add debug telemetry to the keystore

this is constructed in a way such that

1. it's gated off in production builds
2. if it was accidentally gated on, there is some security impact
but not a significant loss of security

We do need the telemetry so that during CI we can confirm that things
are actually working. I think the risk of being too buttoned-up
and then accidentally doing something like accidentally never
initializing keys and leaving them all zero is greater than the
risk of accidental partial leakage of information due to a procedural
mix-up in the image signing ceremony.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-11-18 23:20:31 +08:00
parent 145c2e37b2
commit 22f44f82b9
No known key found for this signature in database

View file

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, KeyInit, generic_array::GenericArr
use bao1x_api::{ use bao1x_api::{
BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, BoardTypeCoding, CP_ID, DEVELOPER_MODE, OEM_MODE, SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES, UUID, BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, BoardTypeCoding, CP_ID, DEVELOPER_MODE, OEM_MODE, SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES, UUID,
}; };
use bao1x_hal::board::{BOOKEND_END, BOOKEND_START};
use bao1x_hal::{ use bao1x_hal::{
acram::{OneWayCounter, SlotManager}, acram::{OneWayCounter, SlotManager},
board::{CHAFF_KEYS, NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1, ROOT_SEED}, board::{CHAFF_KEYS, NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1, ROOT_SEED},
@ -102,6 +103,23 @@ impl KeyStore {
// read key material // read key material
ikm.extend_from_slice(self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap()); ikm.extend_from_slice(self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap());
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
{
// analyze part of the key and print some informative statements during hazardous-debug
// we want to make sure that keys are actually being initialized, erased, or denied
// look at only 64 bits out of the 256 bit key - it's enough that it's highly unlikely that
// these 64 bits would match any of the zero/erased values, but not so much that if a
// dev image is accidentally signed & released that it'd be a serious threat to security
// as you'd still have 192 bits of secret material
let root_seed = self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap();
if root_seed[..8] == [0u8; 8] {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZERO,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
} else if root_seed[..8] == [bao1x_hal::sigcheck::ERASE_VALUE; 8] {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ERASED,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
} else {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.KEYPASS,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
}
}
// build nuisance key offsets - this is direct readout hardening // build nuisance key offsets - this is direct readout hardening
let nk0 = NUISANCE_KEYS_0.try_into_data_iter().unwrap(); let nk0 = NUISANCE_KEYS_0.try_into_data_iter().unwrap();
@ -175,7 +193,7 @@ impl KeyStore {
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
// leak only part of the chaff, see below comment about hedging against accidental signing of a debug // leak only part of the chaff, see below comment about hedging against accidental signing of a debug
// image // image
log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", chaff_xor[..8]); log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", &chaff_xor[..8]);
ikm.extend_from_slice(&chaff_xor); ikm.extend_from_slice(&chaff_xor);
assert!(ikm.len() == (nk_len + 1 + 1) * KEY_LEN); // sanity check that all keys were in fact added assert!(ikm.len() == (nk_len + 1 + 1) * KEY_LEN); // sanity check that all keys were in fact added
@ -220,11 +238,14 @@ impl KeyStore {
// do something with ct_xor that guarantees it's never optimized out // do something with ct_xor that guarantees it's never optimized out
if ct_xor.iter().all(|&cx| cx == 0) { if ct_xor.iter().all(|&cx| cx == 0) {
log::warn!("Chaff result is all-0. Confirming that we're in developer mode"); log::warn!("Chaff result is all-0. Confirming that we're in developer mode");
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZEROCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
// panic if we're not in developer mode // panic if we're not in developer mode
assert!( assert!(
self.owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() != 0, self.owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() != 0,
"Either we have the most improbable chaff, or (more likely) the chaff is set to all 0's" "Either we have the most improbable chaff, or (more likely) the chaff is set to all 0's"
); );
} else {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.OKCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
} }
self.master_key = Some(master_key); self.master_key = Some(master_key);
} }