- STATEMENT-MAP.md: the review surface — every paper §6/§10 item mapped to its Lean name, file, and cone; the named-extractor design invariant and the anti-pigeonhole guards explained; the audit surface stated. - KNOWN-GAPS.md: eight honest scope boundaries, including the process- history candor item (the guessed-pins/false-green episode and its fix). - README: frozen banner. Final sweeps: button EXIT 0 + ALL GREEN + FIDELITY GREEN; zero sorry; the only ∃-conclusions are content-bearing (kbelow_pow2) or hypothesis-guarded helpers — no collision existentials anywhere. Corpus: 54 pinned cones over a defined surface, single sha256 boundary, Lemma 1 axiom-free, Theorems 1-3 + Prop 1(1) + whole-tree Lemma 2 + fidelity 164,479/164,224. Frozen at this commit pending external review. LTL untouched (12 leaves, bcd15f9d). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.9 KiB
Statement map: paper §6 ↔ Lean corpus
The kernel guarantees every proof below; what a reviewer must vet is the statements — that each Lean theorem says what the paper's item says. This map is the review surface. Paper = "The Lean Transparency Log" (https://ltl.zkdefi.org/paper), §6 and §10 (which scopes the mechanization to items i–v).
| paper item | Lean name | file | cone |
|---|---|---|---|
| §5.3 split point k (RFC 9162) | kbelow + kbelow_pos/lt, le_two_kbelow, kbelow_pow2 (2^j = k < n ≤ 2^{j+1} pins k uniquely) |
Basic | no hash axiom |
| §5.3 MTH | MTH |
Basic | sha256 |
| §5.3 Path | Path |
Completeness | sha256 |
| §5.3 Root (App. B) | Root (Option = rejection) |
Basic | sha256 |
| §5.3 ConsRec | ConsRec (+ machine-checked base-refactor equivalences consRec_base_true_eq/false_eq) |
Basic, Refactor | sha256 |
| Lemma 1 (domain separation) | domsep |
Basic | axiom-free |
| Theorem 1 (inclusion completeness) | incl_complete |
Completeness | sha256 (+choice) |
| Lemma 2, width fact ("65-byte preimages") | Hash = length-32 subtype; hnode_preimage_inj |
gen, Basic | propext |
| Lemma 2, whole-tree instance | extractMTH + extractMTH_correct |
Descent | sha256 (+choice) |
| Lemma 2, ConsRec instance (Thm 3 steps 1–2) | consRecBinding |
Binding3 | sha256 (+choice) |
| Theorem 2 (inclusion soundness, explicit 𝓔) | extractIncl + extractIncl_correct |
Extract | sha256 (+choice) |
| Theorem 3 (consistency soundness, explicit 𝓔′) | extractCons + extractCons_correct |
Theorem3 | sha256 (+choice) |
| Prop 1(1) (pin monotonicity + prefix) | pinAccept, pinAccept_monotone, pin_prefix_correct |
PinStore | sha256 (+choice) |
| Prop 1(2), Merkle share | fork_distinct (different roots ⇒ different content); transferability = signature layer, out of scope |
PinStore | sha256 |
| non-vacuity guards (anti-pigeonhole) | extractIncl_nonvacuous, extractMTH_nonvacuous, extractCons_nonvacuous, pin_prefix_nonvacuous |
Extract/Descent/Theorem3/PinStore | sha256 |
| definition fidelity vs deployed verifier | fidelity/ harness: MTH==merkle_root, Path==inclusion_proof, verifier agreement 164,479 + 164,224 (paper's exact case set) |
fidelity | (testing) |
Design invariant of every soundness statement: the collision is the output
of a named extractor function and correctness is a claim about that
output. A bare ∃ x y, x ≠ y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y is provable by
pigeonhole alone (sha256 maps an infinite domain into the finite 32-byte
type), so it carries no cryptographic content; the guards above prove each
extractor's conclusion is false on honest inputs, hence not
choice-dischargeable.
Audit surface (enforced by verification/check.sh, exit 0 = green):
every theorem/def under Proofs/ (52) plus the two load-bearing gen/
instances; excluded by nature: the sanctioned axiom sha256 (it is the
boundary) and abbrev Bytes (alias, no cone content).