From bc5d262431e7ab884e9b661069ce2631a8be97e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bunnie Date: Fri, 23 Jul 2021 17:19:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Update README.md --- services/gam/README.md | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/services/gam/README.md b/services/gam/README.md index c6518d19e..efbebaf7f 100644 --- a/services/gam/README.md +++ b/services/gam/README.md @@ -100,6 +100,22 @@ the form of random lines drawn across the defaced area. This allows users to still read the text within the defaced area, but makes it more difficult to mistake this area for something trusted. +### Trust Level Policy Implementation + +The `RegisterUx` opcode in `gam` is responsible for parceling out trust levels. + +At boot, there is only a "boot context" -- no user apps are allowed, and all +contexts are assigned a high trust level. During the boot process, apps +are registered and claim names out of the `tokens.rs` `EXPECTED_BOOT_CONTEXTS` name space. + +**Roadmap** (as of Xous 0.8.x): The idea is that once boot is thought to be completed, both `xous-names` and the `gam` +are checked to ensure that all the available slots for boot processes are occupied. +If this check passes, a flag should be set indicating we're +done, and the max trust level assignable should drop. This process disallows +future no-boot processes from registering as a trusted context, both in terms of their +name space and their trust level. + + ### TextView A `TextView` object is a heavy data structure that contains both a `xous::String`