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mrwulf
eb3df7503f
The crux layer — the statement whose HAND proof once carried the frontier
coverage bug is now kernel-checked.
- gen: hash outputs refactored to Hash = {l : List UInt8 // l.length = 32}.
MECHANIZATION FINDING: the paper's pair-coincidence step ('equal hnode
values of distinct argument pairs are a collision') is load-bearing on
FIXED-WIDTH outputs — with unconstrained byte strings x++s = X++Y does
not split. hnode_preimage_inj (cone: propext) makes this explicit via
List.append_inj on equal-length components. Queued as a half-sentence
for the paper's next cycle.
- HasCollision := ∃ x y, x ≠ y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y — appears ONLY as a
conclusion, never a hypothesis (no collision-resistance assumed).
- hnode_inj_or_collision / hleaf_inj_or_collision: the per-node dichotomy.
- root_binding: any accepting reconstruction from (v,P) to the honest root
either IS the honest receipt (leaf hash AND full path P = Path m D — case
(ii) pinning every consumed sibling) or exhibits a collision. Motive
quantifies (v,P); induction on Path; k-fold discipline.
- incl_sound (Theorem 2, position binding): accepting a wrong leaf at m
yields a collision. Cone [propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256,
Quot.sound] — the single hash axiom, pinned in check.sh. ALL GREEN.
Also: Root n=1 branch changed from list-match to decidable 'if P = []'
(well-founded unfolding generated a spurious exhaustiveness obligation);
Root_one_cons added. Fable-5 statement-audit passed. LTL untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
33 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
33 lines
1.9 KiB
Markdown
# ltl-accumulator-verified
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Lean 4 mechanization of the security analysis (§6) of the paper
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"The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper): the Merkle
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accumulator's own correctness and soundness theorems, kernel-checked, in
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the same discipline as the four `*-ed25519-verified` subject corpora.
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## Status: layer scaffold (work in progress — honest ledger below)
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| layer | content | status |
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| L1 | bytes, hleaf/hnode, domain separation (Lemma 1) | **done** (domsep: axiom-free) |
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| L2 | MTH, Root, ConsRec definitions + termination | **done** (cones: propext, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
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| L3 | inclusion completeness (Theorem 1) | **done** (incl_complete: propext, Classical.choice, LTLAcc.sha256, Quot.sound) |
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| L4 | root binding for inclusion (Lemma 2, Path instance) | **done** (root_binding; boundary = single sha256 axiom) |
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| L5 | inclusion soundness = collision extractor (Theorem 2) **done**; consistency (Theorem 3) pending |
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| L6 | pin-store state machine safety (Proposition 1) | pending |
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## Discipline (identical to the subject corpora)
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- `verification/Proofs/` contains ZERO `axiom` declarations; the single
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sanctioned axiom site is `verification/gen/` — here, one opaque
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function: SHA-256. The theorems are constructive collision extractors,
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so collision resistance is never assumed, only interpreted.
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- `verification/check.sh` is THE button: compiles every file through
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`lean-guard` (memory cap, core pinning, timeout, single-flight lock)
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and axiom-audits every certificate against its documented exact cone.
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- Expected boundary: `propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound` plus
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`LTLAcc.sha256` for hash-touching certificates — documented per
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certificate in `check.sh`, audited both directions.
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The finished certificates are destined for the LTL itself as attestation
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leaves: the log carrying kernel-checked proofs of its own machinery.
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