mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
synced 2026-11-16 08:38:26 +00:00
add migration from old to new version
confirmed this works for U2F and FIDO2 keys however, the PIN is reset.
This commit is contained in:
parent
c083a9ca85
commit
8974a86f24
4 changed files with 245 additions and 88 deletions
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@ -286,6 +286,13 @@
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"ja": "シークレットベースのロックを解除",
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"zh": "解锁秘密基础"
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},
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"vault.migration_error": {
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"en": "Migration from previous FIDO database encountered errors:",
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"en-tts": "Migration from previous FIDO database encountered errors:",
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"fr": "La migration depuis la base de données FIDO précédente a rencontré des erreurs: *MT*",
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"ja": "以前の FIDO データベースからの移行でエラーが発生しました:",
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"zh": "从以前的 FIDO 数据库迁移遇到错误:"
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},
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"vault.newitem.approve": {
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"en": "Is this password okay?",
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"en-tts": "Is this password okay?",
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@ -461,13 +468,6 @@
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"ja": "アプリ名:",
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"zh": "应用名称:"
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},
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"vault.u2f.appinfo.newapp": {
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"en": "New app: ",
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"en-tts": "New app: ",
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"fr": "Nouvelle application: ",
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"ja": "新しいアプリ: ",
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"zh": "新应用: "
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},
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"vault.u2f.appinfo.never": {
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"en": "never",
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"en-tts": "never",
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@ -475,6 +475,13 @@
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"ja": "使われたことがない",
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"zh": "没用过"
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},
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"vault.u2f.appinfo.newapp": {
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"en": "New app: ",
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"en-tts": "New app: ",
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"fr": "Nouvelle application: ",
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"ja": "新しいアプリ: ",
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"zh": "新应用: "
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},
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"vault.u2f.appinfo.seconds_ago": {
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"en": " secs ago",
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"en-tts": " seconds ago",
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71
apps/vault/src/env/xous/mod.rs
vendored
71
apps/vault/src/env/xous/mod.rs
vendored
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@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ use pddb::Pddb;
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use modals::Modals;
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use locales::t;
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use std::io::{Read, Write};
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use std::num::ParseIntError;
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use num_traits::*;
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use crate::ctap::hid::{CtapHid, KeepaliveStatus, ProcessedPacket, CtapHidCommand};
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@ -29,13 +28,6 @@ pub const U2F_APP_DICT: &'static str = "fido.u2fapps";
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const KEEPALIVE_DELAY: Duration = Duration::from_millis(KEEPALIVE_DELAY_MS);
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mod storage;
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fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ParseIntError> {
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(0..s.len())
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.step_by(2)
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.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16))
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.collect()
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}
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pub struct XousHidConnection {
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pub endpoint: usb_device_xous::UsbHid,
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}
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@ -176,7 +168,7 @@ impl XousEnv {
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if (crate::ctap::U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT.as_millis() as u64) > (now - request_start) {
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let new_remaining = ((crate::ctap::U2F_UP_PROMPT_TIMEOUT.as_millis() as u64) - (now - request_start)) / 1000;
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if new_remaining != last_remaining {
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log::trace!("update timer");
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log::info!("countdown: {}", new_remaining);
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last_remaining = new_remaining;
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let mut to_request_str = request_str.to_string();
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to_request_str.push_str(
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@ -483,67 +475,6 @@ impl XousEnv {
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Ok(())
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}
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/// The point of the attestation key is to delegate the question of the authenticity of your U2F
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/// key effectively to a transaction that happens between the factory and the server. If the
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/// attestation private key is an impenetrable secret and you can trust the factory, then the
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/// attestation key effectively proves the U2F token was made by the factory to its specifications.
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///
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/// In the case of Precursor's threat model, you don't trust the factory, and you assume there is
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/// basically no such thing as an impenetrable secret. So an attestation key is equivalent to any
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/// private key created entirely within your own device; its use proves that you're you, or at
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/// least, someone has possession of your device and your unlock password.
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///
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/// Thus, for Precursor, there is no delegation of the question of authenticity -- you
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/// choose to verify the device to the level you're satisfied with. If you're happy to
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/// just take it out of the box and use it without checking anything, that's your choice,
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/// but you can also check everything as much as you like.
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///
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/// As a result, the "attestation key" serves no role for Precursor users, other than to
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/// identify them as Precursor users. A unique per-device key would furthermore allow
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/// a server to uniquely identify each Precursor user. Therefore, we commit the private key
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/// into this public repository so any and all Precursor users may share it. The more
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/// widely it is used, the harder it becomes to de-anonymize a Precursor users.
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///
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/// This key was generated using the script in `tools/gen_key_materials.sh`, and then printed
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/// out by calling
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/// `./configure.py --private-key=crypto_data/opensk.key --certificate=crypto_data/opensk_cert.pem`
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pub fn attestation_check_init(&mut self) {
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// check if the certs exist; if they don't, populate them.
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// STORAGE_KEYS[0] is the private key; [1] is the public key
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match self.store().find(crate::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[0]) {
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Ok(Some(_)) => {},
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Ok(None) |
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Err(_) => {
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let pk = decode_hex("b8c3abd05cbe17b2faf87659c6f73e8467832112a0e609807cb68996c9a0c6a8").unwrap();
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self.store().insert(
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crate::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[0],
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&pk
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).expect("pddb error initializing OpenSK");
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}
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}
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match self.store().find(crate::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[1]) {
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Ok(Some(_)) => {}
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Ok(None) |
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Err(_) => {
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let der = decode_hex(
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"308201423081e9021449a3e2a4e1078eae2f1a18567f0a734b09db2478300a06\
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082a8648ce3d040302301f311d301b06035504030c14507265637572736f7220\
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55324620444959204341301e170d3232303630353138313233395a170d333230\
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3630343138313233395a30293127302506035504030c1e507265637572736f72\
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2053656c662d5665726966696564204465766963653059301306072a8648ce3d\
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020106082a8648ce3d030107034200042d8fad76c25851ee70ae651ab2361bee\
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1b5d93769aff99d95ad112871060f2f342fb79566fee9e1bade250a29cd65012\
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55e731531755284bfcbe85ada1f39f44300a06082a8648ce3d04030203480030\
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45022100d27e39187da5efaa376254329499bb705f7188dd8c78e0725c7ed28d\
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e5d218e1022070853e1a43707298e07ebe9b9eb7cd5839b794db4c3d22209554\
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1f0bdf82d1f4").unwrap();
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self.store().insert(
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crate::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[1],
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&der
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).expect("pddb error initializing OpenSK");
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}
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}
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}
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}
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impl UserPresence for XousEnv {
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@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ mod totp;
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mod prereqs;
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mod vendor_commands;
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mod storage;
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mod migration_v1;
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use locales::t;
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@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ use crate::vendor_commands::VendorSession;
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use ux::framework::{VaultUx, DEFAULT_FONT, FONT_LIST, name_to_style};
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use xous_ipc::Buffer;
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use xous::{send_message, Message};
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use pddb::Pddb;
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use usbd_human_interface_device::device::fido::*;
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use num_traits::*;
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@ -193,7 +195,7 @@ impl EndpointReplies {
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fn main() -> ! {
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log_server::init_wait().unwrap();
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log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info);
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log::set_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Debug);
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log::info!("my PID is {}", xous::process::id());
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let xns = xous_names::XousNames::new().unwrap();
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@ -239,12 +241,19 @@ fn main() -> ! {
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// block until the PDDB is mounted
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let pddb = pddb::Pddb::new();
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pddb.is_mounted_blocking();
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// Attempt a migration, if necessary. If none is necessary this call is fairly lightweight.
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match crate::migration_v1::migrate(&pddb) {
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Ok(_) => {},
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Err(e) => {
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log::warn!("Migration encountered errors! {:?}", e);
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let modals = modals::Modals::new(&xns).unwrap();
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modals.show_notification(
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&format!("{}\n{:?}", t!("vault.migration_error", xous::LANG), e), None
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).ok();
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}
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};
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let mut env = XousEnv::new(conn);
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{
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let mutex = opensk_mutex.lock().unwrap();
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env.attestation_check_init(); // ensures that our attestation keys have been created
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}
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let mut replies = EndpointReplies::new();
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// only run the main loop if the SoC is compatible
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if env.is_soc_compatible() {
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@ -323,6 +332,7 @@ fn main() -> ! {
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let modals = modals::Modals::new(&xns).unwrap();
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let tt = ticktimer_server::Ticktimer::new().unwrap();
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let mut first_time = true;
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loop {
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let msg = xous::receive_message(sid).unwrap();
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let opcode: Option<VaultOp> = FromPrimitive::from_usize(msg.body.id());
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@ -450,11 +460,14 @@ fn main() -> ! {
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// HID is always selected if the vault is foregrounded
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vaultux.ensure_hid();
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allow_redraw = true;
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// Update database & configs
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send_message(actions_conn,
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Message::new_blocking_scalar(ActionOp::UpdateMode.to_usize().unwrap(), 0, 0, 0, 0)
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).ok();
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vaultux.update_mode();
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if first_time {
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// Populate the initial fields, just the first time
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send_message(actions_conn,
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Message::new_blocking_scalar(ActionOp::UpdateMode.to_usize().unwrap(), 0, 0, 0, 0)
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).ok();
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vaultux.update_mode();
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first_time = false;
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}
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}
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}
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}),
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@ -561,4 +574,3 @@ fn main() -> ! {
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log::trace!("quitting");
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xous::terminate_process(0)
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}
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207
apps/vault/src/migration_v1.rs
Normal file
207
apps/vault/src/migration_v1.rs
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
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use std::io::{Read, Write};
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use vault::ctap::storage::key;
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use std::num::ParseIntError;
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use pddb::Pddb;
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const FIDO_DICT: &'static str = "fido.cfg";
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const FIDO_CRED_DICT: &'static str = "fido.cred";
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const FIDO_PERSISTENT_DICT: &'static str = "fido.persistent";
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fn decode_hex(s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ParseIntError> {
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(0..s.len())
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.step_by(2)
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.map(|i| u8::from_str_radix(&s[i..i + 2], 16))
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.collect()
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}
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/// The point of the attestation key is to delegate the question of the authenticity of your U2F
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/// key effectively to a transaction that happens between the factory and the server. If the
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/// attestation private key is an impenetrable secret and you can trust the factory, then the
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/// attestation key effectively proves the U2F token was made by the factory to its specifications.
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///
|
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/// In the case of Precursor's threat model, you don't trust the factory, and you assume there is
|
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/// basically no such thing as an impenetrable secret. So an attestation key is equivalent to any
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/// private key created entirely within your own device; its use proves that you're you, or at
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/// least, someone has possession of your device and your unlock password.
|
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///
|
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/// Thus, for Precursor, there is no delegation of the question of authenticity -- you
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/// choose to verify the device to the level you're satisfied with. If you're happy to
|
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/// just take it out of the box and use it without checking anything, that's your choice,
|
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/// but you can also check everything as much as you like.
|
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///
|
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/// As a result, the "attestation key" serves no role for Precursor users, other than to
|
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/// identify them as Precursor users. A unique per-device key would furthermore allow
|
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/// a server to uniquely identify each Precursor user. Therefore, we commit the private key
|
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/// into this public repository so any and all Precursor users may share it. The more
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/// widely it is used, the harder it becomes to de-anonymize a Precursor users.
|
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///
|
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/// This key was generated using the script in `tools/gen_key_materials.sh`, and then printed
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/// out by calling
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/// `./configure.py --private-key=crypto_data/opensk.key --certificate=crypto_data/opensk_cert.pem`
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pub fn migrate(pddb: &Pddb) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
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if !pddb.list_dict(None).unwrap().contains(&persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT.to_string()) {
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// build the attestation keys
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let pk = decode_hex("b8c3abd05cbe17b2faf87659c6f73e8467832112a0e609807cb68996c9a0c6a8").unwrap();
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pddb.get(
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persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT,
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&vault::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[0].to_string(),
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None,
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true, true, Some(32), None::<fn()>
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).unwrap().write_all(&pk).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
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let der = decode_hex(
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"308201423081e9021449a3e2a4e1078eae2f1a18567f0a734b09db2478300a06\
|
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082a8648ce3d040302301f311d301b06035504030c14507265637572736f7220\
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55324620444959204341301e170d3232303630353138313233395a170d333230\
|
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3630343138313233395a30293127302506035504030c1e507265637572736f72\
|
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2053656c662d5665726966696564204465766963653059301306072a8648ce3d\
|
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020106082a8648ce3d030107034200042d8fad76c25851ee70ae651ab2361bee\
|
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1b5d93769aff99d95ad112871060f2f342fb79566fee9e1bade250a29cd65012\
|
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55e731531755284bfcbe85ada1f39f44300a06082a8648ce3d04030203480030\
|
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45022100d27e39187da5efaa376254329499bb705f7188dd8c78e0725c7ed28d\
|
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e5d218e1022070853e1a43707298e07ebe9b9eb7cd5839b794db4c3d22209554\
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1f0bdf82d1f4").unwrap();
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pddb.get(
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persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT,
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&vault::api::attestation_store::STORAGE_KEYS[1].to_string(),
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None,
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true, true, None, None::<fn()>
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).unwrap().write_all(&der).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
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// port the master secret
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migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_DICT, "CRED_RANDOM_SECRET", key::CRED_RANDOM_SECRET)?;
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// port AAGUID
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migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_PERSISTENT_DICT, "AAGUID", key::AAGUID)?;
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// port master keys
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migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_DICT, "MASTER_KEYS", key::_RESERVED_KEY_STORE)?;
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// port other settings
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// Turns out that porting over the PIN is a mistake. Just clear it.
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// migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_DICT, "MIN_PIN_LENGTH", key::MIN_PIN_LENGTH)?;
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// migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_DICT, "PIN_RETRIES", key::PIN_RETRIES)?;
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migrate_one(pddb, FIDO_DICT, "GLOBAL_SIGNATURE_COUNTER", key::GLOBAL_SIGNATURE_COUNTER)?;
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// PIN_HASH requires appending a length to the end. This is an `advisory` field, so we...just make up a value of 8.
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// This may not actually be the length used, but it's likely to be long enough to avoid forcing a re-PIN event because
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// the PIN hash is too short.
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// migrate_pin(pddb)?;
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// migrate credentials
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let creds = match pddb.list_keys(FIDO_CRED_DICT, None) {
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Ok(list) => list,
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Err(e) => match e.kind() {
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std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => Vec::new(),
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_ => return Err(xous::Error::InternalError)
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}
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};
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let expected_creds = creds.len();
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let mut successful_migrations = 0;
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let cred_start = key::CREDENTIALS.start;
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for cred in creds {
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let mut key = pddb.get(
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FIDO_CRED_DICT,
|
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&cred,
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None, false, false, None, None::<fn()>
|
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).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
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let mut data = Vec::<u8>::new();
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key.read_to_end(&mut data).unwrap();
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match vault::ctap::storage::deserialize_credential(&data) {
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Some(pk) => {
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log::debug!("Valid pk: {:?}", pk);
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let migrated_data = vault::ctap::storage::serialize_credential(pk).map_err(|_| xous::Error::InternalError)?;
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let mut new_key = pddb.get(
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persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT,
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&(cred_start + successful_migrations).to_string(),
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None, true, true, Some(migrated_data.len()), None::<fn()>
|
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).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
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new_key.write_all(&migrated_data).map_err(|_| xous::Error::OutOfMemory)?;
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successful_migrations += 1;
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log::info!("Migrated credential {}:{}", FIDO_CRED_DICT, cred);
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}
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None => {
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log::warn!("Credential {}:{} did not deserialize, cannot migrate!", FIDO_CRED_DICT, cred);
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}
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}
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}
|
||||
pddb.sync().ok();
|
||||
if successful_migrations == expected_creds {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(xous::Error::InvalidString)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// OpenSK dict already exists; don't migrate anything.
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Only migrates the data if it exists. Does not return an error if the record does not exist
|
||||
fn migrate_one (
|
||||
pddb: &Pddb,
|
||||
legacy_dict: &str,
|
||||
legacy_key: &str,
|
||||
new_key: usize,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
|
||||
match pddb.get(
|
||||
legacy_dict,
|
||||
legacy_key,
|
||||
None, false, false, None, None::<fn()>
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Ok(mut key) => {
|
||||
let mut data = Vec::<u8>::new();
|
||||
let len = key.read_to_end(&mut data).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
|
||||
let mut new_key = pddb.get(
|
||||
persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT,
|
||||
&new_key.to_string(),
|
||||
None, true, true, Some(len), None::<fn()>
|
||||
).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
|
||||
new_key.write_all(&data).map_err(|_| xous::Error::OutOfMemory)?;
|
||||
log::info!("successfully migrated {}:{}", legacy_dict, legacy_key);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
},
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
match e.kind() {
|
||||
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
|
||||
log::info!("migration skipping {}:{}, as it does not exist", legacy_dict, legacy_key);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
},
|
||||
_ => Err(xous::Error::InternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Handle the special case of the PIN_HASH
|
||||
fn migrate_pin (
|
||||
pddb: &Pddb,
|
||||
) -> Result<(), xous::Error> {
|
||||
let legacy_dict = FIDO_DICT;
|
||||
let legacy_key = "PIN_HASH";
|
||||
let new_key = key::PIN_PROPERTIES;
|
||||
match pddb.get(
|
||||
legacy_dict,
|
||||
legacy_key,
|
||||
None, false, false, None, None::<fn()>
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Ok(mut key) => {
|
||||
let mut data = Vec::<u8>::new();
|
||||
let len = key.read_to_end(&mut data).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)? + 1;
|
||||
data.push(5); // add a bogus "length" advisory field of 8
|
||||
let mut new_key = pddb.get(
|
||||
persistent_store::store::OPENSK2_DICT,
|
||||
&new_key.to_string(),
|
||||
None, true, true, Some(len), None::<fn()>
|
||||
).map_err(|_| xous::Error::AccessDenied)?;
|
||||
new_key.write_all(&data).map_err(|_| xous::Error::OutOfMemory)?;
|
||||
log::info!("successfully migrated {}:{}", legacy_dict, legacy_key);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
},
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
match e.kind() {
|
||||
std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
|
||||
log::info!("migration skipping {}:{}, as it does not exist", legacy_dict, legacy_key);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
},
|
||||
_ => Err(xous::Error::InternalError)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue