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https://github.com/saymrwulf/xous-core.git
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boot0 improvements
- rcrr register multiply-written on boot to glitch harden the register. I only realize now that the top-line ECO had an asterisk on it which means that setting the register is still critical - correctness comparison of boot1 keys to IFR copy introduced this is yet another check to prevent tampering with the key block.
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1 changed files with 43 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ pub fn uart_irq_handler() {
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pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
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// set the security bits on the RRAM - without these set, most security is bypassed
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// this issue is fixed on A1 silicon stepping (which is production silicon)
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// glitch_safety: this is fixed by metal mask so no hardening is needed
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// glitch_safety: it is safe to write this register multiple times, and so it is.
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let mut rram = CSR::new(utra::rrc::HW_RRC_BASE as *mut u32);
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rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE);
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@ -71,12 +71,17 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
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let mut csprng = crate::platform::early_init();
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csprng.random_delay();
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rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE);
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bollard!(4);
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// Mesh check takes 100ms for the signal to propagate. Setup the mesh check here, then check the
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// result in boot1. In boot1, the opposite state (`true`) is checked.
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mesh_setup(false, None);
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bollard!(4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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bollard!(4);
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rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE);
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bollard!(4);
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crate::println!("\n~~boot0 up! ({})~~\n", crate::version::SEMVER);
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csprng.random_delay(); // always random-delay after printing
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@ -205,6 +210,43 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! {
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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// now do a check of the consistency of IFR vs boot1 block keys
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let mut all_matches = HardenedBool::TRUE;
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// check the LSBs
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for (&a, b) in ifr_keys.iter().zip(boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter()) {
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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if a != &b.pk[..31] {
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bollard!(die, 4);
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all_matches = HardenedBool::FALSE;
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bollard!(die, 4);
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}
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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// check the MSB
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for (a, b) in ifr_msb.iter().zip(boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter()) {
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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if *a != b.pk[31] {
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bollard!(die, 4);
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all_matches = HardenedBool::FALSE;
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bollard!(die, 4);
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}
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}
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bollard!(die, 4);
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csprng.random_delay();
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match all_matches.is_true() {
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Some(true) => {
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// matched, don't do anything
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}
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_ => {
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// all other cases, erase secrets
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bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(&mut csprng))
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.inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e))
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.ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks
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}
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}
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// mutual distrust - don't trust other third party firmware. If the boot1 key block doesn't match the
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// previously captured receipt, erase collateral
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for (key, slot) in boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(BOOT1_RECEIPT_SLOTS) {
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