public wording: fips205 self-test is 18 cases (17 attacks + a digest-coverage check); the post-quantum head signature is 'the second signature', never 'additive' (README, mirror templates, comments); site says leaf 18, not entry 18 (suite 157/0/0)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mrwulf 2026-09-27 10:30:27 +02:00
parent 1086a3ba02
commit 5954a52369
5 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions

View file

@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ deployed verifier; see the corpus KNOWN-GAPS ledger).
| `fips205-source` | upstream | verbatim snapshot of `integritychain/fips205` (pure-Rust FIPS 205 / SLH-DSA); upstream pin `30bac08`, snapshot head `a3ce8e8` — deviations: CI workflows stripped + the documented Aeneas-compat/de-plumbing patch series (each commit individually justified) | pinned; moves only for transparent, individually-justified Aeneas-compat patches (nothing proposed upstream) | | `fips205-source` | upstream | verbatim snapshot of `integritychain/fips205` (pure-Rust FIPS 205 / SLH-DSA); upstream pin `30bac08`, snapshot head `a3ce8e8` — deviations: CI workflows stripped + the documented Aeneas-compat/de-plumbing patch series (each commit individually justified) | pinned; moves only for transparent, individually-justified Aeneas-compat patches (nothing proposed upstream) |
| `dalek-` / `anza-` / `risc0-` / `betrusted-ed25519-verified` | subject | Rust source + Lean proofs; 44 certs each, attested 44/44 as leaves 13–16 (2026-08-08); earlier 16-cert generations at leaves 8–11, first generations at 0–7 | attested commits fixed | | `dalek-` / `anza-` / `risc0-` / `betrusted-ed25519-verified` | subject | Rust source + Lean proofs; 44 certs each, attested 44/44 as leaves 13–16 (2026-08-08); earlier 16-cert generations at leaves 8–11, first generations at 0–7 | attested commits fixed |
| `pasta-pallas-verified` | subject | field foundation proven (sub/neg, helpers, constants, primality, denotation); field completion and curve layer pending; **not attested** | changes freely | | `pasta-pallas-verified` | subject | field foundation proven (sub/neg, helpers, constants, primality, denotation); field completion and curve layer pending; **not attested** | changes freely |
| `fips205-slhdsa-verified` | subject | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path campaign, parameter set SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s; **11 certificates proven, `check.sh` green with an 18-attack self-test**; attested — leaf 18 (2026-08-08), the log's first post-quantum entry | attested commit fixed | | `fips205-slhdsa-verified` | subject | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path campaign, parameter set SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s; **11 certificates proven, `check.sh` green with an 18-case self-test (17 attacks plus a digest-coverage check)**; attested — leaf 18 (2026-08-08), the log's first post-quantum entry | attested commit fixed |
| `ltl-accumulator-verified` | subject | 61-cert corpus about the log's accumulator model; **leaf 12 subject**, frozen `172a1d0`; hardened model re-attested as leaf 17 (2026-08-08) | frozen; doc-only commits allowed | | `ltl-accumulator-verified` | subject | 61-cert corpus about the log's accumulator model; **leaf 12 subject**, frozen `172a1d0`; hardened model re-attested as leaf 17 (2026-08-08) | frozen; doc-only commits allowed |
| `proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent` (this repo) | machinery | provider service, consumer library, warden (+ local read-only cockpit), dogfood signer, paper, course, tests | **changes freely — the hub** | | `proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent` (this repo) | machinery | provider service, consumer library, warden (+ local read-only cockpit), dogfood signer, paper, course, tests | **changes freely — the hub** |
| `lean-transparency-log` | published | the public mirror: leaves, heads, receipts, fail-closed `verify.py` + selftest | **generated by publish** — canonical files here, templates in pacta, CI-pinned | | `lean-transparency-log` | published | the public mirror: leaves, heads, receipts, fail-closed `verify.py` + selftest | **generated by publish** — canonical files here, templates in pacta, CI-pinned |

View file

@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ The log uses:
- `RFC9162_SHA256` Merkle leaf/node hashing with `0x00` leaf and `0x01` node domain separation. - `RFC9162_SHA256` Merkle leaf/node hashing with `0x00` leaf and `0x01` node domain separation.
- Signed Tree Heads over canonical JSON tree-head payloads. - Signed Tree Heads over canonical JSON tree-head payloads.
- OpenSSL Ed25519 signatures today. - OpenSSL Ed25519 signatures today.
- An additive `SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s` / FIPS 205 slot: verify path proven (fips205-slhdsa-verified, checked by `pacta-verify-slhdsa` built from the pinned proven source); signing deterministic and parameter-locked. Since tree size 14 (2026-08-08) every published head carries this co-signature alongside Ed25519; earlier heads keep their single signature, recorded as absent-not-failed. - A second, post-quantum `SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s` / FIPS 205 slot: verify path proven (fips205-slhdsa-verified, checked by `pacta-verify-slhdsa` built from the pinned proven source); signing deterministic and parameter-locked. Since tree size 14 (2026-08-08) every published head carries this co-signature alongside Ed25519; earlier heads keep their single signature, recorded as absent-not-failed.
- An explicit `ML-DSA-65` / FIPS 204 signature slot that is `unavailable` unless the host has a real backend. If an agent policy requires both signatures, verification fails closed. - An explicit `ML-DSA-65` / FIPS 204 signature slot that is `unavailable` unless the host has a real backend. If an agent policy requires both signatures, verification fails closed.
The deployed instance ([ltl.zkdefi.org](https://ltl.zkdefi.org), The deployed instance ([ltl.zkdefi.org](https://ltl.zkdefi.org),

View file

@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ files in this repository alone:
1. every entry's leaf hash, 1. every entry's leaf hash,
2. every historical Signed Tree Head against the recomputed prefix root 2. every historical Signed Tree Head against the recomputed prefix root
(a split view or tampered entry fails here), (a split view or tampered entry fails here),
3. every STH Ed25519 signature — and, where a head carries the ADDITIVE 3. every STH Ed25519 signature — and, where a head carries the second,
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature (FIPS 205, heads from 2026-08 on), that post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature (FIPS 205, heads from 2026-08 on), that
too: a present-but-wrong post-quantum signature FAILS the run, a head too: a present-but-wrong post-quantum signature FAILS the run, a head
without one is allowed, and an OpenSSL too old to check it (pre-3.5) without one is allowed, and an OpenSSL too old to check it (pre-3.5)
is reported loudly as a degradation, never counted as verified, is reported loudly as a degradation, never counted as verified,
@ -145,12 +145,12 @@ def check_sth_signature(head) -> str:
def check_slh_dsa_signature(head): def check_slh_dsa_signature(head):
"""ADDITIVE post-quantum check (SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, FIPS 205). """Second-signature (post-quantum) check: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, FIPS 205.
Returns (status, hard_failure). Ed25519 remains the REQUIRED signature; Returns (status, hard_failure). Ed25519 remains the REQUIRED signature;
this one is verified when the head carries it and the local OpenSSL this one is verified when the head carries it and the local OpenSSL
(>= 3.5) can check it. The distinctions matter: (>= 3.5) can check it. The distinctions matter:
ABSENT - head predates the second signature. Allowed: additive. ABSENT - head predates the second signature. Allowed by design.
VALID - verified against provider.slhdsa.pub. VALID - verified against provider.slhdsa.pub.
INVALID - present and WRONG. Hard failure - a bad signature is never INVALID - present and WRONG. Hard failure - a bad signature is never
a degradation. a degradation.
@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ def main() -> int:
print(f"STH #{position} size={size} root={head['root_hash'][:16]}… prefix-root:{structural} signature:{signature} slh_dsa:{slh}") print(f"STH #{position} size={size} root={head['root_hash'][:16]}… prefix-root:{structural} signature:{signature} slh_dsa:{slh}")
previous = max(previous, size) previous = max(previous, size)
if slh_tooling_seen: if slh_tooling_seen:
print("NOTE: this log carries an ADDITIVE SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signature that " print("NOTE: this log carries a second, post-quantum SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signature that "
"your OpenSSL cannot check (needs >= 3.5). The required Ed25519 checks " "your OpenSSL cannot check (needs >= 3.5). The required Ed25519 checks "
"above still gate this result; the post-quantum signature was NOT verified.") "above still gate this result; the post-quantum signature was NOT verified.")
latest_path = HERE / "latest-sth.json" latest_path = HERE / "latest-sth.json"
@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ def main() -> int:
cases.append(("--structural-only is explicit, never claims full", cases.append(("--structural-only is explicit, never claims full",
code == 0 and "REDUCED" in out and "[full]" not in out)) code == 0 and "REDUCED" in out and "[full]" not in out))
# The ADDITIVE post-quantum signature must fail closed when tampered. # The second (post-quantum) signature must fail closed when tampered.
# Applicable only to mirrors whose heads carry it; older mirrors record # Applicable only to mirrors whose heads carry it; older mirrors record
# the case as not-applicable rather than silently passing. # the case as not-applicable rather than silently passing.
latest = json.loads((HERE / "latest-sth.json").read_text()) latest = json.loads((HERE / "latest-sth.json").read_text())
@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ Layout:
| `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads | | `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
| `latest-sth.json` | the current head | | `latest-sth.json` | the current head |
| `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's Ed25519 public key — the REQUIRED identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf | | `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's Ed25519 public key — the REQUIRED identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf |
| `provider.slhdsa.pub` | the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the ADDITIVE post-quantum head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that | | `provider.slhdsa.pub` | the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the second (post-quantum) head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that |
| `verify.py` | standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the `openssl` binary; fails closed without them; `--all` covers every published receipt) | | `verify.py` | standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the `openssl` binary; fails closed without them; `--all` covers every published receipt) |
| `verify_selftest.py` | adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts | | `verify_selftest.py` | adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts |

View file

@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ def make_handler(log: TransparencyLog, base_path: str, docs_html: str, paper_pdf
# TOFU mitigation depends on the key being published in two # TOFU mitigation depends on the key being published in two
# independent locations; this is the site's copy (the mirror # independent locations; this is the site's copy (the mirror
# carries the other). Serving only a fingerprint would not do. # carries the other). Serving only a fingerprint would not do.
# The SLH-DSA key (additive post-quantum signature, 2026-08) # The SLH-DSA key (the second, post-quantum signature, 2026-08)
# is published THE SAME WAY as the Ed25519 one — same route # is published THE SAME WAY as the Ed25519 one — same route
# shape, same two-location rule. # shape, same two-location rule.
fname = ("provider.ed25519.pub" if route == "/log-public-key" fname = ("provider.ed25519.pub" if route == "/log-public-key"

View file

@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str
f'<a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror</a> instead.</div>' f'<a href="{mirror}/blob/main/provider.ed25519.pub">mirror</a> instead.</div>'
) )
pem = escape(key_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()) pem = escape(key_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip())
# The SLH-DSA verification key (additive post-quantum head signature, # The SLH-DSA verification key (the second, post-quantum head signature,
# 2026-08) is published THE SAME WAY: full PEM on the page, raw endpoint, # 2026-08) is published THE SAME WAY: full PEM on the page, raw endpoint,
# mirror comparison. Heads before tree 14 carry no SLH-DSA signature and # mirror comparison. Heads before tree 14 carry no SLH-DSA signature and
# verify.py reports them ABSENT — allowed; an append-only log keeps its # verify.py reports them ABSENT — allowed; an append-only log keeps its
@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str
<p style="margin-top:0"><strong>Key&nbsp;2 — SLH-DSA (FIPS&nbsp;205), post-quantum.</strong> Heads from tree size&nbsp;14 on carry a second signature from this key; <p style="margin-top:0"><strong>Key&nbsp;2 — SLH-DSA (FIPS&nbsp;205), post-quantum.</strong> Heads from tree size&nbsp;14 on carry a second signature from this key;
older heads legitimately have none — an append-only log keeps its history. Check it where your older heads legitimately have none — an append-only log keeps its history. Check it where your
tooling allows (OpenSSL&nbsp;≥&nbsp;3.5). The kind of code that verifies such signatures is itself tooling allows (OpenSSL&nbsp;≥&nbsp;3.5). The kind of code that verifies such signatures is itself
a proof subject of this log (entry&nbsp;18).</p> a proof subject of this log (leaf&nbsp;18).</p>
<pre style="margin-bottom:.4rem">{slh_pem}</pre> <pre style="margin-bottom:.4rem">{slh_pem}</pre>
<p class="muted" style="margin:.2rem 0 0">SHA-256 fingerprint <code>{slh_fp}</code> <p class="muted" style="margin:.2rem 0 0">SHA-256 fingerprint <code>{slh_fp}</code>
&nbsp;·&nbsp; raw: <a href="{base}/log-slhdsa-public-key"><code>{base or ''}/log-slhdsa-public-key</code></a> &nbsp;·&nbsp; raw: <a href="{base}/log-slhdsa-public-key"><code>{base or ''}/log-slhdsa-public-key</code></a>