From 5954a52369d1342b2aa65575265602e37fe4db84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: mrwulf Date: Sun, 27 Sep 2026 10:30:27 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] public wording: fips205 self-test is 18 cases (17 attacks + a digest-coverage check); the post-quantum head signature is 'the second signature', never 'additive' (README, mirror templates, comments); site says leaf 18, not entry 18 (suite 157/0/0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 --- ESTATE.md | 2 +- README.md | 2 +- provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py | 14 +++++++------- provider/src/pacta_provider/web.py | 2 +- provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/ESTATE.md b/ESTATE.md index 6241a12..d08847d 100644 --- a/ESTATE.md +++ b/ESTATE.md @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ deployed verifier; see the corpus KNOWN-GAPS ledger). | `fips205-source` | upstream | verbatim snapshot of `integritychain/fips205` (pure-Rust FIPS 205 / SLH-DSA); upstream pin `30bac08`, snapshot head `a3ce8e8` — deviations: CI workflows stripped + the documented Aeneas-compat/de-plumbing patch series (each commit individually justified) | pinned; moves only for transparent, individually-justified Aeneas-compat patches (nothing proposed upstream) | | `dalek-` / `anza-` / `risc0-` / `betrusted-ed25519-verified` | subject | Rust source + Lean proofs; 44 certs each, attested 44/44 as leaves 13–16 (2026-08-08); earlier 16-cert generations at leaves 8–11, first generations at 0–7 | attested commits fixed | | `pasta-pallas-verified` | subject | field foundation proven (sub/neg, helpers, constants, primality, denotation); field completion and curve layer pending; **not attested** | changes freely | -| `fips205-slhdsa-verified` | subject | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path campaign, parameter set SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s; **11 certificates proven, `check.sh` green with an 18-attack self-test**; attested — leaf 18 (2026-08-08), the log's first post-quantum entry | attested commit fixed | +| `fips205-slhdsa-verified` | subject | SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path campaign, parameter set SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s; **11 certificates proven, `check.sh` green with an 18-case self-test (17 attacks plus a digest-coverage check)**; attested — leaf 18 (2026-08-08), the log's first post-quantum entry | attested commit fixed | | `ltl-accumulator-verified` | subject | 61-cert corpus about the log's accumulator model; **leaf 12 subject**, frozen `172a1d0`; hardened model re-attested as leaf 17 (2026-08-08) | frozen; doc-only commits allowed | | `proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent` (this repo) | machinery | provider service, consumer library, warden (+ local read-only cockpit), dogfood signer, paper, course, tests | **changes freely — the hub** | | `lean-transparency-log` | published | the public mirror: leaves, heads, receipts, fail-closed `verify.py` + selftest | **generated by publish** — canonical files here, templates in pacta, CI-pinned | diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 3689f69..cbe8c21 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ The log uses: - `RFC9162_SHA256` Merkle leaf/node hashing with `0x00` leaf and `0x01` node domain separation. - Signed Tree Heads over canonical JSON tree-head payloads. - OpenSSL Ed25519 signatures today. -- An additive `SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s` / FIPS 205 slot: verify path proven (fips205-slhdsa-verified, checked by `pacta-verify-slhdsa` built from the pinned proven source); signing deterministic and parameter-locked. Since tree size 14 (2026-08-08) every published head carries this co-signature alongside Ed25519; earlier heads keep their single signature, recorded as absent-not-failed. +- A second, post-quantum `SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s` / FIPS 205 slot: verify path proven (fips205-slhdsa-verified, checked by `pacta-verify-slhdsa` built from the pinned proven source); signing deterministic and parameter-locked. Since tree size 14 (2026-08-08) every published head carries this co-signature alongside Ed25519; earlier heads keep their single signature, recorded as absent-not-failed. - An explicit `ML-DSA-65` / FIPS 204 signature slot that is `unavailable` unless the host has a real backend. If an agent policy requires both signatures, verification fails closed. The deployed instance ([ltl.zkdefi.org](https://ltl.zkdefi.org), diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py index 63aa6e2..07831c0 100644 --- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py +++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/published_assets.py @@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ files in this repository alone: 1. every entry's leaf hash, 2. every historical Signed Tree Head against the recomputed prefix root (a split view or tampered entry fails here), - 3. every STH Ed25519 signature — and, where a head carries the ADDITIVE - SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature (FIPS 205, heads from 2026-08 on), that + 3. every STH Ed25519 signature — and, where a head carries the second, + post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature (FIPS 205, heads from 2026-08 on), that too: a present-but-wrong post-quantum signature FAILS the run, a head without one is allowed, and an OpenSSL too old to check it (pre-3.5) is reported loudly as a degradation, never counted as verified, @@ -145,12 +145,12 @@ def check_sth_signature(head) -> str: def check_slh_dsa_signature(head): - """ADDITIVE post-quantum check (SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, FIPS 205). + """Second-signature (post-quantum) check: SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s, FIPS 205. Returns (status, hard_failure). Ed25519 remains the REQUIRED signature; this one is verified when the head carries it and the local OpenSSL (>= 3.5) can check it. The distinctions matter: - ABSENT - head predates the second signature. Allowed: additive. + ABSENT - head predates the second signature. Allowed by design. VALID - verified against provider.slhdsa.pub. INVALID - present and WRONG. Hard failure - a bad signature is never a degradation. @@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ def main() -> int: print(f"STH #{position} size={size} root={head['root_hash'][:16]}… prefix-root:{structural} signature:{signature} slh_dsa:{slh}") previous = max(previous, size) if slh_tooling_seen: - print("NOTE: this log carries an ADDITIVE SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signature that " + print("NOTE: this log carries a second, post-quantum SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signature that " "your OpenSSL cannot check (needs >= 3.5). The required Ed25519 checks " "above still gate this result; the post-quantum signature was NOT verified.") latest_path = HERE / "latest-sth.json" @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ def main() -> int: cases.append(("--structural-only is explicit, never claims full", code == 0 and "REDUCED" in out and "[full]" not in out)) - # The ADDITIVE post-quantum signature must fail closed when tampered. + # The second (post-quantum) signature must fail closed when tampered. # Applicable only to mirrors whose heads carry it; older mirrors record # the case as not-applicable rather than silently passing. latest = json.loads((HERE / "latest-sth.json").read_text()) @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ Layout: | `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads | | `latest-sth.json` | the current head | | `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's Ed25519 public key — the REQUIRED identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf | -| `provider.slhdsa.pub` | the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the ADDITIVE post-quantum head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that | +| `provider.slhdsa.pub` | the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the second (post-quantum) head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that | | `verify.py` | standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the `openssl` binary; fails closed without them; `--all` covers every published receipt) | | `verify_selftest.py` | adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts | diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/web.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/web.py index c3e43f6..8290f03 100644 --- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/web.py +++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/web.py @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ def make_handler(log: TransparencyLog, base_path: str, docs_html: str, paper_pdf # TOFU mitigation depends on the key being published in two # independent locations; this is the site's copy (the mirror # carries the other). Serving only a fingerprint would not do. - # The SLH-DSA key (additive post-quantum signature, 2026-08) + # The SLH-DSA key (the second, post-quantum signature, 2026-08) # is published THE SAME WAY as the Ed25519 one — same route # shape, same two-location rule. fname = ("provider.ed25519.pub" if route == "/log-public-key" diff --git a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py index 56344ec..6811102 100644 --- a/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py +++ b/provider/src/pacta_provider/webdocs.py @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str f'mirror instead.' ) pem = escape(key_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()) - # The SLH-DSA verification key (additive post-quantum head signature, + # The SLH-DSA verification key (the second, post-quantum head signature, # 2026-08) is published THE SAME WAY: full PEM on the page, raw endpoint, # mirror comparison. Heads before tree 14 carry no SLH-DSA signature and # verify.py reports them ABSENT — allowed; an append-only log keeps its @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ def _trust_anchor_html(log: TransparencyLog, metadata: dict[str, Any], base: str

Key 2 — SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), post-quantum. Heads from tree size 14 on carry a second signature from this key; older heads legitimately have none — an append-only log keeps its history. Check it where your tooling allows (OpenSSL ≥ 3.5). The kind of code that verifies such signatures is itself -a proof subject of this log (entry 18).

+a proof subject of this log (leaf 18).

{slh_pem}

SHA-256 fingerprint {slh_fp}  ·  raw: {base or ''}/log-slhdsa-public-key