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Update README.md
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@ -100,6 +100,22 @@ the form of random lines drawn across the defaced area. This allows users
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to still read the text within the defaced area, but makes it more difficult
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to still read the text within the defaced area, but makes it more difficult
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to mistake this area for something trusted.
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to mistake this area for something trusted.
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### Trust Level Policy Implementation
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The `RegisterUx` opcode in `gam` is responsible for parceling out trust levels.
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At boot, there is only a "boot context" -- no user apps are allowed, and all
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contexts are assigned a high trust level. During the boot process, apps
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are registered and claim names out of the `tokens.rs` `EXPECTED_BOOT_CONTEXTS` name space.
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**Roadmap** (as of Xous 0.8.x): The idea is that once boot is thought to be completed, both `xous-names` and the `gam`
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are checked to ensure that all the available slots for boot processes are occupied.
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If this check passes, a flag should be set indicating we're
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done, and the max trust level assignable should drop. This process disallows
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future no-boot processes from registering as a trusted context, both in terms of their
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name space and their trust level.
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### TextView
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### TextView
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A `TextView` object is a heavy data structure that contains both a `xous::String`
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A `TextView` object is a heavy data structure that contains both a `xous::String`
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