proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent

pacta is a local CLI prototype for interpreting formal-verification evidence in cryptographic tooling. It is not a trading bot, does not move funds, and does not make financial decisions.

The immediate corpus is the saymrwulf/*-verified family of repositories. The shipped Lean files are treated as the verification artifact. This project intentionally does not run Charon, Aeneas, extraction, or Rust-to-Lean regeneration.

Purpose

An autonomous economic agent needs to answer a narrow question before trusting infrastructure:

Does this theorem cover the exact code path that will protect my funds?

pacta helps answer that by replaying pure Lean checks where possible, auditing axioms and proof hygiene, generating machine-readable claim cards, and assigning residual-risk classifications with explicit exclusions.

macOS / Apple Silicon

The prototype is written for Python 3.11+ and macOS on Apple Silicon. It does not assume GNU coreutils, Linux free, Linux taskset, GNU timeout, Docker, Nix, or x86_64.

Lean tooling is detected with shutil.which("lean") and shutil.which("lake"). If neither is available, pacta reports clear diagnostics and still supports offline claim-card generation and static hygiene scans.

Tests

python -m pytest            # with pytest installed
python3 scripts/mini_pytest.py   # dependency-free fallback runner (same suite)

Install

python3 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"

PyYAML is optional. Without it, pacta can still read the included simple YAML examples and JSON-compatible .yaml files.

Commands

python -m pacta --help
pacta scan --config examples/repos.yaml
pacta doctor --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified
pacta claims --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified --offline-fixture --out claims.yaml
pacta audit --repo ./repos/dalek-ed25519-verified
pacta lean-check --repo ./repos/dalek-ed25519-verified
pacta report --claims claims.yaml --out report.md
pacta score --claims claims.yaml
pacta receipt-verify --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml --receipt provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml --log-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub
pacta agent --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified --offline-fixture --action build-library
pacta agent --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified --clone --run-axioms --action build-library --artifact-dir artifacts-live
pacta agent --claims claims.yaml --action build-wallet-demo
pacta agent --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified --attestation examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml --trust-attestation-provider example-proof-checker.invalid --action build-library

Curriculum Notebooks

The notebooks/ directory contains a zero-to-hero teaching sequence for undergraduate students moving toward research-grade assurance engineering:

• 00_course_map.ipynb: course structure, prerequisites, assessment model, references.
• 01_threat_model_and_truth_boundary.ipynb: threat model, theorem boundaries, exclusions.
• 02_claim_cards_and_risk_model.ipynb: claim card schema and R0-R5 scoring.
• 03_lean_replay_and_axiom_audit.ipynb: replay versus transpilation, Lean invocation, axiom audits.
• 04_proof_hygiene_and_boundaries.ipynb: sorry, local axioms, trivial targets, manifest coverage.
• 05_third_party_attestation_provider.ipynb: provider trust transformation and signed attestations.
• 06_merkle_transparency_logs.ipynb: RFC 9162-style Merkle proofs, STHs, Ed25519/ML-DSA policy.
• 06a_provider_build_the_log.ipynb / 06b_agent_verify_inclusion.ipynb: the MIRRORED PAIR - one provider (builds, Lean-verifies, signs with the merkleized library, self-checks its own inclusion), many agents (verify inclusion from scratch in ~25 lines, no Lean); the domain separation is the design and the lecture structure mirrors it.
• 07_agent_consequences.ipynb: receipt-gated artifact builds and wallet-denial policy.
• 08_capstone_research_program.ipynb: audit the shipped R4 evidence; design the R5 discharge plan.
• 09_dogfood_verified_crypto.ipynb: the proven-path verifier in the agent's own loop; hybrid-PQC posture.

The course states and keeps a "ratchet rule": every load-bearing idea runs twice - napkin scale, then real scale - and every pair is executable in the notebook.

The notebooks are committed without execution output. They can be opened in Jupyter, VS Code, or any notebook reader. They import pacta directly from this repository and avoid external notebook-only dependencies.

Consequence Engine

pacta agent turns evaluation into an operational consequence.

• build-library requires R3 by default. It builds a small Rust proof-gated component capsule under artifacts/. The capsule embeds the claim card and exposes whether downstream automation may use the component for lower-layer cryptographic code only.
• build-wallet-demo requires R4. An R3 Ed25519 arithmetic claim will refuse this action and write a machine-readable denial artifact instead of building a wallet.

This is intentional. Arithmetic proof evidence can authorize a constrained lower-layer library decision, but it must not contaminate wallet, transaction, custody, or trading-agent risk scoring.

In live mode, --clone --run-axioms downloads the configured repository, replays the local Lean checks, runs the axiom audit, writes claims.yaml and report.md, and only builds the capsule if the resulting score satisfies the policy threshold. Failed replay is a hard consequence: no artifact is built.

Verifier Bootstrap

Some verified repositories rely on a pinned Aeneas Lean project, usually exposed by an environment script such as ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh. pacta can use that environment without running extraction:

pacta doctor --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified
pacta agent --config examples/repos.yaml --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified --clone --run-axioms --action build-library

The configured defaults are:

• env_script: ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh
• lean_project_dir: $AENEAS_HOME/backends/lean

If those are missing, the result is R0 for local replay because this machine lacks verifier capability. That is different from saying the theorem is false. It means the agent cannot trust the repository from local machine-checked evidence yet.

Third-Party Attestation

For agents that should not build the full Lean/Aeneas environment locally, pacta also supports an attestation lane. A specialized proof-checking service can replay the proofs in its own controlled environment and publish a certificate describing:

• repository URL and commit,
• theorem/certificate names,
• observed axioms,
• Lean/toolchain environment,
• service identity and signature metadata.

The agent can consume that certificate only when the provider is explicitly trusted:

pacta agent --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --attestation examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --trust-attestation-provider example-proof-checker.invalid \
  --allow-unsigned-attestation \
  --action build-library

This changes the trusted base. The agent is no longer trusting local Lean replay; it is trusting the proof-checking service, its environment, signing key custody, and log retention. Without an explicitly trusted provider, attestation evidence scores R0.

The included examples/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml is an unsigned schema/demo fixture and requires --allow-unsigned-attestation. Real provider certificates should be signed and consumed with --attestation-public-key.

Transparency-Logged Attestations

Standalone signatures prove who signed an attestation, but they do not make the provider accountable for equivocation or silent replacement. The nested provider can also append attestations to a local RFC 9162-style Merkle transparency log and issue inclusion receipts.

The log uses:

• RFC9162_SHA256 Merkle leaf/node hashing with 0x00 leaf and 0x01 node domain separation.
• Signed Tree Heads over canonical JSON tree-head payloads.
• OpenSSL Ed25519 signatures today.
• An explicit ML-DSA-65 / FIPS 204 signature slot that is unavailable unless the host has a real backend. If an agent policy requires both signatures, verification fails closed.

Example:

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-init \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-append \
  --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --private-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --out provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml

pacta receipt-verify \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --receipt provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml \
  --log-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub

Agents can require the receipt before building anything:

pacta agent \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --trust-attestation-provider local-pacta-provider \
  --attestation-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --transparency-receipt provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml \
  --transparency-log-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --require-transparency-receipt \
  --action build-library

To demand post-quantum log signatures as well:

pacta receipt-verify \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --receipt provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml \
  --log-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --require-signatures both

On a host without ML-DSA support, that command should fail. That is intentional. The system records the missing capability as a deployment blocker instead of treating the Ed25519 signature as quantum-robust.

Nested Proof-Check Provider

This repository includes a nested provider prototype under provider/. It searches read-only under your home/GitClone tree for reusable Lean/Aeneas infrastructure, runs the proof replay, signs the result with OpenSSL Ed25519, and emits an attestation.

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider discover --root ~/GitClone
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider init-key --key-dir provider/state/local-provider
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider check \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --repo repos/dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --provider local-pacta-provider \
  --private-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.key \
  --public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --env-script /path/to/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh \
  --lean-project-dir '$AENEAS_HOME/backends/lean' \
  --out provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml

pacta agent \
  --config examples/repos.yaml \
  --repo-name dalek-ed25519-verified \
  --attestation provider/out/dalek-ed25519.attestation.yaml \
  --trust-attestation-provider local-pacta-provider \
  --attestation-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --transparency-receipt provider/out/dalek-ed25519.receipt.yaml \
  --transparency-log-public-key provider/state/local-provider/provider.ed25519.pub \
  --require-transparency-receipt \
  --action build-library

This is the intended trust transformation: local agents can avoid constructing the full verifier environment, but they must explicitly trust the provider identity and verification key.

Real Evidence (shipped)

evidence/ contains signed, transparency-logged attestations from a REAL guarded replay of all four verified repositories: 16/16 certificates proven per fork with boundary-exact axiom cones, pinned to exact repo commits, machine-protected by lean-guard throughout (~30 min of Lean kernel re-checking per fork, done ONCE - verifying the signature + inclusion receipt afterwards takes milliseconds, which is the entire point of the provider model). The log's first four leaves honestly record a failed audit run (two pacta bugs, fixed and documented); the ledger keeps its history. See evidence/README.md to re-verify everything yourself.

The Online Log and the Published Mirror

The log has three synchronized faces, transport being orthogonal to trust:

1. Files (evidence/): self-contained receipts, verifiable offline.
2. Git mirror (saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log, mirrored on Forgejo): every leaf, every signed tree head (the WITNESS CHANNEL - all cloners see the same heads), per-component receipts, the provider public key, and a standalone stdlib-only verify.py. Anyone: python3 verify.py --all.
3. HTTP service (deployed at ltl.zkdefi.org, see DEPLOY.md): read-only CT-style endpoints + customer docs. The web process never touches private keys - heads are signed offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning + freshness detect both) but never forge.

PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider serve --log-dir ... --base-path lean-transparency-log
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-publish --log-dir ... --git-dir <mirror clone> --public-key <pub>
pacta log-fetch   --url https://ltl.zkdefi.org --component dalek-ed25519-verified --out-dir fetched
pacta sth-refresh --url https://ltl.zkdefi.org --sth-store pins.json --log-public-key <pub>
pacta witness-audit --published-dir <clone of lean-transparency-log> --log-public-key <pub>

Split-View Defense (STH Pinning)

Standalone receipt verification cannot detect a provider maintaining two log views. pacta keeps a local STH pin store:

pacta receipt-verify ... --sth-store state/sth-store.json [--consistency-proof proof.yaml] [--max-sth-age-seconds 86400]
pacta agent ... --sth-store state/sth-store.json ...
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-consistency --log-dir ... --from-size N   # proofs for older pins
PYTHONPATH=src:provider/src python -m pacta_provider log-audit --log-dir ...                        # monitor self-check

Unknown log: pin on first use (recorded as trust-on-first-use). Same tree size: the root must match the pin - a mismatch is named EQUIVOCATION and rejected forever. Larger tree: a consistency proof from the pinned size is required (receipts embed a from-previous anchor whose root is itself checked against the pin). Smaller tree: rollback, rejected. --max-sth-age-seconds additionally rejects stale or future-dated tree heads.

Dogfood Verified Cryptography

pacta can verify its own evidence signatures through the PROVEN code path - a small Rust binary built from the pinned proven source workspace (the exact commit the dalek certificates pin, serial backend pinned as the verified extraction pins it):

pacta dogfood-build --source ~/GitClone/FormalVerification/sources/curve25519-dalek-source
pacta dogfood-status
pacta receipt-verify ... --require-verified-verifier   # fail closed unless the proven path ran

The backend that actually verified each signature (verified-dalek-serial or the openssl fallback) is recorded in receipts' signature statuses and attestation evidence; the fallback is never silent. A provenance sidecar records the source commit, backend cfg, and the honest coverage note (the certificates cover the extraction image of this verify path; SHA-512 and the wire glue remain the documented trusted base). ML-DSA is deliberately NOT dogfooded: no proven implementation exists, so the slot stays fail-closed - the hybrid-PQC posture is one proven-classical signature plus one required-but-honest post-quantum slot.

Truth Boundary

The Ed25519 repositories should not be marketed as fully verified wallets. Since 2026-07-06 the strongest claim is substantial and theorem-bound:

Every ed25519 repository in the corpus carries Lean-checked certificates for field arithmetic over F_p (p = 2^255 - 19), the complete twisted Edwards laws, full scalar arithmetic mod l, encoding/decoding canonicality with constructive decompression, and a FOUR-TIER signature apex culminating in the full lift: the extracted verifier accepts iff the signature's R decompresses to a valid on-curve point equal to [k](-A) + [s]B. Each apex tier's axiom cone is pinned to EXACTLY the fork's documented SHA-512/wire-format boundary by that repository's own check script (pacta mirrors those boundary sets per fork and re-checks observed cones against them - the authority is always the repo's button).

pacta treats these as out of scope (they are the theorems' documented trusted base or genuinely unproven):

• SHA-512 itself (an opaque oracle in the apex theorems - no properties assumed).
• Wire parser/filter byte-level specs (their outcomes are hypotheses in the apex tiers).
• Signing-side correctness (key generation, nonces, the signer).
• Rust compiler correctness.
• Charon/Aeneas translation faithfulness.
• Side-channel resistance.
• SIMD, AVX, hardware, zkVM, accelerator, or syscall paths (extraction pins the serial path).
• Wallet policy, transaction construction, RPC, chain, oracle, market, and LLM decision safety.

Risk Levels

• R0: Unknown or untrusted. No usable evidence.
• R1: Tests, audits, or informal claims only.
• R2: Formal model exists, but it is incomplete, weakly tied to production code, or major proof gaps remain.
• R3: A specific lower-layer implementation artifact is Lean-checked for a specific backend and theorem boundary.
• R4: End-to-end primitive proof covers public API, parsing/encoding, scalar arithmetic, hashing interface, signature equation, rejection rules, and implementation boundary.
• R5: R4 plus reproducible production builds, compiler/build assurance, side-channel analysis, hardware/KMS/MPC integration, and operational controls.

Expected classifications: the arithmetic pair alone reaches R3. The full configured set - arithmetic, scalars, encoding/decoding, and the four apex tiers with boundary-exact cones - reaches R4, always with explicit residual blockers (the SHA-512 oracle, hypothesis-parametric parses, translation faithfulness, missing side-channel/build assurance). R5 remains future work. The build-wallet-demo gate therefore genuinely opens on real evidence now - and still emits only a policy scaffold, never a production wallet.