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Author SHA1 Message Date
65772b3d2e warden hardening round: policy engine, ledger rotation, MCP UX, treasury LIVE, ops docs
Tier 2:
- request_signature decomposed into named gates (latch, freshness,
  intent, policy, signer, firewall)
- ledger: O(1) tail-read appends under a dedicated lock file (survives
  rotation rename); hash-chained segment rotation at policy
  ledger.rotate_at; verify-ledger walks all segments to genesis;
  archive tampering detected (tested)
- docs/threat-model.md (attacker matrix 1-9, proven-vs-trusted, design
  invariants) + docs/runbook-latch.md (diagnose-first recovery)
- lecture 10: executable corrupt-a-member exercise (capsule pin catches
  one appended byte), honest note on what the pin does NOT stop

Lightweight policy engine (POLICY_DENIED wired):
- policy.json: per-request/per-day amount ceilings, counterparty
  allow/deny lists, per-identity overrides; rules make their intent
  fields mandatory; daily sums from the ledger
-

Agent UX:
- signed refusal receipts travel inside MCP errors (receipt +
  receipt_path in structuredContent)
- airgap over MCP: request_signature signer=airgap + request_id,
  new airgap_pending tool; park -> list -> device answers -> complete
  (tested end-to-end)
- all 8 tools carry readOnly/destructive annotations
- sliding-window rate limiter per tool class (custody/verify/liveness);
  RATE_LIMITED refusal code; surface control, not ledgered

warden-treasury LIVE:
- treasury.py: stdlib base58, compact-u16, legacy+v0 wire parsing;
  every required signature quorum-verified over exact message bytes;
  completeness gap named in every verdict; RPC fetch uses response as
  bytes only
-
- live-quorum test: synthetic Solana tx signed with wallet key ->
  authentic via 4 proven forks; flipped byte -> not authentic

100 tests green (was 85).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 13:38:42 +02:00
a7cc3d2a5f warden re-audit (Fable 5): fix ledger race, quorum perf, small-order honesty
Correctness:
- ledger: single-flight fcntl lock over read-modify-append + fsync. Two
  concurrent writers previously could fork the hash chain (read same tail,
  same prev_hash). New test races 8 threads x6 appends; chain stays intact
  with contiguous indices.
- small-order list: the order-8 encodings were hand-typed and unverifiable
  and diverged from the canonical libsodium blocklist. A BOGUS entry is the
  only dangerous direction (it down-grades a real tamper to a note, skipping
  the latch), so the list is now the certain-low-order set only (y in
  {0,1,-1}, reduced/non-reduced, both sign bits); order-8 edges escalate to
  tamper until a derived list lands. Fail-safe asymmetry documented + tested.
- freshness: removed a tautological .

Non-functional:
- quorum members now run concurrently (ThreadPoolExecutor): a verify costs
  one member's latency, not the sum (~17ms for 4 members, live).
- Wallet.quorum() memoized per state_dir: binary swap-detection hashes run
  once at assembly, not on every verify; documented rationale.

85 tests green; live 4-fork wallet re-verified end-to-end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 08:24:51 +02:00
97ac5594fe warden wallet core: R4-gated capsule, hash-chained ledger, quorum inbound, firewalled outbound
- Wallet.init is the R4 gate in executable form: per member, the built
  binary's source commit must match an attestation whose verdicts are
  re-derived locally, scored >= R4, and Merkle-bound to a verified STH
  under the log key (explicit --trusted-provider required, never inferred)
- append-only hash-chained ledger; latch semantics (tamper => custody
  frozen; unlatch is a deliberate operator act recorded with a note)
- outbound: intent envelope bound to payload bytes -> signer (local
  dogfood or airgap/Precursor-style outbox) -> quorum firewall; a
  rejected self-signature is quarantined, never released, and latches
- refusal receipts: signed machine-actionable artifacts (code, missing,
  remediation); unsigned-by-design while latched
- live end-to-end against ltl.zkdefi.org: 4 members R4 (leaves 4-7),
  release firewall unanimous-accept, inbound unanimous-accept, refusal
  signed, ledger chain verified

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:31:50 +02:00