diff --git a/bao1x-boot/boot0/src/main.rs b/bao1x-boot/boot0/src/main.rs index 0f91baaba..b5e56c47b 100644 --- a/bao1x-boot/boot0/src/main.rs +++ b/bao1x-boot/boot0/src/main.rs @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ pub fn uart_irq_handler() { pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! { // set the security bits on the RRAM - without these set, most security is bypassed // this issue is fixed on A1 silicon stepping (which is production silicon) - // glitch_safety: this is fixed by metal mask so no hardening is needed + // glitch_safety: it is safe to write this register multiple times, and so it is. let mut rram = CSR::new(utra::rrc::HW_RRC_BASE as *mut u32); rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE); @@ -71,12 +71,17 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! { let mut csprng = crate::platform::early_init(); csprng.random_delay(); + rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE); bollard!(4); // Mesh check takes 100ms for the signal to propagate. Setup the mesh check here, then check the // result in boot1. In boot1, the opposite state (`true`) is checked. mesh_setup(false, None); bollard!(4); + csprng.random_delay(); + bollard!(4); + rram.wfo(utra::rrc::SFR_RRCCR_SFR_RRCCR, bao1x_hal::rram::SECURITY_MODE); + bollard!(4); crate::println!("\n~~boot0 up! ({})~~\n", crate::version::SEMVER); csprng.random_delay(); // always random-delay after printing @@ -205,6 +210,43 @@ pub unsafe extern "C" fn rust_entry() -> ! { } bollard!(die, 4); + // now do a check of the consistency of IFR vs boot1 block keys + let mut all_matches = HardenedBool::TRUE; + // check the LSBs + for (&a, b) in ifr_keys.iter().zip(boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter()) { + bollard!(die, 4); + csprng.random_delay(); + if a != &b.pk[..31] { + bollard!(die, 4); + all_matches = HardenedBool::FALSE; + bollard!(die, 4); + } + } + bollard!(die, 4); + // check the MSB + for (a, b) in ifr_msb.iter().zip(boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter()) { + bollard!(die, 4); + csprng.random_delay(); + if *a != b.pk[31] { + bollard!(die, 4); + all_matches = HardenedBool::FALSE; + bollard!(die, 4); + } + } + bollard!(die, 4); + csprng.random_delay(); + match all_matches.is_true() { + Some(true) => { + // matched, don't do anything + } + _ => { + // all other cases, erase secrets + bao1x_hal::sigcheck::erase_secrets(&mut Some(&mut csprng)) + .inspect_err(|e| crate::println!("{}", e)) + .ok(); // "ok" because the expected error is a check on logic/configuration bugs, not attacks + } + } + // mutual distrust - don't trust other third party firmware. If the boot1 key block doesn't match the // previously captured receipt, erase collateral for (key, slot) in boot1_block.sealed_data.pubkeys.iter().zip(BOOT1_RECEIPT_SLOTS) {