this adds a "kicker" thread that gets updated with a target time
to kick the UX by the FIDO2 USB handler. When the target time is
met, an "update" command is issued to the UX.
This hopefully creates an efficient mechanism for triggering a
UX redraw that also has an acceptable delay.
This may not be the correct fix, but it causes the test bench to pass.
This will be revisted once I hear back from the OpenSK maintainers.
I strongly supect the issue is actually a bug in how permissions are cleared
after a user presence test, and not that the checks themselves are
incorrect.
currently 10 seconds from boot before cred reset can be issued;
automated testing can't always keep up with that. expand to
20 seconds. This is not "standards compliant" but the idea that
you unplug the device and it stays on is also not "standards compliant".
Code now builds, but, it doesn't fully work. Also,
the vault backup vendor routines have yet to be wedged in.
On the other hand, this edit is much more targeted than
the first one, so hopefully future port-ins of OpenSK
will be much smoother. In particular, OpenSK has a nice
`env` abstraction that has enough power now for us to
stick most of the Xous-specific stuff in there. There's
still a few patches needed to the main code loop, mainly
to accommodate our ability to display more information
than flash an LED.
The storage layer is also migrated to a totally new
dictionary, because the latest version also completely
redoes the storage with some sort of key/value system,
which maps nicely into the PDDB.
Added more predefined scalar messages
Checks WiFi status
Spawns separate thread for client_sync (reading the network)
Most all log messages are now INFO (to be shown by default)
Closes#300
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
Allows a variable to be set to the EMPTY string
- by not setting a value `/set myvar`
During initialization now verifies that PDDB is mounted.
Added warnings for PDDB not mounted and WiFi not connected.
- the WiFi check is not yet implemented
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
Adds migrations framework
Delays mtxcli initialization until first user input, because we know:
- PDDB is mounted
- Timer is stable
- User actually using mtxcli
Adds send_async_msg scalar_async_msg
- basis for automatically updating chatroom
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
Adds migrations framework
- Migration for v0.9.11-0120: update the filter
Filter
- narrow filter to only the fields and events for the current room
Introduces "read only" variables (e.g. __version).
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
`vault` is changed so that instead of clearing the list of
data each time the screen is updated, it tries to compare it
against the existing data and modifies the record if it needs to,
or leaves it untouched.
Furthermore, at least in the password path, temporary strings
are pre-allocated and re-used, instead of freed and re-allocated
every time through the main loop.
The combination of these optimzations reduces the time to re-parse
a couple hundred records from about 1000ms to 200ms, reducing the
overall time to retrieve the database from 1.8s to 1.0s. It also
makes the loop much more stable over time; previously, as the heap
fragmented, performance would slowly degrade. Now that most
records are static and re-used, the performance seems to stay
constant.
The framwork is also put in place to re-use TOTP/U2F records,
but the code still uses the legacy method of clearing the
entire stored list and rebuilding it. However, it wasn't deemed
a priority to fix this because generally I haven't seen use cases
where users have hundreds of tokens or TOTP's; so long as the
number is about 20 or so, the performance difference should
be imperceptible with or without optimization.
This refactors the remaining vault accessor routines to use
the new more efficient key pre-fetching routine. This also
fixes up an error in test case generation and hopefully resolves
an issue with concurrency errors using the older version of
the access routine.
* Updates the mtxcli app
mtxcli:
- Simple chat now functional!
- All strings use translations
- Updates the README
- updates mtxcli to handle PDDB existence check
Adds *.pyc to .gitignore
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
results are slightly better on the first run (3700ms instead of 4900ms)
but there seems to be really excessive allocations using the heap
allocated serializer by rkyv. We really need to use the bufserializer
I think for this to work.
In general, hosted mode is assumed "by default" if the target
is not Xous. This allows packages to be built cleanly on command
lines that don't know to pass a --feature flag to specify a target.
However, an explicit "hosted" flag is still retained so that we
can confirm the build system intent. This saves us from the failure
mode that we thought we were building for target A, but accidentally
ommitted the flag, and instead we've been silently building for
"hosted" mode without any warning. The main consumer of the "hosted"
flag is now just the build.rs script inside of the utralib.
* Adds mtxcli commands using the PDDB
/get key -- shows value of key (from the PDDB)
/set key value -- sets value of key (in the PDDB)
/unset key -- removes key (from the PDDB)
/status -- shows status of the connection
Updates .gitignore for PDDB in hosted mode
NOTE: action on DefaultApp is not yet implemented: this
should allow the GAM to choose which application is safe
as a default (for other applications to "quit" by switching to it).
Proposed default application is "shellchat".
Updates mtxcli commands
- removes audio command
- adds help and quit commands
Initial version of mtxcli is simply a copy of repl with the
requisite manifest changes to make the app unique.
Signed-off-by: Tom Marble <tmarble@info9.net>
Avoid allocations in some cases, for example, when formatting
to an I/O buffer. Or when formatting an string.
Signed-off-by: Jean-Pierre De Jesus DIAZ <me@jeandudey.tech>
This will allow for e.g. xous on riscv32-imac but not a precursor
target, for example: by using feature selectors we get to have
a bigger range of targets that we support, such as for implementations
that haven't been upstreamed or have official target-triples.
The downsides are:
- patch override libraries don't absorb feature flags. so, for
example, the AES crate that is used to patch other crates won't
be aware of the target features without modifying the referencing
crates.
- features are normally meant to be additive, but target features
are mutually exclusive. The mutex is enforced by a check in
utralib that throws a panic on build if two targets are accidentally
selected at the same time.
- HOTP now prompts for an initial count
- Found a code path where improperly formatted HOTP field can
lead to a 0-value being passed to a totp generator
- Added guardrails around the TOTP generator so it can't divide by 0:
it issues a warning instead.
hotp is merged as a "minor" feature off of totp. In other words,
the default mode is totp, but one can specify a totp record
to be an hotp record and it will behave as an hotp record.
We re-use the "step_seconds" field to specify the count parameter.
There is no separate initial count / count field -- the two are
tracked in a single u64 that is stored in the "step_seconds" field
of what would be a totp record.
This also revs the TOTP record to v2. This *should* not break
anything:
- v1 records deserialize as totp records into v2 (which is correct,
as there are no hotp in v1)
- when a v1 record is saved to disk, it is stored in v2 format
- v1 records that are not edited stay as v1
unique content
Instead of generating a unique GUID every time a new record gets
created, hash known unique content for every entry and use that as key.
The StorageContent trait now has a hash() method that returns a Vec
containing the SHA-256 hash of the object's unique content.
Hashing is done by re-using the same calls that ctap uses.
This allows dupes detection when restoring a backup, allowing us to
employ a "never overwrite" policy: Precursor is the main source of truth
for such data.
Still needs a way to deterministically generate a key for each entry.
Idea: a `hash() -> String` method on StorageContent so that new_record
can call it, store said object with the newly-generated key.
Since this is a deterministic operation, restoring a backup with dupes
would not overwrite what's present in PDDB already.
Instead of syncing for each new record, new_records() only syncs:
- when it's writing an entry that has index multiple of 10
- when it's the last packet in sequence
The response to get OpenSSH to work is non-compliant
(because it's trying to read a 2.1 command set out of a 2.0
device). This will lead to breakage in the 2.0 test bench,
but, it will allow the device to work with OpenSSH.
meh. specs, schmecs.
read_to_end() "guesses" the total amount of data to read by doing
roughly 5 calls per couple hundred bytes: it starts by guessing
it's 32 bytes long, then another 32, then 64, then 128, and then
a final call to make sure there's nothing more.
The read() call is somewhat expensive in that it involves initializing
and sending page-sized memory chunks, and every time it also
descends the entire basis hierarchy, recomputing the overlay.
Probably, this can be improved with some sort of server-side caching
of read results -- if a file is read, it seems very likely that
the next few bytes will be read and a smarter caching implementation
could smooth over some of the expense.
However, a much easier fix for now is to just change the read
call to read exactly the length of the file being presented. Since
we already have the key handle, we can get the attributes and then
do a single read of the exact amount.
Doing this improves the speed of the UX substantially, about 40%
faster for the same operation (at least).
In retrospect forcing apps to manage their suspend in resume
crosses too many abstraction barriers.
Instead, the app should specify the mode of the hardware, but
then the driver should be responsible for restoring that state
on resume, not the app.
perfomance regression on the PDDB with the latest fixes make
the device stop passing compliance when the database grows
to about 40-ish keys. For now, we set the cred limit to 32,
until the performance issues are addressed. (note that yubico
has a limit of 25 credentials, so, 32 is not insanely low).
The behavior with a secret basis is as follows:
- The key stays in the basis in which it was created.
- So, if you created k1 in .System basis, and k2 in Secret basis,
if you edit k1 while Secret basis is open, k1 stays in .System
basis. it does *not* migrate into Secret basis.
I think this is the "least surprising" behavior. There is an
argument that "maybe I want to keep secret notes in an overlay
on a key" but I feel like creating a second shadow copy of a key
with a different set of notes is not the most desired behavior
for this application (NB: it could be desired for others applications,
and that behavior can be programmed with the PDDB API; which is
why the API is a bit explicit at the moment. This flexibility goes
against the goal of "foolproof deniability", unfortunately, but
I think it is too early to know which default to set for the system).
These adjustments ideally make the system less confusing to use in
the face of secret Bases, but the spec calls for some information that
could be a leakage channel (see below).
- items that are assumed to be consistent regardless of the basis
are now forced into the System basis. This reduces potentially confusing
behavior if the system has han unlocked secret basis and things like
PIN hashes are set which appear to be global.
- There is a "global signature counter" which could leak some information
about how many credentials are in the device. However, the FIDO2 spec
enforces some plausible deniability by requiring that the counter increments
by a random value instead of by 1. In the OpenSK implementation, this increments
by a random integer from 1-8. So, if you store dozens of credentials in secret
bases, it may become less deniable due to this global signature counter.
The global signature counter seems optional, so maybe that is a feature to
be stripped out...
this checks to make sure that the system is in a usable state
for the vault to run before allowing it to be launched.
in particular, the PDDB must be initialized, and so must the
system time.
- test entries for passwords at 100 entries. it's...pretty slow
at 300 passwords, about 8 seconds to scan/read-in the database.
once the database is read-in, sorting and viewing is fast. good
news is that heap usage is about 300k for that many entries,
no OOM crashes found. just slow.
- fix an unimplemented()! error
- strip out some debug
originally we stuck it in the CRED_DICT because it forces its
creation -- but there's no reason to *really* do that. We just
set the dictionary to be created if it's not existent in the later
API calls.
By moving this to FIDO_DICT instead of FIDO_CRED_DICT it makes
key access & sorting much cleaner in the UX, because you don't
have this odd key hanging out, and it also means that you can't
have an attack on the system where you try to name a key with
the name held in FIDO_CRED_DICT to try and read it out.
UX interaction via blocking modals are put into its own thread
so that the background UX can update while menus and modals are
popped up.
Still some bugs to work out to make this fully implemented,
but this is the major work fleshed out.
The prediction API now takes an API token. This is a 128-bit
number that gets passed to the prediction engine, and it's meant
to be unique for every context that requires a predictor.
It's up to the prediction engine to do anything with the token.
For the "null" engines (such as the icontray for `vault` and
`tts`) the token is just ignored. But for example, in `shellchat`,
the API token is used to store a history record in a HashMap on
a per-token basis. This means that every app that uses the
`shellchat` history function gets their own history that can only
be read out by that app.
The actual token itself is mostly passed through the API. The
token storage is in the Context layer (each Context has a record
for a token, that starts as `None`), and is passed down to
the predictor every time the context swaps, and the predictor
receives the token and passes it back if the token was `Some`,
or allocates a new random token if it was `None`.
Note that everything is a Context, including, for example, menus and
modal dialog boxes, but not all contexts have predictors. Only
Contexts that ask for a predictor have them. This mechanism
works smoothly in this model (as opposed to other hacks and work-arounds
previously tried getting to this solution).
i've extracted the key parameters from the test suite and confirmed that
that the hash value is computed correctly on their side.
i've also confirmed that the hash value is computed correctly from
the locally computed key.
so what's gone wrong is the devired secret key doesn't match what's
on the other side.
possible issues could be either a PK serialization issue, or something
wrong in the DH exchange itself.
trying to debug why PIN authentication doesn't work. looks like
Cosekey conversion is fine, the data is arriving OK...but the
dh key exchange is not generated the expected shared secret.
Had two JSON entries with the same key, which meant you had
a 50/50 chance of a rebuild being triggered depending on which
entry was picked for the build. :-/
The OpenSK UX layer was completely gutted and re-written using
Xous-native idioms. There's a bit of ambiguity on what exactly
OpenSK meant to do with the one button and the LEDs, but for
Xous we want to show things like what you're signing for and
why.
For now, we just show the app hash during registration and signing,
but down the road that will need to be matched up against a
plaintext description of the application upon registration, so
users can have a client-side description of what they are approving.
At the moment, we're stuck at provisioning the attestation certificate
and key. The transaction goes through, but is rejected by the
test web site right now with not too much explanation of what went
wrong, but maybe the next step is to try and use the OpenSK
native tools to provision a set of keys onto the device to see
if that fixes it (instead of the current bodge of hard-coding
some manually extracted hex values into the database).
This macro will be removed, since it is no longer necessary. Remove this
macro across the project and replace it with a standard `main()`
function.
Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io>
the implementation uses an explicitly expanded key schedule for
every AES key, with separate enc/dec keys. This does save setting
up the key scheduler every time, but, it also breaks a lot of API
assumptions. Since we have the performance to afford the key
setup/teardown for every call, this commit basically turns
the key refs into actual slices of the key itself. This creates
a weird bit of code where you have an enc key being equated to
a dec key directly; those lines are left in to make it a bit easier
to diff against the original source.
But the high bit is that the original implementation, by expanding
the key scheduler, had to have a different enc and dec key schedule
(even tho they come from the same key) but this compacted form
makes them identical.
This commit also starts working in at converting the PersistentStore
to use the PDDB.
I think I basically understand the scope of the problem, and it's
mostly just some grunt recoding of the PersistentStore calls
to refer to PDDB entries by k/v names. The main thing I've done
so far is to recode the macro that creates the partitions in
OpenSK to just create string names for every item that needs
to be stored. These string names will be used to index into a dictionary
that is dedicated to the FIDO2 function.
Woo? we have CBC encryption using Rust's most favored AES library
now.
I have a feeling I'm going to be re-doing all of this once they
decide to finally take GenericArray out back and shoot it....
*everoyne* is relying on rand_core, a later version, that uses
a "getrandom" thing that tries to make the call for random
number generators generic.
I mean, it's kind of cool, but, it's also sort of a libc
non-pure-rust nightmare because basically it always delegates
to a C-style API for a variety of platforms.
Next step is to see if we can't...patch...getrandom to point
to a much simplified, xous-only version that is 100% pure Rust.
The vault app is the beginning of a multi-purpose authentication vault.
It will feature:
1. FIDO2 authentication
2. TOTP authenticators
3. Password storage to PDDB with auto-typing via keyboard HID
This is the first step on a very very long journey.
change the notification modal to accept the primary message and an
Option of independent text to display as a qrcode
pub fn show_notification(&self, notification: &str, qrtext:Option<&str>) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {}
trust levels now default to a mid-level, with the password
modals explicitly tested for by the Context logic (the idea
being to deny any untrusted canvases the ability to render
inverted text).
ball bounce app also basically works, and context
switching between the bounce app and the main menu
is working too.
The first "app" is just going to be a whole-framebuffer
demo that gets raw keys and does some stuff on the screen.
It's the starting point if you wanted to eg. write a simple
video game or something for the device, but you didn't care
about much of the other UX sugar.