From 22f44f82b967165c37410f72d822db1b06a88d37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bunnie Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2025 23:20:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] add debug telemetry to the keystore this is constructed in a way such that 1. it's gated off in production builds 2. if it was accidentally gated on, there is some security impact but not a significant loss of security We do need the telemetry so that during CI we can confirm that things are actually working. I think the risk of being too buttoned-up and then accidentally doing something like accidentally never initializing keys and leaving them all zero is greater than the risk of accidental partial leakage of information due to a procedural mix-up in the image signing ceremony. --- .../keystore/src/platform/baosec/store.rs | 23 ++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/services/keystore/src/platform/baosec/store.rs b/services/keystore/src/platform/baosec/store.rs index bd9536ea3..8d57ebf77 100644 --- a/services/keystore/src/platform/baosec/store.rs +++ b/services/keystore/src/platform/baosec/store.rs @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, KeyInit, generic_array::GenericArr use bao1x_api::{ BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, BoardTypeCoding, CP_ID, DEVELOPER_MODE, OEM_MODE, SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES, UUID, }; +use bao1x_hal::board::{BOOKEND_END, BOOKEND_START}; use bao1x_hal::{ acram::{OneWayCounter, SlotManager}, board::{CHAFF_KEYS, NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1, ROOT_SEED}, @@ -102,6 +103,23 @@ impl KeyStore { // read key material ikm.extend_from_slice(self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap()); + #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] + { + // analyze part of the key and print some informative statements during hazardous-debug + // we want to make sure that keys are actually being initialized, erased, or denied + // look at only 64 bits out of the 256 bit key - it's enough that it's highly unlikely that + // these 64 bits would match any of the zero/erased values, but not so much that if a + // dev image is accidentally signed & released that it'd be a serious threat to security + // as you'd still have 192 bits of secret material + let root_seed = self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap(); + if root_seed[..8] == [0u8; 8] { + log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZERO,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END); + } else if root_seed[..8] == [bao1x_hal::sigcheck::ERASE_VALUE; 8] { + log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ERASED,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END); + } else { + log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.KEYPASS,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END); + } + } // build nuisance key offsets - this is direct readout hardening let nk0 = NUISANCE_KEYS_0.try_into_data_iter().unwrap(); @@ -175,7 +193,7 @@ impl KeyStore { #[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")] // leak only part of the chaff, see below comment about hedging against accidental signing of a debug // image - log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", chaff_xor[..8]); + log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", &chaff_xor[..8]); ikm.extend_from_slice(&chaff_xor); assert!(ikm.len() == (nk_len + 1 + 1) * KEY_LEN); // sanity check that all keys were in fact added @@ -220,11 +238,14 @@ impl KeyStore { // do something with ct_xor that guarantees it's never optimized out if ct_xor.iter().all(|&cx| cx == 0) { log::warn!("Chaff result is all-0. Confirming that we're in developer mode"); + log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZEROCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END); // panic if we're not in developer mode assert!( self.owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() != 0, "Either we have the most improbable chaff, or (more likely) the chaff is set to all 0's" ); + } else { + log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.OKCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END); } self.master_key = Some(master_key); }