mrwulf b8ffbafa7f The provider eats its own dogfood: root signatures via the merkleized library ... The dogfood principle now runs in BOTH directions. Agents already verified signatures through the proven dalek path; now the provider SIGNS with it too, and proves to itself that the signing code is in its own log before every signature: - dogfood binary gains a `sign` mode (seed over stdin, never argv; ed25519_dalek::SigningKey from the same pinned merkleized workspace). Honesty ledger unchanged: the library's VERIFY path is certificate-covered; its signing path is declared trusted base - but it is the ATTESTED artifact, not an un-attested third implementation. - sign_payload_ed25519_detailed: signing dispatch mirroring the verify dispatch; the backend that actually signed is recorded in every attestation signature block and STH. - THE SELF-REFERENTIAL CHECK: before signing any tree head, the provider runs the SAME Merkle inclusion verification an agent runs - against the very tree it is about to sign - for the newest leaf attesting the signing library itself, and embeds the result in the signature block: signing_provenance: signing_backend: verified-dalek-serial signing_library_component: dalek-ed25519-verified signing_library_source_commit: aa0f6ab... self_inclusion: verified signing_library_leaf_index: 4 signing_library_certificates_proven: 16/16 A root signature that names the leaf vouching for the code that produced it. First-append chicken-and-egg is handled honestly (self_inclusion: library_not_in_log). - Evidence refreshed: all four receipts re-issued under dogfood-signed STHs; the full agent verify loop re-run green. 50/50 tests (new signing roundtrip test, skip-safe where unbuilt). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>		2026-07-06 15:21:17 +02:00
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src	The provider eats its own dogfood: root signatures via the merkleized library	2026-07-06 15:21:17 +02:00
Cargo.toml.template	Dogfood cryptography: pacta verifies signatures through the PROVEN code path	2026-07-06 10:13:48 +02:00