add debug telemetry to the keystore

this is constructed in a way such that

1. it's gated off in production builds
2. if it was accidentally gated on, there is some security impact
but not a significant loss of security

We do need the telemetry so that during CI we can confirm that things
are actually working. I think the risk of being too buttoned-up
and then accidentally doing something like accidentally never
initializing keys and leaving them all zero is greater than the
risk of accidental partial leakage of information due to a procedural
mix-up in the image signing ceremony.
This commit is contained in:
bunnie 2025-11-18 23:20:31 +08:00
parent 145c2e37b2
commit 22f44f82b9
No known key found for this signature in database

View file

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ use aes::cipher::{BlockDecrypt, BlockEncrypt, KeyInit, generic_array::GenericArr
use bao1x_api::{
BOOT0_PUBKEY_FAIL, BoardTypeCoding, CP_ID, DEVELOPER_MODE, OEM_MODE, SLOT_ELEMENT_LEN_BYTES, UUID,
};
use bao1x_hal::board::{BOOKEND_END, BOOKEND_START};
use bao1x_hal::{
acram::{OneWayCounter, SlotManager},
board::{CHAFF_KEYS, NUISANCE_KEYS_0, NUISANCE_KEYS_1, ROOT_SEED},
@ -102,6 +103,23 @@ impl KeyStore {
// read key material
ikm.extend_from_slice(self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap());
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
{
// analyze part of the key and print some informative statements during hazardous-debug
// we want to make sure that keys are actually being initialized, erased, or denied
// look at only 64 bits out of the 256 bit key - it's enough that it's highly unlikely that
// these 64 bits would match any of the zero/erased values, but not so much that if a
// dev image is accidentally signed & released that it'd be a serious threat to security
// as you'd still have 192 bits of secret material
let root_seed = self.slot_mgr.read(&ROOT_SEED).unwrap();
if root_seed[..8] == [0u8; 8] {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZERO,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
} else if root_seed[..8] == [bao1x_hal::sigcheck::ERASE_VALUE; 8] {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ERASED,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
} else {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.KEYPASS,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
}
}
// build nuisance key offsets - this is direct readout hardening
let nk0 = NUISANCE_KEYS_0.try_into_data_iter().unwrap();
@ -175,7 +193,7 @@ impl KeyStore {
#[cfg(feature = "hazardous-debug")]
// leak only part of the chaff, see below comment about hedging against accidental signing of a debug
// image
log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", chaff_xor[..8]);
log::info!("chaff: {:x?}", &chaff_xor[..8]);
ikm.extend_from_slice(&chaff_xor);
assert!(ikm.len() == (nk_len + 1 + 1) * KEY_LEN); // sanity check that all keys were in fact added
@ -220,11 +238,14 @@ impl KeyStore {
// do something with ct_xor that guarantees it's never optimized out
if ct_xor.iter().all(|&cx| cx == 0) {
log::warn!("Chaff result is all-0. Confirming that we're in developer mode");
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.ZEROCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
// panic if we're not in developer mode
assert!(
self.owc.get(DEVELOPER_MODE).unwrap() != 0,
"Either we have the most improbable chaff, or (more likely) the chaff is set to all 0's"
);
} else {
log::info!("{}KEYSTORE.OKCHAFF,{}", BOOKEND_START, BOOKEND_END);
}
self.master_key = Some(master_key);
}