implement a basis for anti-rollback upgrades

the actual transition to a new version isn't here. But,
at the very least, the root keys are now derived by hashing
them MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT times, which allows us to create a
key chain based on a global version number that can be incremented
while allowing derviation of older keys without compromising newer
keys.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2022-02-04 01:33:04 +08:00
parent 6d6b62ae60
commit 11c88b170e
6 changed files with 231 additions and 143 deletions

View file

@ -1,128 +1,128 @@
KEYROM 0 A SLICE_X36Y50 b'df14e1bb410df3a1'
KEYROM 0 B SLICE_X36Y50 b'd04dff21f89ee8bf'
KEYROM 0 C SLICE_X36Y50 b'416c1a28fd83c77b'
KEYROM 0 D SLICE_X36Y50 b'ba0269ba89e641d7'
KEYROM 1 A SLICE_X37Y50 b'9c44df255fd2a5da'
KEYROM 1 B SLICE_X37Y50 b'aea94847e5f2cd0c'
KEYROM 1 C SLICE_X37Y50 b'8b92e766041d2215'
KEYROM 1 D SLICE_X37Y50 b'a0d520564ff78a60'
KEYROM 2 A SLICE_X36Y51 b'f3cb7a1101eeaf6c'
KEYROM 2 B SLICE_X36Y51 b'ab6ac834e19baefc'
KEYROM 2 C SLICE_X36Y51 b'00b12075b2185b18'
KEYROM 2 D SLICE_X36Y51 b'7d4eae2b7c7b0778'
KEYROM 3 A SLICE_X37Y51 b'cc668b73dc5b20ed'
KEYROM 3 B SLICE_X37Y51 b'a5b8b7120edeb93c'
KEYROM 3 C SLICE_X37Y51 b'597f101f0a33972c'
KEYROM 3 D SLICE_X37Y51 b'6469cc5379d26720'
KEYROM 4 A SLICE_X36Y52 b'aeb1bc7732636490'
KEYROM 4 B SLICE_X36Y52 b'eb882878da9c7943'
KEYROM 4 C SLICE_X36Y52 b'71f37802768585ae'
KEYROM 4 D SLICE_X36Y52 b'3e0a50c473a23418'
KEYROM 5 A SLICE_X37Y52 b'bf85b47bebbd4ed0'
KEYROM 5 B SLICE_X37Y52 b'6c3c2429eda490ae'
KEYROM 5 C SLICE_X37Y52 b'1b37ffc31fdfdfcc'
KEYROM 5 D SLICE_X37Y52 b'04a6c3992e50fc67'
KEYROM 6 A SLICE_X36Y53 b'e4d8253303f260ad'
KEYROM 6 B SLICE_X36Y53 b'94213ab1b2d87176'
KEYROM 6 C SLICE_X36Y53 b'd928e7243d13ee32'
KEYROM 6 D SLICE_X36Y53 b'1baf76b1bae5dd35'
KEYROM 7 A SLICE_X37Y53 b'f94f5b910a3adfd5'
KEYROM 7 B SLICE_X37Y53 b'37a5ab15c01e20e4'
KEYROM 7 C SLICE_X37Y53 b'6baa138e51b37fea'
KEYROM 7 D SLICE_X37Y53 b'28270dc201771b62'
KEYROM 8 A SLICE_X36Y54 b'ff84d4a63041c516'
KEYROM 8 B SLICE_X36Y54 b'52918b89290e53ef'
KEYROM 8 C SLICE_X36Y54 b'c6f32dcdec7b8cc9'
KEYROM 8 D SLICE_X36Y54 b'4bf983b124ea3e62'
KEYROM 9 A SLICE_X37Y54 b'c18b0d2924202e43'
KEYROM 9 B SLICE_X37Y54 b'75a403a06a95f69b'
KEYROM 9 C SLICE_X37Y54 b'0e6c4c529690213d'
KEYROM 9 D SLICE_X37Y54 b'105b5014c6ff9172'
KEYROM 10 A SLICE_X36Y55 b'2818d6b10fcc1315'
KEYROM 10 B SLICE_X36Y55 b'332f6d00f603bb50'
KEYROM 10 C SLICE_X36Y55 b'32332a423e3e7c1a'
KEYROM 10 D SLICE_X36Y55 b'b1643077491b5e06'
KEYROM 11 A SLICE_X37Y55 b'361bab4ce8b57fee'
KEYROM 11 B SLICE_X37Y55 b'92edf70b9cfe0098'
KEYROM 11 C SLICE_X37Y55 b'63039a3ecc72f58d'
KEYROM 11 D SLICE_X37Y55 b'733ba57f04b75284'
KEYROM 12 A SLICE_X36Y56 b'765767c682d26569'
KEYROM 12 B SLICE_X36Y56 b'497992efc3776d79'
KEYROM 12 C SLICE_X36Y56 b'7d95ac30fbb5d34b'
KEYROM 12 D SLICE_X36Y56 b'89f54d6c6492b724'
KEYROM 13 A SLICE_X37Y56 b'f5eb153c883b6b6a'
KEYROM 13 B SLICE_X37Y56 b'b97af3b9d2c75292'
KEYROM 13 C SLICE_X37Y56 b'be705ea0031d0e71'
KEYROM 13 D SLICE_X37Y56 b'0dd907c101fddb1e'
KEYROM 14 A SLICE_X36Y57 b'3a773992ffd19035'
KEYROM 14 B SLICE_X36Y57 b'39540ab5ad9029a4'
KEYROM 14 C SLICE_X36Y57 b'fe6a6748030621db'
KEYROM 14 D SLICE_X36Y57 b'037296f110144ae4'
KEYROM 15 A SLICE_X37Y57 b'62e89c33394dcb13'
KEYROM 15 B SLICE_X37Y57 b'a0d90f274ca934b0'
KEYROM 15 C SLICE_X37Y57 b'd3321d7e3d0817f4'
KEYROM 15 D SLICE_X37Y57 b'0f89feb7554feb88'
KEYROM 16 A SLICE_X36Y58 b'6144cb3338715f56'
KEYROM 16 B SLICE_X36Y58 b'e8b7136a67dd63dc'
KEYROM 16 C SLICE_X36Y58 b'1915eb8794f26e06'
KEYROM 16 D SLICE_X36Y58 b'7e06c5e6258396b7'
KEYROM 17 A SLICE_X37Y58 b'1cd1cb5102979c09'
KEYROM 17 B SLICE_X37Y58 b'7e390dd426f32f6b'
KEYROM 17 C SLICE_X37Y58 b'cd796e3604b1f665'
KEYROM 17 D SLICE_X37Y58 b'd6d3a0d503744352'
KEYROM 18 A SLICE_X36Y59 b'7838fefdfeff0caf'
KEYROM 18 B SLICE_X36Y59 b'39937d76a02e55b2'
KEYROM 18 C SLICE_X36Y59 b'a74ce365e488fb5c'
KEYROM 18 D SLICE_X36Y59 b'5ff47e2ad8f8c727'
KEYROM 19 A SLICE_X37Y59 b'24877ab3b82cfb60'
KEYROM 19 B SLICE_X37Y59 b'0997e1bd2730dc92'
KEYROM 19 C SLICE_X37Y59 b'22cb622b3807b997'
KEYROM 19 D SLICE_X37Y59 b'305a1a9722c36348'
KEYROM 20 A SLICE_X36Y60 b'ed417bdc093cc6e5'
KEYROM 20 B SLICE_X36Y60 b'368c101fbe4593f9'
KEYROM 20 C SLICE_X36Y60 b'f524fe658b30c5ff'
KEYROM 20 D SLICE_X36Y60 b'427894ffe12ea152'
KEYROM 21 A SLICE_X37Y60 b'8d6628875ae19e43'
KEYROM 21 B SLICE_X37Y60 b'1e3d36077f35ebed'
KEYROM 21 C SLICE_X37Y60 b'55cbcc5900fbe0fa'
KEYROM 21 D SLICE_X37Y60 b'b3576c48e96b040f'
KEYROM 22 A SLICE_X36Y61 b'0c1baa89112852b0'
KEYROM 22 B SLICE_X36Y61 b'39483bee52dceb4c'
KEYROM 22 C SLICE_X36Y61 b'd9b21bb5703e5abc'
KEYROM 22 D SLICE_X36Y61 b'707e78d4d0a3fd99'
KEYROM 23 A SLICE_X37Y61 b'06b27a972f8fac72'
KEYROM 23 B SLICE_X37Y61 b'5d6a42a77b856df6'
KEYROM 23 C SLICE_X37Y61 b'f48aeab4a59dcd34'
KEYROM 23 D SLICE_X37Y61 b'c210bd1111f5513f'
KEYROM 24 A SLICE_X36Y62 b'5a8d01dc3c48c365'
KEYROM 24 B SLICE_X36Y62 b'550604e502c4b51e'
KEYROM 24 C SLICE_X36Y62 b'196e9d00a1dddb36'
KEYROM 24 D SLICE_X36Y62 b'56fcd1ec8b205a60'
KEYROM 25 A SLICE_X37Y62 b'b278f2eeab6f1eb6'
KEYROM 25 B SLICE_X37Y62 b'daf87a1c092d4d95'
KEYROM 25 C SLICE_X37Y62 b'7e2e704497c71ad4'
KEYROM 25 D SLICE_X37Y62 b'81fe60c9b947f5cc'
KEYROM 26 A SLICE_X36Y63 b'aaf0eab1eb9a4390'
KEYROM 26 B SLICE_X36Y63 b'44b81cf224548463'
KEYROM 26 C SLICE_X36Y63 b'50445f9b117caeaf'
KEYROM 26 D SLICE_X36Y63 b'80ea15490c51a616'
KEYROM 27 A SLICE_X37Y63 b'0c3cd10b73427f91'
KEYROM 27 B SLICE_X37Y63 b'a2d60f9a2e16eff3'
KEYROM 27 C SLICE_X37Y63 b'07a7dd73948f0bf6'
KEYROM 27 D SLICE_X37Y63 b'4e84fc06d10dd094'
KEYROM 28 A SLICE_X36Y64 b'3f371180b689d79c'
KEYROM 28 B SLICE_X36Y64 b'8aab4a1aafd06b10'
KEYROM 28 C SLICE_X36Y64 b'2e2bc7d70388afab'
KEYROM 28 D SLICE_X36Y64 b'f84c176996b25a8a'
KEYROM 29 A SLICE_X37Y64 b'adedccab0cf1047d'
KEYROM 29 B SLICE_X37Y64 b'dc944b65364129e4'
KEYROM 29 C SLICE_X37Y64 b'4c71b98fc479b286'
KEYROM 29 D SLICE_X37Y64 b'9be04f29153ca694'
KEYROM 30 A SLICE_X36Y65 b'aa98cf138633738d'
KEYROM 30 B SLICE_X36Y65 b'fdf766fd0e5a46d0'
KEYROM 30 C SLICE_X36Y65 b'5230ebd643274b37'
KEYROM 30 D SLICE_X36Y65 b'e96126419731faa4'
KEYROM 31 A SLICE_X37Y65 b'29277868d4660ffa'
KEYROM 31 B SLICE_X37Y65 b'e8a0b6dbe77de21c'
KEYROM 31 C SLICE_X37Y65 b'feaacc3708396854'
KEYROM 31 D SLICE_X37Y65 b'a43e6b13f2017b0f'
KEYROM 0 A SLICE_X36Y50 b'2253afe6ef9575fb'
KEYROM 0 B SLICE_X36Y50 b'd7a7360d5f354148'
KEYROM 0 C SLICE_X36Y50 b'cd35270191ed0296'
KEYROM 0 D SLICE_X36Y50 b'677bccac8c854b80'
KEYROM 1 A SLICE_X37Y50 b'be530e5c8f3c4974'
KEYROM 1 B SLICE_X37Y50 b'5f6e609627b7e0c8'
KEYROM 1 C SLICE_X37Y50 b'6e9b2b527ee1580f'
KEYROM 1 D SLICE_X37Y50 b'2108b5666987a290'
KEYROM 2 A SLICE_X36Y51 b'd2ce61c675aff795'
KEYROM 2 B SLICE_X36Y51 b'eb1ef14b699919c0'
KEYROM 2 C SLICE_X36Y51 b'46f2c8c59d5f1ba1'
KEYROM 2 D SLICE_X36Y51 b'cd80cfaa878e0180'
KEYROM 3 A SLICE_X37Y51 b'0c51f2e27045d192'
KEYROM 3 B SLICE_X37Y51 b'77b5a6da36ef4e1f'
KEYROM 3 C SLICE_X37Y51 b'f8a08063a4f3ed92'
KEYROM 3 D SLICE_X37Y51 b'99f7211d54ddb6c7'
KEYROM 4 A SLICE_X36Y52 b'718a31cc9ee39a05'
KEYROM 4 B SLICE_X36Y52 b'5fd9d20624321ef8'
KEYROM 4 C SLICE_X36Y52 b'471c91be68c93189'
KEYROM 4 D SLICE_X36Y52 b'0629ab62709ed8c3'
KEYROM 5 A SLICE_X37Y52 b'39437ee930c1cb51'
KEYROM 5 B SLICE_X37Y52 b'39e23cac2cac61a4'
KEYROM 5 C SLICE_X37Y52 b'4c59e99b64641d54'
KEYROM 5 D SLICE_X37Y52 b'b2ac7dcf09f95bc9'
KEYROM 6 A SLICE_X36Y53 b'04863a46de78bb00'
KEYROM 6 B SLICE_X36Y53 b'93c8c73315aa91b7'
KEYROM 6 C SLICE_X36Y53 b'350559ee3b7c5a20'
KEYROM 6 D SLICE_X36Y53 b'b5133117630b39e7'
KEYROM 7 A SLICE_X37Y53 b'4294e882a04e56ba'
KEYROM 7 B SLICE_X37Y53 b'c7ff1f45d08b9ca0'
KEYROM 7 C SLICE_X37Y53 b'66d9ae43b2039467'
KEYROM 7 D SLICE_X37Y53 b'524bdf2a1966c7c3'
KEYROM 8 A SLICE_X36Y54 b'd1476a22da9f278e'
KEYROM 8 B SLICE_X36Y54 b'f05270c26650743d'
KEYROM 8 C SLICE_X36Y54 b'28902e6d244dae0c'
KEYROM 8 D SLICE_X36Y54 b'566f5bb0134e0148'
KEYROM 9 A SLICE_X37Y54 b'a5302e52dbe88445'
KEYROM 9 B SLICE_X37Y54 b'4b8f67a43520b2d0'
KEYROM 9 C SLICE_X37Y54 b'44fd3624d3331f52'
KEYROM 9 D SLICE_X37Y54 b'856da7c86a5b3074'
KEYROM 10 A SLICE_X36Y55 b'08586053fb439e8a'
KEYROM 10 B SLICE_X36Y55 b'13497280447028fc'
KEYROM 10 C SLICE_X36Y55 b'c48584b5b5b87eac'
KEYROM 10 D SLICE_X36Y55 b'86b02ea381d479e7'
KEYROM 11 A SLICE_X37Y55 b'f360ab86140d2b49'
KEYROM 11 B SLICE_X37Y55 b'66f18a9de97cc12b'
KEYROM 11 C SLICE_X37Y55 b'612f4c5e7721fa81'
KEYROM 11 D SLICE_X37Y55 b'7e44dc2e8baa33f4'
KEYROM 12 A SLICE_X36Y56 b'64db34a1ca57dff1'
KEYROM 12 B SLICE_X36Y56 b'28685c8c97479bf9'
KEYROM 12 C SLICE_X36Y56 b'5f6947f723bf5916'
KEYROM 12 D SLICE_X36Y56 b'886b36cfdd4a02dd'
KEYROM 13 A SLICE_X37Y56 b'8b0a0a4ee719e0da'
KEYROM 13 B SLICE_X37Y56 b'1c17af721fc23adc'
KEYROM 13 C SLICE_X37Y56 b'08a6d62f007312f0'
KEYROM 13 D SLICE_X37Y56 b'98375538659f662f'
KEYROM 14 A SLICE_X36Y57 b'3b95c9d486da6015'
KEYROM 14 B SLICE_X36Y57 b'd6214d19e434f1ee'
KEYROM 14 C SLICE_X36Y57 b'e3b5fcf0629c3760'
KEYROM 14 D SLICE_X36Y57 b'da5bf495cd79a9a4'
KEYROM 15 A SLICE_X37Y57 b'f0ffd0f51557ed10'
KEYROM 15 B SLICE_X37Y57 b'799568e1f278c442'
KEYROM 15 C SLICE_X37Y57 b'88ae4b1b805ce08d'
KEYROM 15 D SLICE_X37Y57 b'e79b9412723d8069'
KEYROM 16 A SLICE_X36Y58 b'9cc476c6386d531f'
KEYROM 16 B SLICE_X36Y58 b'58f3aae6bb9e16e8'
KEYROM 16 C SLICE_X36Y58 b'725cf041a326db93'
KEYROM 16 D SLICE_X36Y58 b'b387bcb61b5c423c'
KEYROM 17 A SLICE_X37Y58 b'c115a65674534d4b'
KEYROM 17 B SLICE_X37Y58 b'1130f37503837f8f'
KEYROM 17 C SLICE_X37Y58 b'1468172d24b1ead7'
KEYROM 17 D SLICE_X37Y58 b'792442338c128d22'
KEYROM 18 A SLICE_X36Y59 b'9c617ee9ba38a501'
KEYROM 18 B SLICE_X36Y59 b'6d984069c95e4ef9'
KEYROM 18 C SLICE_X36Y59 b'f10beff31109d25b'
KEYROM 18 D SLICE_X36Y59 b'f9b4d041e7ca503c'
KEYROM 19 A SLICE_X37Y59 b'd4ba8f06f06b4fb7'
KEYROM 19 B SLICE_X37Y59 b'3ce9a9b357086462'
KEYROM 19 C SLICE_X37Y59 b'a2a225576026700a'
KEYROM 19 D SLICE_X37Y59 b'aff7b790a55eb8de'
KEYROM 20 A SLICE_X36Y60 b'704409bc903ef405'
KEYROM 20 B SLICE_X36Y60 b'c18b95e0171e54ff'
KEYROM 20 C SLICE_X36Y60 b'359e818020171bff'
KEYROM 20 D SLICE_X36Y60 b'db1956d85b3ac72b'
KEYROM 21 A SLICE_X37Y60 b'f4a5bd2a85da7ad6'
KEYROM 21 B SLICE_X37Y60 b'7b34842435ad6643'
KEYROM 21 C SLICE_X37Y60 b'680555e38333b824'
KEYROM 21 D SLICE_X37Y60 b'f52238f3a23f6823'
KEYROM 22 A SLICE_X36Y61 b'e66acde30283926c'
KEYROM 22 B SLICE_X36Y61 b'fa1d856c53476c3e'
KEYROM 22 C SLICE_X36Y61 b'85c7e56acc617a6c'
KEYROM 22 D SLICE_X36Y61 b'80eb2e91c11cc50a'
KEYROM 23 A SLICE_X37Y61 b'dd72ae20a782b480'
KEYROM 23 B SLICE_X37Y61 b'abff67507d431c8a'
KEYROM 23 C SLICE_X37Y61 b'f7777938b277aea2'
KEYROM 23 D SLICE_X37Y61 b'634726cedd3b5537'
KEYROM 24 A SLICE_X36Y62 b'e6506582408d39ce'
KEYROM 24 B SLICE_X36Y62 b'2a7511e97c36dd0a'
KEYROM 24 C SLICE_X36Y62 b'3612f35d7ec66f41'
KEYROM 24 D SLICE_X36Y62 b'b2df7104b89c57c0'
KEYROM 25 A SLICE_X37Y62 b'ba82d0bafa114fc8'
KEYROM 25 B SLICE_X37Y62 b'd53e0d2f4ef1be85'
KEYROM 25 C SLICE_X37Y62 b'0505b902ee81679d'
KEYROM 25 D SLICE_X37Y62 b'e5642bedf9d64049'
KEYROM 26 A SLICE_X36Y63 b'3273253b029bbd31'
KEYROM 26 B SLICE_X36Y63 b'd835604661c9c2d6'
KEYROM 26 C SLICE_X36Y63 b'd745ce6225442b0b'
KEYROM 26 D SLICE_X36Y63 b'721ccebdbb3ac8f6'
KEYROM 27 A SLICE_X37Y63 b'cf49dd20a62e6b8d'
KEYROM 27 B SLICE_X37Y63 b'7b972b0d3c859700'
KEYROM 27 C SLICE_X37Y63 b'cce695c18121cc17'
KEYROM 27 D SLICE_X37Y63 b'38e80e3cda01e93e'
KEYROM 28 A SLICE_X36Y64 b'13c52ea98ae5b7c8'
KEYROM 28 B SLICE_X36Y64 b'f3df5eaf7d98a7d4'
KEYROM 28 C SLICE_X36Y64 b'3f630ad83ca51d6b'
KEYROM 28 D SLICE_X36Y64 b'a9cf6962c7bc9511'
KEYROM 29 A SLICE_X37Y64 b'8afc60b2d3835958'
KEYROM 29 B SLICE_X37Y64 b'594fddca4fef1ceb'
KEYROM 29 C SLICE_X37Y64 b'e0e2c4baf29e66dc'
KEYROM 29 D SLICE_X37Y64 b'5fdcfd6d8b5511cf'
KEYROM 30 A SLICE_X36Y65 b'ca31c936cf2c0ccb'
KEYROM 30 B SLICE_X36Y65 b'71bd727cb1666975'
KEYROM 30 C SLICE_X36Y65 b'8104235008036fbb'
KEYROM 30 D SLICE_X36Y65 b'e26362ee08a04dc1'
KEYROM 31 A SLICE_X37Y65 b'c2d7ed7a1dd05b59'
KEYROM 31 B SLICE_X37Y65 b'd99dbec6e439a61f'
KEYROM 31 C SLICE_X37Y65 b'172a205e659acfa6'
KEYROM 31 D SLICE_X37Y65 b'6306a15e5c9c3467'

View file

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
<device schemaVersion="1.1" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xs:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="CMSIS-SVD.xsd" >
<vendor>litex</vendor>
<name>SOC</name>
<description><![CDATA[Litex SoC 2022-01-28 03:05:30]]></description>
<description><![CDATA[Litex SoC 2022-02-04 00:56:54]]></description>
<addressUnitBits>8</addressUnitBits>
<width>32</width>
@ -1238,10 +1238,10 @@ register to disable individual events.]]></description>
<register>
<name>GIT_GITREV</name>
<description><![CDATA[First 32-bits of the git revision. This documentation was built from git rev
``5ac27d00``, so this value is 1522695424, which should be enough to check out
``1f5d7406``, so this value is 526218246, which should be enough to check out
the exact git version used to build this firmware.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0014</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x5ac27d00</resetValue>
<resetValue>0x1f5d7406</resetValue>
<size>32</size>
<fields>
<field>
@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ the exact git version used to build this firmware.]]></description>
is ``1``, then the repository this was built from has one additional commit
beyond the tag indicated in `MAJOR`, `MINOR`, and `REVISION`.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0018</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x08</resetValue>
<resetValue>0x0a</resetValue>
<size>32</size>
<fields>
<field>
@ -3593,7 +3593,7 @@ inject too fast.]]></description>
<name>SEED1</name>
<description><![CDATA[Bits 32-63 of `SEED_SEED`. Seed used for the build]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0000</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x6ef8973c</resetValue>
<resetValue>0x1eaac4e</resetValue>
<size>32</size>
<fields>
<field>
@ -3608,7 +3608,7 @@ inject too fast.]]></description>
<name>SEED0</name>
<description><![CDATA[Bits 0-31 of `SEED_SEED`.]]></description>
<addressOffset>0x0004</addressOffset>
<resetValue>0x5df014e4</resetValue>
<resetValue>0x12142066</resetValue>
<size>32</size>
<fields>
<field>

Binary file not shown.

View file

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use crate::bcrypt::*;
use crate::api::PasswordType;
use core::convert::TryInto;
use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, PublicKey, Signer, ExpandedSecretKey};
use ed25519_dalek::{Keypair, Signature, PublicKey, Signer, ExpandedSecretKey, SecretKey};
use curve25519_dalek::scalar::Scalar;
use curve25519_dalek::constants;
use sha2::{FallbackStrategy, Sha256, Sha512, Sha512Trunc256};
@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ use digest::Digest;
use graphics_server::BulkRead;
use core::mem::size_of;
use core::cell::RefCell;
use rand_core::RngCore;
use aes::{Aes256, NewBlockCipher, BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt};
use cipher::generic_array::GenericArray;
@ -35,6 +36,13 @@ use root_keys::key2bits::*;
// TODO: add hardware acceleration for BCRYPT so we can hit the OWASP target without excessive UX delay
const BCRYPT_COST: u32 = 7; // 10 is the minimum recommended by OWASP; takes 5696 ms to verify @ 10 rounds; 804 ms to verify 7 rounds
/// Maximum number of times the global rollback limiter can be updated. Every time this is updated,
/// the firmware has to be re-signed, the gateware ROM re-injected, and the PDDB system key updated.
///
/// N.B.: As of Xous 0.9.6 we don't have a call to update the anti-rollback count, we have only provisioned for
/// that call to exist sometime in the future.
const MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT: u8 = 255;
/// Size of the total area allocated for signatures. It is equal to the size of one FLASH sector, which is the smallest
/// increment that can be erased.
const SIGBLOCK_SIZE: u32 = 0x1000;
@ -86,6 +94,7 @@ impl KeyRomLocs {
const PEPPER: u8 = 0xf8;
const FPGA_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfc;
const LOADER_MIN_REV: u8 = 0xfd;
const GLOBAL_ROLLBACK: u8 = 0xfe;
const CONFIG: u8 = 0xff;
}
@ -277,13 +286,33 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
}
pub fn kernel_base(&self) -> u32 { self.kernel_base }
/// takes a root key and computes the current rollback state of the key by hashing it
/// MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - GLOBAL_ROLLBACK times.
fn compute_key_rollback(&mut self, key: &mut [u8]) {
assert!(key.len() == 32, "Key length is incorrect");
self.keyrom.wfo(utra::keyrom::ADDRESS_ADDRESS, KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as u32);
let mut rollback_limit = self.keyrom.rf(utra::keyrom::DATA_DATA);
if rollback_limit > 255 { rollback_limit = 255; } // prevent increment-up attacks that roll over
log::debug!("rollback_limit: {}", rollback_limit);
for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - rollback_limit as u8 {
let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
hasher.update(&key);
let digest = hasher.finalize();
assert!(digest.len() == 32, "Digest had an incorrect length");
key.copy_from_slice(&digest);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
if _i >= (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - 3) {
log::info!("iter {} key {:x?}", _i, key);
}
}
}
/// This implementation creates and destroys the AES key schedule on every function call
/// However, Rootkey operations are not meant to be used for streaming operations; they are typically
/// used to secure subkeys, so a bit of overhead on each call is OK in order to not keep excess secret
/// data laying around.
/// ASSUME: the caller has confirmed that the user password is valid and in cache
pub fn aes_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, block: &mut [u8; 16]) {
let key = match key_index {
let mut key = match key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -308,6 +337,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key
}
};
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key));
match op_type {
AesOpType::Decrypt => cipher.decrypt_block(block.try_into().unwrap()),
@ -315,7 +345,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
}
}
pub fn aes_par_op(&mut self, key_index: u8, op_type: AesOpType, blocks: &mut[[u8; 16]; PAR_BLOCKS]) {
let key = match key_index {
let mut key = match key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -337,6 +367,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key
}
};
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
let cipher = Aes256::new(GenericArray::from_slice(&key));
match op_type {
AesOpType::Decrypt => {
@ -352,7 +383,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
}
}
pub fn kwp_op(&mut self, kwp: &mut KeyWrapper) {
let key = match kwp.key_index {
let mut key = match kwp.key_index {
KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY => {
let mut key_enc = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY);
let pcache: &PasswordCache = unsafe{& *(self.pass_cache.as_ptr() as *const PasswordCache)};
@ -374,6 +405,11 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.fake_key
}
};
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root user key: {:x?}", key);
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut key);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root user key (anti-rollback): {:x?}", key);
let keywrapper = Aes256KeyWrap::new(&key);
match kwp.op {
KeyWrapOp::Wrap => {
@ -810,9 +846,37 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// get access to the pcache and generate a keypair
let pcache: &mut PasswordCache = unsafe{&mut *(self.pass_cache.as_mut_ptr() as *mut PasswordCache)};
// initialize the global rollback constant to 0
self.sensitive_data.borrow_mut().as_slice_mut::<u32>()[KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as usize] = 0;
let mut root_sk = [0u8; ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
self.trng.fill_bytes(&mut root_sk);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("root privkey: {:x?}", root_sk);
let keypair = if true { // true for production, false for debug (uses dev keys, so we can compare results)
// we use software hashing because for short keys its faster
let mut derived_sk = [0u8; ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&root_sk);
// hash a derived secret key based on the maximum rollback limit we anticipate less the current global rollback limit (which is 0)
// this allows us to work with a "final" key that generates a private signing key, which can't be predicted to future versions
// given the current key (due to the irreversability of Sha512/256), but once derived to a more recent version can be willfullly
// computed to an older version to recover e.g. old data encrypted with a prior key
//
// We don't use the `compute_key_rollback` function because the value of the GLOBAL_ROLLBACK in the KeyROM
// has not yet been set (it should be zero, but there is no reason for it to be at this point).
for _i in 0..MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT {
let mut hasher = Sha512Trunc256::new_with_strategy(FallbackStrategy::SoftwareOnly);
hasher.update(&derived_sk);
let digest = hasher.finalize();
derived_sk.copy_from_slice(&digest);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
if _i >= (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - 3) {
log::info!("iter {} key {:x?}", _i, derived_sk);
}
}
let sk: SecretKey = SecretKey::from_bytes(&derived_sk).expect("couldn't construct secret key");
let pk: PublicKey = (&sk).into();
// keypair zeroizes on drop
Keypair::generate(&mut self.trng)
Keypair{public: pk, secret: sk}
} else {
Keypair::from_bytes(
&[168, 167, 118, 92, 141, 162, 215, 147, 134, 43, 8, 176, 0, 222, 188, 167, 178, 14, 137, 237, 82, 199, 133, 162, 179, 235, 161, 219, 156, 182, 42, 39,
@ -825,7 +889,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey: {:?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey: {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
// encrypt the FPGA key using the update password. in an un-init system, it is provided to us in plaintext format
// e.g. in the case that we're doing a BBRAM boot (eFuse flow would give us a 0's key and we'd later on set it)
@ -876,7 +940,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// I don't think this loop should make any extra copies of the secret key, but might be good to check in godbolt!
for (dst, (plain, key)) in
private_key_enc.iter_mut()
.zip(keypair.secret.to_bytes().iter()
.zip(root_sk.iter() // we encrypt the root sk, not the derived sk
.zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*dst = plain ^ key;
}
@ -1071,16 +1135,27 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
// derive signing key
let mut keypair_bytes: [u8; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH] = [0; ed25519_dalek::KEYPAIR_LENGTH];
let enc_signing_key = self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PRIVKEY);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("encrypted root privkey: {:x?}", enc_signing_key);
for (key, (&enc_key, &pw)) in
keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH].iter_mut()
.zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*key = enc_key ^ pw;
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("decrypted root privkey: {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
// derived_sk now holds the "Root" secret key. It needs to be hashed (MAX_ROLLBACK_LIMIT - GLOBAL_ROLLBACK) times to get the current signing key.
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
// now populate the public key portion. that's just in the plain.
// note that this would have been updated in the case of an update to GLOBAL_ROLLBACK -- the purpose of
// this routine is to sign software in the current rollback count, not to increment the rollback count
for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut()
.zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) {
*key = src;
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("anti-rollback privkey: {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("trying to make a keypair from {:x?}", keypair_bytes);
// Keypair zeroizes on drop
let keypair: Option<Keypair> = if provision_bbram && !self.is_initialized() {
@ -1090,6 +1165,8 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
Some(Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?)
};
log::debug!("keypair success");
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", keypair.as_ref().unwrap().secret.to_bytes());
// stage the keyrom data for patching
self.populate_sensitive_data();
@ -1286,12 +1363,17 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
.zip(enc_signing_key.iter().zip(pcache.hashed_update_pw.iter())) {
*key = enc_key ^ pw;
}
self.compute_key_rollback(&mut keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback): {:x?}", &keypair_bytes[..ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]);
for (key, &src) in keypair_bytes[ed25519_dalek::SECRET_KEY_LENGTH..].iter_mut()
.zip(self.read_key_256(KeyRomLocs::SELFSIGN_PUBKEY).iter()) {
*key = src;
}
// Keypair zeroizes the secret key on drop.
let keypair = Keypair::from_bytes(&keypair_bytes).map_err(|_| RootkeyResult::KeyError)?;
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
log::debug!("keypair privkey (after anti-rollback + conversion): {:x?}", keypair.secret.to_bytes());
// check if the keypair is valid by signing and verifying a short message
let test_data = "whiskey made me do it";
@ -1755,6 +1837,7 @@ impl<'a> RootKeys {
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::USER_KEY as usize, 256, "Boot key: ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::PEPPER as usize, 128, "Pepper: ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::CONFIG as usize, 32, "Config (as BE): ");
self.debug_print_key(KeyRomLocs::GLOBAL_ROLLBACK as usize, 32, "Global rollback state: ");
}
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]

View file

@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ fn xmain() -> ! {
use crate::implementation::RootKeys;
log_server::init_wait().unwrap();
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info);
log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug);
log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id());
let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap();

View file

@ -583,14 +583,19 @@ def main():
with open(args.soc, "rb") as f:
image = f.read()
pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify)
print("Erasing PDDB root structures")
pc_usb.erase_region(locs['LOC_PDDB'][0], 1024 * 1024)
else:
print("This will overwrite any secret keys in your device. Continue? (y/n)")
print("This will overwrite any secret keys in your device and erase PDDB keys. Continue? (y/n)")
confirm = input()
if len(confirm) > 0 and confirm.lower()[:1] == 'y':
print("Programming SoC gateware {}".format(args.soc))
with open(args.soc, "rb") as f:
image = f.read()
pc_usb.flash_program(locs['LOC_SOC'][0], image, verify=verify)
print("Erasing PDDB root structures")
pc_usb.erase_region(locs['LOC_PDDB'][0], 1024 * 1024)
if args.audiotest != None:
print("Loading audio test clip {}".format(args.audiotest))