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warden wallet core: R4-gated capsule, hash-chained ledger, quorum inbound, firewalled outbound

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- Wallet.init is the R4 gate in executable form: per member, the built
  binary's source commit must match an attestation whose verdicts are
  re-derived locally, scored >= R4, and Merkle-bound to a verified STH
  under the log key (explicit --trusted-provider required, never inferred)
- append-only hash-chained ledger; latch semantics (tamper => custody
  frozen; unlatch is a deliberate operator act recorded with a note)
- outbound: intent envelope bound to payload bytes -> signer (local
  dogfood or airgap/Precursor-style outbox) -> quorum firewall; a
  rejected self-signature is quarantined, never released, and latches
- refusal receipts: signed machine-actionable artifacts (code, missing,
  remediation); unsigned-by-design while latched
- live end-to-end against ltl.zkdefi.org: 4 members R4 (leaves 4-7),
  release firewall unanimous-accept, inbound unanimous-accept, refusal
  signed, ledger chain verified

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrwulf 2026-07-06 23:31:50 +02:00
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"""warden - the verified-custody wallet core.
A wallet is a directory that holds no opinions, only evidence:
- ``capsule.json`` the custody capsule: which quorum members guard the
boundary, compiled from which attested sources, with
the transparency-log receipts that authorized them
(R4 gate), and the policy in force.
- ``ledger.jsonl`` append-only, hash-chained event log. Every inbound
verification, outbound signature, refusal, incident,
and latch transition is an entry; each entry commits
to its predecessor by SHA-256.
- ``keys/`` wallet identities (OpenSSL PEM). Private keys only
for the local signer; the airgap signer keeps its
seed on the device, where it belongs.
- ``incidents/`` quorum divergences and firewall quarantines, full
trails, numbered.
- ``receipts/`` refusal receipts - signed, machine-actionable
artifacts a refused agent can hand its principal.
- ``quarantine/`` signatures the outbound firewall refused to release.
- ``airgap/`` outbox/inbox exchange directory for the gap signer.
Trust posture, stated once and enforced everywhere: the INBOUND boundary
(and the outbound firewall's check) runs on quorum members whose verify
paths carry machine-checked correctness certificates - custody-grade.
The OUTBOUND signing step is declared trusted base (the attested artifact,
not a third implementation) until signing-side proofs land. A tamper-grade
quorum divergence latches custody shut, and refusals while latched are
honest enough to arrive unsigned: a wallet that no longer trusts its own
boundary does not pretend to certify its apologies.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import json
import os
import time
import uuid
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any
from .attestation import validate_attestation
from .claims import build_claim_card
from .config import load_config
from .dogfood import (
locate_verifier,
pem_public_key_to_raw,
sign_payload_dogfood,
)
from .quorum import (
QUORUM_BACKENDS,
QuorumResult,
QuorumVerifier,
member_provenance,
binary_path as quorum_binary_path,
)
from .risk import risk_at_least, score_claim_card
from .signing import generate_ed25519_keypair
from .sthstore import check_sth_freshness
from .transparency import verify_inclusion, verify_signed_tree_head
from .yamlio import load_data
CAPSULE_TYPE = "pacta.wallet.custody_capsule.v1"
LEDGER_GENESIS = "pacta.wallet.ledger_genesis.v1"
# Refusal codes: the machine-actionable vocabulary. Every refusal names one.
REFUSAL_CODES = (
"EVIDENCE_REQUIRED", # missing/insufficient transparency-log evidence
"POLICY_DENIED", # request violates capsule policy
"CUSTODY_LATCHED", # tamper latch is engaged; custody frozen
"EVIDENCE_STALE", # STH pin older than the freshness policy
"MALFORMED_INTENT", # intent envelope failed validation
"SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE", # signer backend cannot serve the request
"FIREWALL_QUARANTINE", # produced signature failed the quorum firewall
"PENDING_AIRGAP", # request parked in the airgap outbox
)
class WalletError(RuntimeError):
pass
@dataclass(slots=True)
class Refusal:
code: str
reason: str
missing: list[str]
remediation: str
receipt_path: Path | None = None
receipt: dict[str, Any] | None = None
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"code": self.code,
"reason": self.reason,
"missing": self.missing,
"remediation": self.remediation,
"receipt_path": str(self.receipt_path) if self.receipt_path else None,
"receipt": self.receipt,
}
def _now() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
def _canonical(document: Any) -> bytes:
return json.dumps(document, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
def _sha256(data: bytes) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Signers
class LocalDogfoodSigner:
"""Signs with the attested dogfood binary; seed from a PEM on this host.
Honesty: the signing path is trusted base - but it is the merkleized,
attested artifact, and every signature it emits must still pass the
quorum firewall before release.
"""
name = "local-dogfood"
def __init__(self, binary: str | Path | None = None) -> None:
self.binary = Path(binary) if binary else locate_verifier()
if self.binary is None or not Path(self.binary).exists():
raise WalletError(
"dogfood signing binary not found; run `pacta dogfood-build` first"
)
def sign(self, payload: bytes, private_key_path: Path) -> bytes:
return sign_payload_dogfood(payload, private_key_path, self.binary)
class AirgapSigner:
"""Models the Precursor/Betrusted flow: the seed never touches this host.
A signing request is written to ``airgap/outbox/<id>.request.json``; a
human (or the device bridge) carries it across the gap, signs, and drops
``airgap/inbox/<id>.response.json`` containing ``signature_hex``. The
wallet picks it up on the next attempt with the same request id - and
the signature still has to pass the quorum firewall, which is exactly
the fault-injection countermeasure (verify-after-sign) the hardware
story needs.
"""
name = "airgap"
def __init__(self, airgap_dir: Path, wait_seconds: float = 0.0, poll: float = 0.2) -> None:
self.outbox = airgap_dir / "outbox"
self.inbox = airgap_dir / "inbox"
self.outbox.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.inbox.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.wait_seconds = wait_seconds
self.poll = poll
def request_path(self, request_id: str) -> Path:
return self.outbox / f"{request_id}.request.json"
def response_path(self, request_id: str) -> Path:
return self.inbox / f"{request_id}.response.json"
def sign(self, payload: bytes, private_key_path: Path, request_id: str | None = None,
intent: dict[str, Any] | None = None) -> bytes:
request_id = request_id or uuid.uuid4().hex[:16]
response = self.response_path(request_id)
if not response.exists():
request = {
"type": "pacta.wallet.airgap_request.v1",
"request_id": request_id,
"created_at": _now(),
"payload_hex": payload.hex(),
"payload_sha256": _sha256(payload),
"intent": intent or {},
"instructions": (
"Carry this file across the gap. Sign payload_hex with the device "
"key and write {\"signature_hex\": ...} to "
f"airgap/inbox/{request_id}.response.json"
),
}
self.request_path(request_id).write_text(
json.dumps(request, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
deadline = time.monotonic() + self.wait_seconds
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if response.exists():
break
time.sleep(self.poll)
if not response.exists():
raise PendingAirgap(request_id)
body = json.loads(response.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
signature = bytes.fromhex(str(body.get("signature_hex", "")))
if len(signature) != 64:
raise WalletError(f"airgap response {request_id} has no 64-byte signature_hex")
return signature
class PendingAirgap(Exception):
def __init__(self, request_id: str) -> None:
super().__init__(request_id)
self.request_id = request_id
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The wallet
class Wallet:
def __init__(self, wallet_dir: str | Path) -> None:
self.dir = Path(wallet_dir)
self.capsule_path = self.dir / "capsule.json"
self.ledger_path = self.dir / "ledger.jsonl"
self.latch_path = self.dir / "latch.json"
self.keys_dir = self.dir / "keys"
self.incidents_dir = self.dir / "incidents"
self.receipts_dir = self.dir / "receipts"
self.quarantine_dir = self.dir / "quarantine"
self.airgap_dir = self.dir / "airgap"
# -- init / R4 gate ------------------------------------------------------
@classmethod
def init(
cls,
wallet_dir: str | Path,
evidence_dir: str | Path,
log_public_key: str | Path,
repos_config: str | Path = Path("examples") / "repos.yaml",
trusted_provider: str | None = None,
backends: list[str] | None = None,
state_dir: str | Path | None = None,
require_tier: str = "R4",
min_members: int = 2,
freshness_max_age_days: int = 30,
identity_name: str = "warden",
) -> "Wallet":
"""Create a wallet - the R4 gate in executable form.
For every quorum member: the built binary's provenance must name an
attested source commit; the evidence dir must hold that component's
attestation + receipt; the attestation is re-validated locally
(observations, never verdicts), scored, and must reach
``require_tier``; the receipt's inclusion proof must verify against
its signed tree head under the log's public key; and the source
commit in the attestation must equal the commit the binary was
compiled from. Any miss refuses wallet creation - a custody wallet
that cannot show its evidence has no business existing.
"""
wallet = cls(wallet_dir)
if wallet.capsule_path.exists():
raise WalletError(f"wallet already exists at {wallet.dir}")
evidence = Path(evidence_dir)
config = load_config(repos_config)
names = backends or list(QUORUM_BACKENDS)
members: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
problems: list[str] = []
for name in names:
binary = quorum_binary_path(name, state_dir)
if not binary.exists():
problems.append(f"{name}: quorum binary not built ({binary})")
continue
prov = member_provenance(name, state_dir)
component = QUORUM_BACKENDS[name]["component"]
att_path = evidence / f"{component}.attestation.json"
rec_path = evidence / f"{component}.receipt.json"
if not att_path.exists() or not rec_path.exists():
problems.append(
f"{name}: missing evidence for {component} "
f"(need {att_path.name} and {rec_path.name})"
)
continue
attestation = load_data(att_path)
if isinstance(attestation, dict) and "attestation" in attestation:
attestation = attestation["attestation"]
receipt = load_data(rec_path)
try:
repo = config.repo_named(component)
except KeyError as exc:
problems.append(f"{name}: {exc}")
continue
if not trusted_provider:
raise WalletError(
"wallet init requires an explicit --trusted-provider: custody evidence "
"must name whose observations you are trusting (never inferred from the "
"attestation itself)"
)
result = validate_attestation(
attestation,
repo,
path=att_path,
trusted_provider=trusted_provider,
public_key_path=log_public_key,
allow_unsigned=False,
transparency_receipt_path=rec_path,
transparency_log_public_key_path=log_public_key,
)
if not result.accepted:
problems.append(
f"{name}: attestation not accepted: " + "; ".join(result.diagnostics[:3])
)
continue
card = build_claim_card(repo, wallet.dir, attestation=result)
assessment = score_claim_card(card)
if not risk_at_least(assessment.level, require_tier):
problems.append(
f"{name}: evidence tier {assessment.level} below required {require_tier}: "
+ "; ".join(assessment.blockers[:3])
)
continue
sth = receipt.get("sth") or {}
ok_sth, sth_diags, _ = verify_signed_tree_head(sth, log_public_key)
if not ok_sth:
problems.append(f"{name}: receipt STH failed verification: {sth_diags[:2]}")
continue
from .transparency import leaf_bytes_for_attestation
ok_incl = verify_inclusion(
leaf_bytes_for_attestation(attestation),
int(receipt.get("leaf_index", -1)),
int(receipt.get("tree_size", 0)),
[bytes.fromhex(h) for h in receipt.get("inclusion_proof", [])],
bytes.fromhex(str(sth.get("root_hash", ""))),
)
if not ok_incl:
problems.append(f"{name}: inclusion proof does not bind attestation to the log")
continue
att_commit = ((attestation.get("subject") or {}).get("repo_commit") or "")
src_commit = prov.get("source_commit") or ""
src_attested = ((attestation.get("subject") or {}).get("source_commit") or "")
# The attestation subject names the verification repo commit and
# (when present) the extracted source commit; the binary must be
# compiled from an attested source commit.
if src_attested and src_commit and src_attested != src_commit:
problems.append(
f"{name}: binary compiled from {src_commit[:12]} but attestation covers "
f"{src_attested[:12]}"
)
continue
members.append(
{
"backend": name,
"component": component,
"semantics": QUORUM_BACKENDS[name]["semantics"],
"entry_point": prov.get("entry_point"),
"source_commit": src_commit,
"repo_commit": att_commit,
"binary_sha256": prov.get("binary_sha256"),
"backend_cfg": prov.get("backend_cfg"),
"risk_tier": assessment.level,
"evidence": {
"leaf_hash": receipt.get("leaf_hash"),
"leaf_index": receipt.get("leaf_index"),
"tree_size": receipt.get("tree_size"),
"inclusion_proof": receipt.get("inclusion_proof"),
"sth": sth,
},
}
)
if len(members) < min_members:
raise WalletError(
"R4 gate refused wallet creation "
f"({len(members)}/{min_members} members eligible):\n- "
+ "\n- ".join(problems or ["no eligible members"])
)
# Signing binary provenance (outbound trusted base, attested artifact)
signing_binary = locate_verifier(state_dir=None)
from .dogfood import load_provenance
signing_prov = load_provenance(signing_binary) if signing_binary else {}
capsule = {
"type": CAPSULE_TYPE,
"created_at": _now(),
"members": members,
"policy": {
"require_unanimity": True,
"min_members": min_members,
"require_tier": require_tier,
"freshness_max_age_days": freshness_max_age_days,
},
"signing": {
"backend": "verified-dalek-serial (attested artifact; trusted base)",
"binary_sha256": _sha256(Path(signing_binary).read_bytes()) if signing_binary else None,
"source_commit": signing_prov.get("source_commit"),
"coverage_note": (
"verify path certificate-covered; signing path trusted base - "
"every outbound signature passes the quorum firewall before release"
),
},
"problems_at_init": problems,
}
wallet.dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
for sub in (wallet.keys_dir, wallet.incidents_dir, wallet.receipts_dir,
wallet.quarantine_dir, wallet.airgap_dir / "outbox", wallet.airgap_dir / "inbox"):
sub.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
capsule_bytes = _canonical(capsule)
wallet.capsule_path.write_text(json.dumps(capsule, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
genesis = {
"type": LEDGER_GENESIS,
"capsule_sha256": _sha256(capsule_bytes),
}
wallet._append_ledger("genesis", genesis)
generate_ed25519_keypair(
wallet.keys_dir / f"{identity_name}.key.pem",
wallet.keys_dir / f"{identity_name}.pub.pem",
)
os.chmod(wallet.keys_dir / f"{identity_name}.key.pem", 0o600)
return wallet
# -- capsule / state -----------------------------------------------------
def capsule(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
if not self.capsule_path.exists():
raise WalletError(f"no wallet at {self.dir} (missing capsule.json)")
return json.loads(self.capsule_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
def latch_state(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
if self.latch_path.exists():
return json.loads(self.latch_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return {"latched": False}
def _latch(self, reason: str, incident_ref: str | None) -> None:
state = {"latched": True, "reason": reason, "incident": incident_ref, "at": _now()}
self.latch_path.write_text(json.dumps(state, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
self._append_ledger("latch", state)
def unlatch(self, operator_note: str) -> None:
"""Deliberately a human act: the CLI asks for a written note, and the
note lands in the permanent ledger next to the latch it releases."""
state = {"latched": False, "operator_note": operator_note, "at": _now()}
self.latch_path.write_text(json.dumps(state, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
self._append_ledger("unlatch", state)
# -- ledger ---------------------------------------------------------------
def _ledger_entries(self) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
if not self.ledger_path.exists():
return []
return [
json.loads(line)
for line in self.ledger_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
if line.strip()
]
def _append_ledger(self, entry_type: str, body: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
entries = self._ledger_entries()
prev_hash = entries[-1]["entry_hash"] if entries else "0" * 64
entry = {
"index": len(entries),
"timestamp": _now(),
"entry_type": entry_type,
"body": body,
"prev_hash": prev_hash,
}
entry["entry_hash"] = _sha256(_canonical(entry))
with self.ledger_path.open("a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
handle.write(json.dumps(entry, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
return entry
def verify_ledger(self) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
problems: list[str] = []
prev = "0" * 64
for entry in self._ledger_entries():
claimed = entry.get("entry_hash")
body = {k: v for k, v in entry.items() if k != "entry_hash"}
if entry.get("prev_hash") != prev:
problems.append(f"entry {entry.get('index')}: chain break")
if _sha256(_canonical(body)) != claimed:
problems.append(f"entry {entry.get('index')}: hash mismatch")
prev = claimed or prev
return (not problems), problems
def ledger_head(self) -> str:
entries = self._ledger_entries()
return entries[-1]["entry_hash"] if entries else "0" * 64
# -- quorum assembly -------------------------------------------------------
def quorum(self, state_dir: str | Path | None = None) -> QuorumVerifier:
capsule = self.capsule()
members: dict[str, Path] = {}
for member in capsule["members"]:
name = member["backend"]
binary = quorum_binary_path(name, state_dir)
if not binary.exists():
raise WalletError(f"quorum member binary missing: {binary}")
actual = _sha256(binary.read_bytes())
if member.get("binary_sha256") and actual != member["binary_sha256"]:
raise WalletError(
f"quorum member {name} binary hash changed since the capsule was sealed "
f"({actual[:12]} != {member['binary_sha256'][:12]}); rebuild or re-init"
)
members[name] = binary
return QuorumVerifier(members, min_members=int(capsule["policy"]["min_members"]))
# -- inbound ---------------------------------------------------------------
def verify_inbound(
self,
payload: bytes,
signature: bytes,
public_key: bytes,
context: str = "",
state_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> QuorumResult:
result = self.quorum(state_dir).verify(payload, signature, public_key)
record = {
"context": context,
"payload_sha256": _sha256(payload),
"public_key_hex": public_key.hex(),
"signature_hex": signature.hex(),
"result": result.to_dict(),
}
self._append_ledger("inbound-verify", record)
if result.incident:
ref = self._write_incident(result.incident)
if result.incident.get("severity") == "tamper":
self._latch("unexplained quorum divergence on inbound verification", ref)
return result
def _write_incident(self, incident: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
existing = sorted(self.incidents_dir.glob("*.json"))
ref = f"{len(existing):04d}"
body = dict(incident)
body["incident_ref"] = ref
body["recorded_at"] = _now()
(self.incidents_dir / f"{ref}.json").write_text(
json.dumps(body, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8"
)
self._append_ledger("incident", {"incident_ref": ref, "severity": incident.get("severity")})
return ref
# -- refusal receipts --------------------------------------------------------
def _refuse(
self,
code: str,
reason: str,
missing: list[str],
remediation: str,
request: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
sign: bool = True,
) -> Refusal:
assert code in REFUSAL_CODES, code
receipt = {
"type": "pacta.wallet.refusal_receipt.v1",
"code": code,
"reason": reason,
"missing": missing,
"remediation": remediation,
"request_sha256": _sha256(_canonical(request or {})),
"ledger_head": self.ledger_head(),
"issued_at": _now(),
}
latched = self.latch_state().get("latched", False)
if sign and not latched:
try:
signature, identity = self._sign_as_wallet(_canonical(receipt))
receipt["signature"] = {
"identity": identity,
"signature_hex": signature.hex(),
"scheme": "ed25519-dogfood",
}
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - refusals must never fail to issue
receipt["signature"] = {"status": "unavailable", "detail": str(exc)}
else:
receipt["signature"] = {
"status": "unsigned",
"detail": (
"custody latch engaged - a wallet that no longer trusts its own "
"boundary does not certify its refusals" if latched else "signing skipped"
),
}
existing = sorted(self.receipts_dir.glob("*.json"))
ref = f"{len(existing):04d}"
path = self.receipts_dir / f"{ref}.json"
path.write_text(json.dumps(receipt, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
self._append_ledger("refusal", {"receipt_ref": ref, "code": code, "reason": reason})
return Refusal(code, reason, missing, remediation, path, receipt)
def _sign_as_wallet(self, payload: bytes) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
keys = sorted(self.keys_dir.glob("*.key.pem"))
if not keys:
raise WalletError("wallet has no identity key")
key = keys[0]
identity = key.name.removesuffix(".key.pem")
signer = LocalDogfoodSigner()
signature = signer.sign(payload, key)
return signature, identity
# -- outbound: intent → sign → firewall → release ------------------------------
def request_signature(
self,
intent: dict[str, Any],
payload: bytes,
signer: Any = None,
key_name: str = "warden",
request_id: str | None = None,
state_dir: str | Path | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any] | Refusal:
"""The outbound path. Returns a release dict on success, or a Refusal.
Order matters and is deliberate: latch, policy freshness, intent
binding, signer, then the firewall - the quorum verifies the fresh
signature and only unanimity releases it. A signature that fails the
firewall is quarantined and never returned to the caller; that is
the verify-after-sign fault-injection countermeasure, custody-grade.
"""
request = {"intent": intent, "payload_sha256": _sha256(payload), "key_name": key_name}
latch = self.latch_state()
if latch.get("latched"):
return self._refuse(
"CUSTODY_LATCHED",
f"custody latch engaged: {latch.get('reason')}",
[f"operator unlatch with written note (incident {latch.get('incident')})"],
"resolve the incident, then `pacta wallet unlatch --note <why>`",
request,
)
capsule = self.capsule()
freshness = self._check_freshness(capsule)
if freshness is not None:
return freshness if isinstance(freshness, Refusal) else freshness
problem = self._validate_intent(intent, payload)
if problem:
return self._refuse(
"MALFORMED_INTENT",
problem,
["intent.purpose (non-empty string)", "intent.payload_sha256 matching the payload"],
"resend with a well-formed intent envelope; see WALLET.md#intent",
request,
)
key = self.keys_dir / f"{key_name}.key.pem"
pub = self.keys_dir / f"{key_name}.pub.pem"
if signer is None:
signer = LocalDogfoodSigner()
if not pub.exists():
return self._refuse(
"SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE",
f"no identity {key_name} in this wallet",
[f"keys/{key_name}.pub.pem"],
"create the identity or name an existing one",
request,
)
if isinstance(signer, LocalDogfoodSigner) and not key.exists():
return self._refuse(
"SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE",
f"identity {key_name} has no local private key (airgap-only identity?)",
[f"keys/{key_name}.key.pem"],
"use the airgap signer for this identity",
request,
)
try:
if isinstance(signer, AirgapSigner):
signature = signer.sign(payload, key, request_id=request_id, intent=intent)
else:
signature = signer.sign(payload, key)
except PendingAirgap as pending:
return self._refuse(
"PENDING_AIRGAP",
f"request {pending.request_id} parked in the airgap outbox",
[f"airgap/inbox/{pending.request_id}.response.json"],
"sign on the device, drop the response file, resend with the same request_id",
request,
sign=False,
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
return self._refuse(
"SIGNER_UNAVAILABLE", f"signer failed: {exc}", [], "check the signer backend", request
)
# THE FIREWALL: the fresh signature faces the full quorum.
public_key = pem_public_key_to_raw(pub)
result = self.quorum(state_dir).verify(payload, signature, public_key)
if not result.accepted:
quarantine_ref = self._quarantine(payload, signature, public_key, intent, result)
if result.incident:
incident_ref = self._write_incident(result.incident)
else:
incident_ref = None
self._latch(
"outbound firewall rejected a signature this wallet just produced "
f"(quarantine {quarantine_ref})",
incident_ref,
)
return self._refuse(
"FIREWALL_QUARANTINE",
"the quorum refused a signature produced by this wallet's own signer - "
f"classification {result.classification}; the signature was quarantined, "
"never released, and custody is latched",
[],
"treat as a fault/tamper event; inspect quarantine and incidents, then unlatch deliberately",
request,
sign=False,
)
release = {
"type": "pacta.wallet.release.v1",
"signature_hex": signature.hex(),
"public_key_hex": public_key.hex(),
"identity": key_name,
"signer": getattr(signer, "name", "unknown"),
"intent": intent,
"payload_sha256": _sha256(payload),
"firewall": result.to_dict(),
"issued_at": _now(),
}
self._append_ledger("outbound-sign", release)
return release
def _check_freshness(self, capsule: dict[str, Any]) -> Refusal | None:
max_age_days = int(capsule["policy"].get("freshness_max_age_days", 0) or 0)
if max_age_days <= 0:
return None
newest: dict[str, Any] | None = None
for member in capsule["members"]:
sth = (member.get("evidence") or {}).get("sth") or {}
if not newest or str(sth.get("timestamp", "")) > str(newest.get("timestamp", "")):
newest = sth
if newest is None:
return None
fresh, why = check_sth_freshness(newest, max_age_days * 86400)
if fresh:
return None
return self._refuse(
"EVIDENCE_STALE",
f"the wallet's newest pinned tree head fails the freshness policy: {why}",
["a fresh signed tree head from the transparency log"],
"run `pacta sth-refresh` against the log, then re-init or update the capsule; "
"a wallet should not outlive its evidence",
None,
)
@staticmethod
def _validate_intent(intent: dict[str, Any], payload: bytes) -> str | None:
if not isinstance(intent, dict):
return "intent must be an object"
purpose = intent.get("purpose")
if not isinstance(purpose, str) or not purpose.strip():
return "intent.purpose is required (non-empty string): the ledger records why, not just what"
digest = intent.get("payload_sha256")
if digest != _sha256(payload):
return "intent.payload_sha256 must match the payload (binds the intent to these exact bytes)"
return None
def _quarantine(
self,
payload: bytes,
signature: bytes,
public_key: bytes,
intent: dict[str, Any],
result: QuorumResult,
) -> str:
existing = sorted(self.quarantine_dir.glob("*.json"))
ref = f"{len(existing):04d}"
(self.quarantine_dir / f"{ref}.json").write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"type": "pacta.wallet.quarantined_signature.v1",
"quarantine_ref": ref,
"payload_sha256": _sha256(payload),
"signature_hex": signature.hex(),
"public_key_hex": public_key.hex(),
"intent": intent,
"firewall": result.to_dict(),
"recorded_at": _now(),
},
indent=2,
sort_keys=True,
)
+ "\n",
encoding="utf-8",
)
return ref
# -- posture -------------------------------------------------------------
def posture(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
capsule = self.capsule()
ok_ledger, ledger_problems = self.verify_ledger()
incidents = sorted(self.incidents_dir.glob("*.json"))
receipts = sorted(self.receipts_dir.glob("*.json"))
return {
"type": "pacta.wallet.posture.v1",
"capsule_sha256": _sha256(_canonical(capsule)),
"members": [
{
"backend": m["backend"],
"component": m["component"],
"risk_tier": m["risk_tier"],
"source_commit": m["source_commit"],
"binary_sha256": m["binary_sha256"],
}
for m in capsule["members"]
],
"policy": capsule["policy"],
"latch": self.latch_state(),
"ledger": {
"entries": len(self._ledger_entries()),
"head": self.ledger_head(),
"chain_ok": ok_ledger,
"problems": ledger_problems,
},
"incidents": len(incidents),
"refusal_receipts": len(receipts),
"generated_at": _now(),
}