derviation of older keys without compromising newer
keys.
Was doing disjoint loads and stores on an Atomic, really, should
be using the fetch_add, fetch_sub variants to be proper.
Didn't seem to impact anything but maybe there's a future version
of me that high fives me for doing this.
this prevents us from having to use the entire reserved region
as a worst-case and improves screen-up time on resume.
previously, we didn't encode a signed length in the kernel so we couldn't
trust the length that was presented to us. This was fixed a while ago
but i just connected the dots today that this needed to be updated as well.
- code is merged into shellchat so there's less alignment overhead
and some library reuse
- server is not spawned until it's needed, so the RAM load is less
Saves a bit on resources and the RTC crate doesn't need
to be stand-alone now that the modals crate is a thing;
we are able to split the UX routine to manage the RTC out
of the code that actually manages the hardware.
The hardware code ended up in LLIO, and the UX ended up in the status
routine.
Each Cargo.toml now includes a comment which remnids maintainers
of the dependency policy for Xous (that is, nail down every dependency
to the minor number).
Versions are pinned down to the minor number. Yes, this means that
we don't automatically pull in features and bug updates from crates.io,
but it also means we don't pull in new attack surfaces and code that
hasn't been tested or reviewed. I'd like this process to be very deliberate
and not automatic for Xous.
The `rand` crate is almost pinned down to a single version, except
for an odd dependency that's pulled in by hosted mode that depends
on rand 0.8.4 via a subordinate dependency via the `tempfile` crate.
Pondering if it's worth it to try and eliminate that, because the
0.8.4 version doesn't get compiled into any version that touches
real hardware. It just makes it harder to analyze the Cargo.lock
file, mostly. I think I'll leave it as-is.
- check the password with a double-entry on the first boot
- if we see a blank disk, bypass the usual checks and allow the mount
to fail, then, enter the setup routine.
This is one of the truly redeeming features of Rust is that a
major refactor of a core structure like this doesn't leave me
shaking in my boots -- I feel pretty good that this works
since everything passes the CI tests.
The original FS implementation did the "stupid C thing" which
just creates a fixed lenth field and uses null-terminated C
strings. Which actually restricts PDDB entry names to be ascii
as valid UTF-8 can encode single-byte nulls.
The intention was for names to be fully utf-8 compliant, but in
order to do that we have to burn one byte of potential filename
length and encode an overall length field for the name strings.
This change does that, which both makes the code a bit safer
at the expense of losing a character off of the maximum filename
length.
The rootkey enclave actually doesn't check if your password is
correct -- it has no way of knowing because it doesn't know how
the keys will be used. Password checking is delegated to the
requesting process because also the password retry method and
policy depends upon the application, and is a significant amount
of UX plumbing (in fact the rootkeys should have less UX plumbing
than it has right now - this is something to do in the near future).
Add a mechanism in the PDDB to check if a password was entered
correctly, and retry if it isn't. Without this, an incorrect
password would actually trigger a reformat of the PDDB, since
it can't find the system basis structure with a bad password.
This is going to require users to update their devices before
doing a key initialization.
The problem is that we can't trust the length of data presented
to us to self-sign, so we sign the whole area. In v0.9.2 of the
loader, a check was introduced to check the putative length of
the signed area against the actual length of the signed area,
by encoding the length of the signed area within the signed
region.
This would require the rootkeys algorithm to also encode that
new length at the end of the signed area, but this was never
done. However, this bug was never found during testing probably
because I failed to completely erase the original key provisioning
(I was more fixated on checking that existing keys were not damaged by
firmware updates at the time), and thus did not trigger a full
rootkey provisioning cycle when I did the test. I had only just
caught it now while porting the PDDB from simulation to real
hardware.
- hosted mode uses an awful, horrific hack to simulate FLASH:
it makes a global singleton that is freely mutable. Oh but wait!
that's actually how the hardware behaves. It's up to the code
around the hardware to create those primitives. So, maybe it makes
sense that the simulation model for the hardware is terribly
unsafe and unprotected.
- the format routine at least doesn't crash and creates some
semblance of a result that looks right-ish. Need to write a
utility that helps to explore the "disk image" so we can
understand what's going on.
This is a "no good choice" situation but there is a problem with
progress bars.
You want progress bars to update quickly, and you don't want
to have to context switch out for the entire graphics stack to
come back to you to approve the drawing of your progress bar update.
On the other hand, you don't want to short-circuit all the checks
on drawing stuff to the screen for the sake of progress bars --
right now, there are a number of checks in place to make sure you
can't draw stuff on parts of the screen you shouldn't, to avoid
fake messages and dialog boxes.
I had managed to work out a way to get a dialog box to redraw without
violating the security rules -- each redraw is checked by the defacing
routine -- however, due to the way I was computing the height of
the modal I was causing the dialog box to be resized to its largest
size and then shrunk again to fit the text every iteration. This
in essence also caused the defacement routine to run repeatedly,
which caused the GAM to also issue repeated redraw requests to
the main loop.
These redraw requests can't be serviced until the task being tracked
by the progress bar is completed. As the progress bar gets redrawn
almost a hundred times as part of the task, roughly a hundred messages
arrive in the server's queue before it can handle a single one.
This results in a deadlock situation on completion of the progress
bar, because we want to fire off a message to ourselves to go to
the next state in the Ux routine.
There are a few possible solutions to this:
1. Multi thread the heck out of the routine doing the progress bar,
so the dialog box and the slider are each in their own threads
with their own responders and then the thing doing the computation
is doing some Mutex-guarded-Arc thing.
2. Do some very unsafe bodge to allow sliders to do direct draws
that are unchecked
3. Add a check so that if the size of the dialog box doesn't change,
defacement isn't recomputed and thus redraw messages aren't sent back.
(1) doesn't work for a number of reasons -- in a general case, it's
probably OK, but it does cause a lot more memory usage (and we are
lean on memory); but more importantly, for this use case, our routine
is interacting with CSRs and those don't implement Send so you can't
pass them into a thread via a closure. You could maybe put the dialog
boxes themselves into an Arc Mutex thing but because this routine
was heavily coded to re-use the heavyweight Ux resources this becomes
a bit cumersome to code.
(2) is terrible
(3) ended up working and what is in this commit. I think it's OK
because a progress bar generally doesn't require changing the
size of a window to update its state; therefore the redraw is
deface-safe (since you aren't changing the bounds of what you were
already approved to draw in). Of course, if you have some sort
of a progress bar implementation that changes the size of the messages
reported up top so that the dialog box has to change size over and
over again, you still end up in the deadlock situation!
The function `as_slice_mut()` takes a `MemoryRange` and returns a
mutable slice. Previously, this could be called on a memory range that
was not defined as `mut`.
This will be fixed in `xous-rs` so that `as_slice_mut()` can only be
called on a region that is defined as `mut`.
Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io>
This code was originally in https://github.com/betrusted-io/rom-locate.
However, the majority of that crate is concerned with creating the database
files necessary for the patching, and it pulls in a lot of dependencies.
Changing hardware targets is considered to be a "huge" change for this
project, so we're pushing the code generator directly into xous-core,
and commiting the generated code directly. The theory is that we would
probably never have to modify this code, since it's so intimately linked
to the hardware; it's a bit like committing an include file with
register offsets for a particular peripheral.
also add some bread crumbs on the more user-facing APIs to
help beginners out. Need to do a good spring cleaning of the
rustdoc tree, though. looks pretty terrible as it is.