- walletmcp.py: stdlib stdio JSON-RPC MCP server; 7 outcome-first tools
with strict schemas; errors are structured (code/missing/remediation),
never prose; results carry evidence (structuredContent)
- custodycard.py: A2A-style card sharpened to self-proving - embeds each
member's LTL inclusion proof + STH so a counterparty recomputes trust
instead of believing it; proof-of-posture nonce challenge returns a
firewalled, signed posture attestation with the full quorum trail
- cli.py:
- verified end-to-end on the live wallet: all 7 MCP tools, structured
refusal on bad input, and a counterparty recomputing all 4 inclusion
proofs + STH signatures from the card alone (no operator trust)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Wallet.init is the R4 gate in executable form: per member, the built
binary's source commit must match an attestation whose verdicts are
re-derived locally, scored >= R4, and Merkle-bound to a verified STH
under the log key (explicit --trusted-provider required, never inferred)
- append-only hash-chained ledger; latch semantics (tamper => custody
frozen; unlatch is a deliberate operator act recorded with a note)
- outbound: intent envelope bound to payload bytes -> signer (local
dogfood or airgap/Precursor-style outbox) -> quorum firewall; a
rejected self-signature is quarantined, never released, and latches
- refusal receipts: signed machine-actionable artifacts (code, missing,
remediation); unsigned-by-design while latched
- live end-to-end against ltl.zkdefi.org: 4 members R4 (leaves 4-7),
release firewall unanimous-accept, inbound unanimous-accept, refusal
signed, ledger chain verified
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- dogfood/quorum/verify-{dalek,anza,risc0,betrusted}: verify-only crates
built from the pinned proven source workspaces (serial backends pinned
per fork; anza entry is the certificate-covered verify_sha512, not the
default Zebra-lineage verify())
- src/pacta/quorum.py: unanimity-required acceptance, divergence
taxonomy (semantic-edge vs unexplained/tamper), small-order/canonicity
edge flags, per-member provenance sidecars with binary hashes
- live smoke: 4/4 members agree on accept and reject
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- serve/webdocs/cli default to base_path='' (own subdomain, root serving)
- webdocs link builder handles the empty base like web.py already did
- all docs, paper, notebook 06b, and published-mirror README point at
https://ltl.zkdefi.org; DEPLOY.md rewritten for subdomain + redirect
- tests: root mount is the production shape; one test keeps exercising
the path-mounted variant
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three synchronized faces of one log - transport orthogonal to trust:
- PUBLISHED GIT MIRROR: log-publish exports the public face (one file
per leaf so git history mirrors log history; the FULL STH history as
the witness channel; per-component attestations + receipts; the
provider public key; a standalone stdlib-only verify.py and customer
README). Live at github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log (genesis:
8 leaves incl. the honest failed-run entries, dogfood-signed head).
- ONLINE SERVICE (pacta_provider serve): read-only, zero-dependency
HTTP with CT-style endpoints under a base path for
zkdefi.org/lean-transparency-log - /v1/sth, /v1/sth-history,
/v1/sth-consistency?first=N, /v1/proof, /v1/attestation, /v1/entries,
/v1/metadata, /healthz - plus self-contained customer documentation
at /docs (current state, attested components, API, the verify-
without-trusting-this-site path, and the means/does-NOT-mean
boundary). The process never loads private keys: heads are signed
offline; a compromised server can withhold or replay (pinning +
freshness detect both) but never forge. STH history now recorded
append-only by the provider (with a backfill head signed for the
existing log).
- AGENT ONLINE CLIENT: pacta log-fetch (download evidence; explicitly
UNVERIFIED until receipt-verify runs - transport is not trust) and
pacta sth-refresh (fetch head, verify signature, advance the pin via
an online consistency proof from the pinned size; fail closed).
- WITNESSES: pacta witness-audit over a clone of the published mirror
recomputes every prefix root from the public leaves and checks every
historical head + signature - no consistency proofs needed when the
leaves are public. Tampering one published entry trips both the
leaf-hash check and the prefix-root check (tested). verify.py gives
customers the same audit with zero installation.
- DEPLOY.md: the complete server-session checklist for zkdefi.org -
reconstruct the servable log FROM the published mirror (the server
stays in witness trust-position), hardened systemd unit, nginx/Caddy
path routing, Forgejo mirror setup, the provider->world update
cycle, and remote smoke tests.
Validated end-to-end on the REAL log: all 10 endpoints, online-fetched
proof re-verified locally through the dogfood verifier with pinning,
online pin refresh, publish + witness audit green, tamper caught,
standalone verify.py green in the published clone. 54/54 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The dogfood principle now runs in BOTH directions. Agents already
verified signatures through the proven dalek path; now the provider
SIGNS with it too, and proves to itself that the signing code is in its
own log before every signature:
- dogfood binary gains a `sign` mode (seed over stdin, never argv;
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey from the same pinned merkleized workspace).
Honesty ledger unchanged: the library's VERIFY path is
certificate-covered; its signing path is declared trusted base - but
it is the ATTESTED artifact, not an un-attested third implementation.
- sign_payload_ed25519_detailed: signing dispatch mirroring the verify
dispatch; the backend that actually signed is recorded in every
attestation signature block and STH.
- THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CHECK: before signing any tree head, the
provider runs the SAME Merkle inclusion verification an agent runs -
against the very tree it is about to sign - for the newest leaf
attesting the signing library itself, and embeds the result in the
signature block:
signing_provenance:
signing_backend: verified-dalek-serial
signing_library_component: dalek-ed25519-verified
signing_library_source_commit: aa0f6ab...
self_inclusion: verified
signing_library_leaf_index: 4
signing_library_certificates_proven: 16/16
A root signature that names the leaf vouching for the code that
produced it. First-append chicken-and-egg is handled honestly
(self_inclusion: library_not_in_log).
- Evidence refreshed: all four receipts re-issued under dogfood-signed
STHs; the full agent verify loop re-run green.
50/50 tests (new signing roundtrip test, skip-safe where unbuilt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The provider ran its full honest replay against the four verified
repositories on this machine - every Lean compile and axiom audit routed
through lean-guard (memory-capped, core-pinned, single-flight, ~30 min
per fork) - and the results are now shipped under evidence/:
- 16/16 certificates proven per fork, every axiom cone boundary-exact
(the four apex tiers carry their fork's documented SHA-512/wire
boundary axiom-for-axiom), each attestation pinned to the exact repo
commit (dalek 8ded7bc, anza 673c15e, risc0 98a13a6, betrusted
81f614a) and Ed25519-signed.
- All four appended to the persistent transparency log. The log holds
EIGHT leaves: the first four are the initial run's attestations,
which honestly recorded an AUDIT FAILURE (the two pacta bugs fixed in
e87f0e8) - an append-only trust ledger keeps its bad day, and the
fixed run's leaves sit beside it.
- Every receipt re-verified through the FULL stack: dogfood verifier
(backend verified-dalek-serial recorded), STH pin store, freshness
policy. Receipts are freshly issued against the final tree (a stale
mid-run receipt tripped the pin store's rollback defense exactly as
designed; the rollback diagnostic now hints at idempotent re-issue).
- The capstone consequence ran for real: pacta agent with trusted
provider + signature via the proven path + required receipt + pin
store + --require-verified-verifier built the R4-gated library
capsule from ATTESTED evidence (no local Lean replay needed by the
consuming agent).
Docs and teaching updated against the real artifacts: evidence/README
(inventory + re-verify instructions), README "Real Evidence" section,
lecture 5 now re-derives 16/16 verdicts from the REAL dalek attestation
(signature checked on the proven path, provider labels ignored), and
lecture 6 verifies all four REAL receipts and walks a fresh pin store
over them. Every changed notebook cell executed before commit. 49/49
tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first live four-fork replay was a system success and a content
failure: all 256 file compiles ran green under lean-guard, and the
provider SIGNED ATTESTATIONS OF FAILURE rather than hiding that its
audit phase broke - exactly the fail-closed behavior the design
demands. Two defects, both mine:
1. Guarded axiom audits lost --root: the audit's temp .lean lives
outside the toolchain root; guard mode now forwards
--root=<temp dir> exactly as it does for repo files.
2. The cone parser was single-line: Lean wraps the apex tiers'
11-axiom boundaries across lines, so the four apex certificates
parsed as empty/dirty. The parser now flattens a 16-line window
(the same move the corpus' check scripts make) - unit-tested on a
real wrapped transcript.
Validated standalone against dalek's fresh oleans: 16/16 certificates
proven with boundary-exact cones; the observed full-lift cone equals
the documented dalek boundary axiom-for-axiom. 49/49 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pacta's replay invoked `lake env lean` bare - on the reference machine
that is exactly the pattern that once OOM-crashed the host (see the
corpus' POSTMORTEM). New RepoConfig.lean_guard (set for all five repos
in examples/repos.yaml: verification/lean-guard): when configured,
every compile and axiom audit runs `lake env <guard> <file> --root=...`
instead of bare lean - hard memory cap via systemd scope + lean -M,
core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock, free-RAM preflight with the
Guard-3a retry ladder, all tuned via LEAN_MEM_MB / LEAN_MIN_FREE_MB /
LEAN_MEM_WAIT_SEC / LEAN_TIMEOUT / LEAN_MAX_CORES. Provider
attestations now record a machine_protection block naming the guard
(or "UNGUARDED"). Smoke-tested live on the real dalek repo: clamping
trace visible, compile green. 49/49 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
"Eat your own dogfood": pacta consumes certificates about a verified
Ed25519 implementation while checking those certificates' signatures
with OpenSSL. Now it can use the object of its own evidence:
- dogfood/pacta-verified-verify: a ~90-line Rust binary built against
the PINNED proven source workspace (saymrwulf/curve25519-dalek-source
at the exact commit the dalek certificates pin - the build records it:
aa0f6ab...) with the serial backend pinned via RUSTFLAGS exactly as
the verified extraction pins it. Cargo.toml is committed as a template
({{SOURCE}} placeholder) so no machine path is hardcoded; the rendered
file, target/, and the built binary are gitignored.
- pacta dogfood-build --source <workspace>: renders, builds, installs
to dogfood/state/, and writes a provenance sidecar (source commit,
backend cfg, rustc, and an honest coverage note: the certificates
cover verify_sha512, the extraction-refactored image of this verify
path; SHA-512 and the wire glue remain the theorems' documented
boundary). pacta dogfood-status reports the active backend.
- signing.verify_payload_ed25519_detailed: dispatch - the dogfood
binary when present (backend "verified-dalek-serial"), OpenSSL
fallback otherwise, and the backend that ACTUALLY ran is recorded in
receipt signature statuses and attestation evidence. Fallback is
never silent.
- --require-verified-verifier (receipt-verify + agent): policy fails
closed when verification did not run on the certificate-covered
path.
- ML-DSA is deliberately unchanged: no proven implementation exists,
so the slot stays fail-closed "unavailable" - the honest hybrid-PQC
posture is one proven-classical signature plus one required-but-
unproven PQC slot, never a pretend backend.
Validated live: receipt verification through the proven verifier
(backend recorded), a corrupted signature bit rejected BY the proven
binary, tampered attestations rejected, and the policy failing closed
when the binary is absent. 49/49 tests green (incl. PEM-SPKI raw-key
cross-check against openssl, dispatch/backend recording with a stub,
and a real-binary roundtrip that skips gracefully where unbuilt).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A transparency log without split-view defense is just a signature with
extra steps: the provider could serve one tree to the agent and another
to the world, or roll the log back, and standalone receipt verification
would never notice. The primitives (RFC 9162 consistency proofs) were
already implemented and correct; this closes the loop on the AGENT side.
- src/pacta/sthstore.py: a local STH pin store. Unknown log -> pin
(trust-on-first-use, recorded as such). Same tree size -> the root
must match the pin byte-for-byte; a mismatch is named EQUIVOCATION
and is a hard rejection. Larger tree -> a consistency proof FROM THE
PINNED SIZE is required and verified before the pin advances
(receipts already embed a from-previous anchor; the anchor's root is
itself checked against the pin so a lying anchor cannot bridge a
split view). Smaller tree -> LOG ROLLBACK, hard rejection.
- Freshness policy: --max-sth-age-seconds rejects stale (or
future-dated) tree heads - an old-but-valid STH can hide later
entries.
- Wired into receipt-verify, claims, and agent (--sth-store,
--consistency-proof, --max-sth-age-seconds); evidence records the
pin action; any accountability failure fails the receipt closed.
- Provider: log-consistency --from-size N (serve proofs for pinning
agents whose pin is older than the receipt's embedded anchor) and
log-audit (monitor self-check: recompute the tree, verify the stored
STH and per-entry leaf hashes).
Live drill in this commit's validation: pin-on-first-use -> matched ->
grown-with-proof advance -> a real forged same-size split view REJECTED
with the equivocation diagnostic -> freshness rejection -> clean
self-audit. tests/test_sthstore.py covers pin/match/equivocation,
growth-without-proof, lying consistency anchors, rollback, freshness.
45/45 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The verified corpus completed its phase 2 on 2026-07-06: every ed25519
fork now carries FOUR button-enforced apex tiers up to the full lift
(accept <=> decompress(R) = [k](-A)+[s]B as points), the complete scalar
layer, and the constructive encoding/decoding chain. pacta was calibrated
to the pre-apex corpus and - worse - had no vocabulary for
boundary-audited certificates: its axiom audit knew only "clean = exactly
the three standard axioms", so the apex tiers would have scored dirty.
New vocabulary:
- Profile.certificate_axioms: per-certificate ALLOWED axiom sets;
expected_axioms_for(cert) resolves each certificate's own boundary.
- RepoConfig.apex_boundary: a simple per-fork key (dalek-wrappers /
hash3 / anza) expanded by the ed25519 profile into the exact
per-tier allowed sets. AUTHORITY NOTE in profiles/ed25519.py: each
repo's check.sh Phase 3b is the enforcement point; if the button and
this table disagree, the button wins.
- run_axiom_audit compares each certificate against ITS allowed set;
deviation in EITHER direction (extra axiom or missing boundary
axiom) is dirty.
New risk reality:
- R4 is now reachable: full four-tier apex + constructive chain +
scalar arithmetic, all proven with cones pinned to their documented
boundaries. R4 always carries explicit residual blockers (SHA-512
oracle, hypothesis-parametric wire parses, translation faithfulness,
no side-channel/build assurance - those gate R5).
- R3 unchanged (arithmetic pair) and now explains exactly which apex
certificates are missing for R4.
Attestation trust model hardened:
- The provider is trusted for its OBSERVATION, never its VERDICT:
axiom_status is re-derived locally from observed_axioms against the
agent's own boundary policy. A provider that labels a dirty cone
"clean" gains nothing; "proven" with no observed axioms is
"unverifiable".
- Partial attestations degrade instead of being rejected: uncovered
certificates stay unproven and the score caps accordingly (an
arithmetic-only attestation still authorizes an R3 library capsule,
never a wallet).
Also: scripts/mini_pytest.py - a dependency-free test runner (tmp_path,
raises, monkeypatch, capsys) for hosts without pytest; examples
regenerated FROM the tool (dalek/anza fixtures now R4, 16 certs; new
full four-tier attestation example); tests updated + new
tests/test_boundaries.py (lying-provider, missing-boundary-axiom,
partial-coverage cases). 40/40 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
