proof-aware-crypto-tooling-.../dogfood/pacta-verified-verify/Cargo.toml.template

# Rendered by `pacta dogfood-build` - the {{SOURCE}} placeholder is replaced
# with the local checkout of the PINNED proven source workspace
# (saymrwulf/curve25519-dalek-source). Committed as a template so the repo
# never hardcodes a machine-specific path.
[package]
name = "pacta-verified-verify"
version = "0.1.0"
edition = "2021"
publish = false

[dependencies]
ed25519-dalek = { path = "{{SOURCE}}/ed25519-dalek", default-features = false, features = ["fast", "zeroize"] }

[workspace]
Dogfood cryptography: pacta verifies signatures through the PROVEN code path "Eat your own dogfood": pacta consumes certificates about a verified Ed25519 implementation while checking those certificates' signatures with OpenSSL. Now it can use the object of its own evidence: - dogfood/pacta-verified-verify: a ~90-line Rust binary built against the PINNED proven source workspace (saymrwulf/curve25519-dalek-source at the exact commit the dalek certificates pin - the build records it: aa0f6ab...) with the serial backend pinned via RUSTFLAGS exactly as the verified extraction pins it. Cargo.toml is committed as a template ({{SOURCE}} placeholder) so no machine path is hardcoded; the rendered file, target/, and the built binary are gitignored. - pacta dogfood-build --source <workspace>: renders, builds, installs to dogfood/state/, and writes a provenance sidecar (source commit, backend cfg, rustc, and an honest coverage note: the certificates cover verify_sha512, the extraction-refactored image of this verify path; SHA-512 and the wire glue remain the theorems' documented boundary). pacta dogfood-status reports the active backend. - signing.verify_payload_ed25519_detailed: dispatch - the dogfood binary when present (backend "verified-dalek-serial"), OpenSSL fallback otherwise, and the backend that ACTUALLY ran is recorded in receipt signature statuses and attestation evidence. Fallback is never silent. - --require-verified-verifier (receipt-verify + agent): policy fails closed when verification did not run on the certificate-covered path. - ML-DSA is deliberately unchanged: no proven implementation exists, so the slot stays fail-closed "unavailable" - the honest hybrid-PQC posture is one proven-classical signature plus one required-but- unproven PQC slot, never a pretend backend. Validated live: receipt verification through the proven verifier (backend recorded), a corrupted signature bit rejected BY the proven binary, tampered attestations rejected, and the policy failing closed when the binary is absent. 49/49 tests green (incl. PEM-SPKI raw-key cross-check against openssl, dispatch/backend recording with a stub, and a real-binary roundtrip that skips gracefully where unbuilt). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> 2026-07-06 08:13:48 +00:00			# Rendered by `pacta dogfood-build` - the {{SOURCE}} placeholder is replaced
			`# with the local checkout of the PINNED proven source workspace`
			`# (saymrwulf/curve25519-dalek-source). Committed as a template so the repo`
			`# never hardcodes a machine-specific path.`
			`[package]`
			`name = "pacta-verified-verify"`
			`version = "0.1.0"`
			`edition = "2021"`
			`publish = false`

			`[dependencies]`
			`ed25519-dalek = { path = "{{SOURCE}}/ed25519-dalek", default-features = false, features = ["fast", "zeroize"] }`

			`[workspace]`