ltl-accumulator-verified/ATTESTATION-RUNBOOK.md

ATTESTATION RUNBOOK — entry 13 (the log attests its own machinery)

Status: COMPLETE — entry 13 appended and live, 2026-07-16. Log tree 12→13; new root 3488a2d0ff9f00415bb561d61b01a420e3ca2e0f7b29351ec9ebb3f57319da0d; new leaf index 12, hash 8cb258d657f1fd00baaa9e0091e26c316cb69b591cb249a9543f51cade57c50a (subject ltl-accumulator-verified@172a1d0, 61/61, mechanized-model scope, KNOWN-GAPS 14/15). log-clone commit 1726e8e, pushed + deployed + live- consumer-verified (accepted:true, ed25519:verified). Evidence on SD outputs/entry13-append-evidence/. This runbook is retained as the record of how it was done. The log now carries kernel-checked proofs of its own accumulator machinery. This file is the single authoritative ToDo for everything that happens between now and the appending of leaf index 12 (the 13th entry, file entries/000012.json, tree size 12 → 13). It is written to be executed by a human with no AI assistance; an agent executing it must obey the Agent Appendix at the end. Every step ends in a mechanical check.

---

0. Vocabulary (read once)

term	meaning
operator	The human running the log service (owner of ltl.zkdefi.org and its keys). NOT warden (warden is a consumer). All Phase-B actions are operator actions.
corpus	ltl-accumulator-verified at freeze commit 172a1d0 (round-5 freeze — the reviewed subject; supersedes the earlier 2da0a79) — the kernel-checked mechanization of paper §6.
the button	verification/check.sh. Green means: printed === ATTESTATION GREEN (Lean + fidelity) === AND echo $? printed 0. BOTH. Never judge from scrolled output.
the log	Live service ltl.zkdefi.org + public mirror repo lean-transparency-log. At execution time: 12 leaves (indices 0–11), head root bcd15f9d…, frozen. As of this record's date (2026-07-16, post-execution): 13 leaves, head root 3488a2d0…, leaf 12 live.
entry 13	The attestation of the corpus itself. APPENDED 2026-07-16 as leaf index 12 (leaf hash 8cb258d6…); this runbook is the record of that execution.
kit round N	The review package delivered to the external reviewers after freeze N. Round-1 kit = freeze 6e56414; round 2 = 260ad64; round 3 = 9972ab4; round 4 = 2da0a79; round 5 = 172a1d0; round 6 = review of 172a1d0 + pacta producer (current).

2a. Release tuple (the single source of immutable identifiers)

Phase B binds THESE exact identifiers. Every Phase-B command consumes them; any mismatch aborts. Filled from the round-6 rehearsal (2026-07-16); re-confirm each on the day (B0).

SUBJECT_COMMIT   = 172a1d0653f489d5b7cb73ac7942a57cbb496532   # corpus (round-5 freeze, reviewed r6)
PACTA_CODE_BASE  = 8b1a325caaef6d3993d63d4c730eab03065e936b   # round-6-hardened
                    producer: parser hardening + fail-closed classifier +
                    leaf `scope` block + examples/repos.yaml entry + dead-code
                    cleanup. The 12→13 rehearsal ran green on this producer.
PACTA_COMMIT     = <the pacta working-tree HEAD at B2 time — MUST have
                    `git diff PACTA_CODE_BASE HEAD -- src provider` EMPTY
                    (producer code identical to the reviewed base; doc-only
                    commits above it, e.g. paper/, are fine). Record the exact
                    HEAD in the B6 evidence.>
EXPECTED_OLD_SIZE= 12
EXPECTED_OLD_ROOT= bcd15f9d7ea1c9e5bd0a9e64fa8d846208b1e29ee167d4f1eac19b30e6913ee9
KEY_FINGERPRINT  = 874c8a008a607021528b2493fa1caf059f9d5c123d29193dfabc09a6d1e7a56a
CONFIG           = pacta examples/repos.yaml, entry ltl-accumulator-verified (record its sha256 in B0)
NEW_INDEX        = 12   (the 13th leaf)
NEW_SIZE         = 13

1. Iron rules (violating any of these is never correct)

1. Nothing is appended, re-signed, or deployed before ALL Phase-B gate conditions are met. The gate is listed verbatim at Phase B.
2. The log's current state is always a safe state. If any step fails, STOP, record the output verbatim, and leave everything as it is. A log stuck at 12 leaves is healthy; a log with a bad 13th leaf is not repairable by deletion (append-only).
3. Never: force-push the log repo; edit or delete anything under entries/; re-sign an already-published head; backdate anything.
4. Red output is never argued with. Fix nothing "quickly to make it pass." A failed check means the run is over.
5. IACR/editor correspondence never enters any git repo (SD card only).

2. Facts (as of 2026-07-16, post round-6)

artifact	where	state
corpus	github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified	172a1d0 (round-5 freeze; = SUBJECT_COMMIT §2a), pushed, clean. 2da0a79 was the round-4 freeze — superseded.
review kits	SD outputs/accumulator-review-kit-round{2..6}/	round 6 (pre-attestation sign-off) delivered 2026-07-16; corpus tarball 18fbd697… + CORPUS-MANIFEST.sha256
log mirror repo	github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log	ec12dda (12 leaves; unchanged since paper submission)
pacta (producer)	github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent	change-freeze LIFTED 2026-07-16 (IACR decided). Producer for entry 13 = PACTA_COMMIT (§2a): the commit carrying the round-6 parser hardening + fail-closed classifier + leaf scope block + examples/repos.yaml entry. NOT the old 3d81d53.
Forgejo mirrors	https://zkdefi.org/saymrwulf/<repo>.git (anonymously readable)	pull-synced by server cron nightly 03:00 UTC (/home/admin/cloud/bin/reconcile-mirrors.py, log .reconcile.log); verify per step A5
log public key	lean-transparency-log/provider.ed25519.pub (PEM)	fingerprint 874c8a00…a56a in log-metadata.json
log PRIVATE key	RESOLVED 2026-07-12: laptop-side, mode 0600, inside a gitignored state dir of the pacta working tree (exact path in operator-private notes, deliberately not in this public file); public half byte-matches provider.ed25519.pub. NOT on the droplet. encrypted SD backup exists (A3b, operator, 2026-07-14)	A3 done; A3b done
producer driver	RESOLVED 2026-07-12: it exists and is committed — pacta's provider/ CLI (python3 -m pacta_provider: check → signed attestation; log-append → leaf + signed STH + receipt; log-publish → public face). Heads are signed with signing_backend: verified-dalek-serial (the dogfooded signer binary built from the verify-path-proven dalek fork; the signing operation itself is not proven — clarification added 2026-08-08, the event is unchanged), self_inclusion: verified. Only the per-run orchestration was session work	see step A4 (rehearsal, not reconstruction)
server deployment	the private infrastructure repo (github, master) — since a186bac includes the ltl vhost/service/reconstruct.py, md5-verified == droplet	see its DEPLOY.md § "The LTL service"

---

PHASE A — preparation (complete except A2)

A1. Reviewer confirmations of round 4 — DONE (2026-07-15)

Both round-4 reviews are on the SD card. Claude reviewer: "Nothing blocks the freeze… no remaining findings on the corpus itself" (re-executed everything hostile, incl. deliberately breaking the lied-size tripwires — both broke the run as designed — and the first paper↔Lean cross-check, faithful). GPT-5.6: "Approve after minor documentation fixes" for an attestation SCOPED TO THE MECHANIZED MODEL (see the B2 wording requirement below); its principal finding (the deployment refinement invariant is unmechanized) is now KNOWN-GAPS gap 15. The round-5 housekeeping freeze addressed both reviewers' remaining documentation items.

A2. The author's read (the one step only the operator can do)

Read, in this order, against the paper's §6 and §10:

1. STATEMENT-MAP.md — every row: does the Lean statement say what the paper's item says?
2. KNOWN-GAPS.md — all 15 entries (confirm the count on the day: grep -cE '^[0-9]+\.' KNOWN-GAPS.md → 15): is each acceptable to publish? Gap 15 (deployment refinement invariant unmechanized) is the one that most constrains the leaf's claim — read it last and deliberately. No proofs need reading; the kernel checked those. Budget one evening. Check: operator writes one line — "statement map and gaps read and accepted, " — into the SD card notes (NOT into a repo, to keep the repo freeze clean until Phase B).

A3. Locate and verify the signing key (operator-only; no agent)

The private key's location was deliberately NOT hunted down by the agent (credential searches are operator work). Candidate locations, in likely order: the server (ssh admin@zkdefi.org, under /home/admin/cloud/ltl/ or a docker volume of the ltl compose service); a local directory outside the git repos; removable media. Find the file, then verify it is THE key by deriving its public half and comparing byte-for-byte with the published one:

openssl pkey -in <CANDIDATE_PRIVATE_KEY> -pubout \
  | diff - lean-transparency-log/provider.ed25519.pub \
  && echo "KEY CONFIRMED" || echo "WRONG KEY - keep looking"

Check: prints KEY CONFIRMED. Then record the path in the operator's private notes (never in git). Do not copy the key anywhere, do not print it, do not change its permissions.

A4. Structural 12→13 rehearsal — DONE (round 6, 2026-07-16)

The first A4 rehearsal (a one-leaf log from scratch) was rejected by round-6 review: it exercised the invocation but NOT the 12→13 transition. Redone as a structural 12→13 rehearsal (GPT Method B: throwaway key on a disposable COPY of the real operational state). Transcript on SD (entry13-rehearsal-12to13_20260716-…_e1a15aab.txt), throwaway state destroyed. Verified end to end:

• disposable copy of provider/state/transparency-log-main roots to bcd15f9d… == live (the real append base);
• candidate from the clean-room subject 172a1d0 + pinned producer: 61/61 proven+clean, and the scoped wording is IN THE LEAF's scope block (subject/certs/scope all inspected — this is the B2b gate, rehearsed);
• append 12→13 → tree_size 13, leaf index 12;
• prefix immutability: entries 0..11 byte-identical to the predecessor;
• consistency 12→13 accepted by BOTH the deployed verifier AND the mechanized model.

Three real defects were found and fixed by this rehearsal before it went green:

1. re-APPENDING published entries double-wraps them (log-append wraps its input; published leaf fields are already wrapped) — wrong root. The published face itself rebuilds the tree fine; the append base must nonetheless be the operational state (provider/state/transparency-log-main), which stores unwrapped attestations. Now B0 checks exactly this.
2. pacta axiom parser mis-attributed cones to axiom-free certificates and matched names by substring (the accumulator is the first subject with axiom-free certs) — fixed + record-scoped + fail-closed classification (pacta round-6 hardening; 6 regression tests).
3. the attestation LEAF did not carry its scope block at all — the scoped wording reached only the claim card. Fixed: build_attestation now emits scope (guarantees/exclusions/deployment_constraints).

Version-controlled artifacts for the real run: pacta examples/repos.yaml entry ltl-accumulator-verified (61 certs w/ per-cert cones, nine axiom_imports, known_status = the scoped wording), plus the round-6 pacta commit (PACTA_COMMIT, §2a). The real B-phase run differs only in: real key/pub paths (A3 notes), --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log-main, log-publish --git-dir <lean-transparency-log clone>, and — the one thing the rehearsal could NOT do under a throwaway key — full-history witness-audit under the PRODUCTION key (that is B0 + B3's job).

Background (retained): the producer driver was never lost session work — it is the committed pacta_provider CLI (check → signed attestation; log-append → leaf + head via make_signed_tree_head, verified-dalek-serial signer; log-publish → public face; serve keyless). Leaves 8–11 were produced this way; only the per-run orchestration was ephemeral, and it is now the version-controlled examples/repos.yaml entry + this runbook's B-steps.

A3b. Back up the signing key — DONE (operator, confirmed 2026-07-14)

Completed by the operator; the procedure below is retained as the reference for future key-backup refreshes. The laptop file is the only copy in existence; a disk failure would freeze the log at its current size forever (still verifiable, never extendable). Operator-only: create an ENCRYPTED backup (e.g. openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -pbkdf2 or age) of the key file onto the SD card under the standing naming convention, passphrase memorized or stored separately — never plaintext, never in any git repo, never on the droplet. Check: decrypt the backup to a temp file, run A3's openssl pubkey diff against it (prints KEY CONFIRMED), shred the temp file.

A5. Confirm the Forgejo mirrors (no SSH needed)

The mirrors are anonymously readable. For each repo, both commands must print the same hash:

for r in ltl-accumulator-verified lean-transparency-log \
         proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent dalek-ed25519-verified \
         anza-ed25519-verified risc0-ed25519-verified betrusted-ed25519-verified; do
  a=$(git ls-remote "https://github.com/saymrwulf/$r.git" main | cut -f1)
  b=$(git ls-remote "https://zkdefi.org/saymrwulf/$r.git" main | cut -f1)
  [ "$a" = "$b" ] && echo "OK   $r $a" || echo "LAG  $r github=$a forgejo=$b"
done

Check: seven OK lines. A LAG line within 24h of a push is normal (nightly 03:00 UTC sync); a LAG older than that means the server cron needs attention (/home/admin/cloud/.reconcile.log).

---

PHASE B — the append (BLOCKED until the gate below is fully open)

GATE — all six, no exceptions, no substitutions:

• A1 done (both reviewers confirmed, in writing, on SD)
• A2 done (author read of all 15 KNOWN-GAPS entries, dated note)
• A3 done (KEY CONFIRMED) + A3b (encrypted backup)
• A4 done (structural 12→13 rehearsal green — round 6)
• B0 passed on the day (live predecessor state re-verified)
• The operator has given an explicit, fresh order to append — in words, on that day. A past intention does NOT count. (The IACR decision arrived 2026-07-16, rejected; per operator it no longer gates — so this reduces to the fresh order.)

Set the release tuple (§2a) into the shell first; every step reads it:

SUBJECT_COMMIT=172a1d0653f489d5b7cb73ac7942a57cbb496532
PACTA_COMMIT=<pacta commit with the round-6 hardening + repos.yaml entry>
EXPECTED_OLD_SIZE=12
EXPECTED_OLD_ROOT=bcd15f9d7ea1c9e5bd0a9e64fa8d846208b1e29ee167d4f1eac19b30e6913ee9

B0. Preflight the live predecessor state (NEW — round-6 GPT §10)

An append-only system must re-read its actual predecessor, not trust a Facts table. Fresh clone of lean-transparency-log; verify ALL of:

• exactly $EXPECTED_OLD_SIZE NUMBERED leaves entries/[0-9]*.json (NOT ls entries/ | wc -l — entries/ also holds per-component <component>.attestation.json convenience pointers; the live log has 12 numbered leaves + 4 named pointers = 16 files. The tree size is the numbered count and the STH's tree_size, never the file count);
• latest-sth.json tree_size == $EXPECTED_OLD_SIZE;
• its full root_hash == $EXPECTED_OLD_ROOT;
• the STH signature verifies under provider.ed25519.pub (fingerprint == KEY_FINGERPRINT);
• pacta witness-audit --published-dir <clone> exits 0 (every prefix root + every historical STH signature — real key, so this passes here where the rehearsal could not);
• live service agrees: curl -s https://ltl.zkdefi.org/v1/sth returns the same size and root;
• GitHub mirror head == local clone head;
• the operator's operational state (provider/state/transparency-log-main) has $EXPECTED_OLD_SIZE entries and roots to $EXPECTED_OLD_ROOT (this IS the append base. The published face DOES rebuild the tree — hash each stored leaf as-is; witness-audit does exactly that. The trap the round-6 rehearsal hit is different: published entries store the WRAPPED leaf, and feeding them back through log-append wraps them AGAIN — double-wrapped leaves, wrong root. Appends therefore run ONLY against the operational state, which stores unwrapped attestations);
• no partial entry 13 exists anywhere (no entries/000012.json, no size-13 head). Check: every bullet true. Any mismatch: STOP.

B1. Clean-room re-verification of the subject

git clone https://github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified /tmp/attest-13
cd /tmp/attest-13 && git checkout $SUBJECT_COMMIT
test -z "$(git status --porcelain)"        # clean tree
cd verification && ./check.sh ; echo "exit=$?"

Check: clean tree; prints === ATTESTATION GREEN (Lean + fidelity) === and exit=0. Then ./selftest_audit.sh ; echo "exit=$?" → SELF-TEST GREEN, exit=0. Archive the check transcript; record its sha256 (bound into evidence per B6). Any other outcome: STOP.

B1b. Pin the producer (NEW — round-6 GPT §4; corrected during execution)

The leaf is generated by pacta AND signed by the verified-dalek-serial dogfood binary using the private key — BOTH the built binary (dogfood/state/) and the key (provider/state/local-provider/) live only in the operator's working tree, NOT in a bare clone. So the producer for B2/B3 is the operator's pacta WORKING TREE, verified to be:

git -C <pacta working tree> rev-parse HEAD          # == $PACTA_COMMIT
git -C <pacta working tree> status --porcelain   | grep -v '^??' | wc -l                           # == 0 (tracked clean)
ls dogfood/state/*.provenance.json                  # dogfood binary present
python3 scripts/mini_pytest.py                      # full green (needs the binary)

Check: HEAD == $PACTA_COMMIT; no tracked modifications; dogfood binary present; suite green. (A fresh clone will FAIL the wallet dogfood-signer test — that test needs the built binary; it is orthogonal to the log path. Verify the log-relevant modules explicitly if in doubt: test_lean.py, test_provider.py, test_web_and_witness.py.)

B2. Generate the candidate attestation (do NOT append yet)

Using the pinned producer (the operator's pacta working tree at $PACTA_COMMIT, verified in B1b) and its examples/repos.yaml entry ltl-accumulator-verified, run pacta_provider check against the clean-room subject /tmp/entry13/attest-13 (A4's rehearsed invocation, real key/pub from A3's notes). NOTE: the candidate emerges PROVIDER-SIGNED (check signs at generation — that is fine and reversible); what must not happen before inspection is the APPEND. Nothing enters the log in this step.

B2b. Candidate-leaf inspection gate (NEW — round-6 GPT §5, both reviewers)

Before any append, mechanically require of the generated attestation:

• subject.component == ltl-accumulator-verified
• subject.repo_url == the expected URL
• subject.repo_commit == $SUBJECT_COMMIT (FULL sha)
• 61 certificates; all status == proven; all axiom_status == clean
• scope.deployment_constraints contains the REQUIRED scoped wording (below) and does NOT contain "deployed verifier is formally verified"
• scope.exclusions contains the boundary exclusions (SHA-256 CR, gaps 14/15, gap 4)

REQUIRED ATTESTATION SCOPE (round-4 GPT §11; now carried by the LEAF's scope block — round-6 fix — not merely the claim card):

This corpus kernel-checks the listed theorems about the mechanized recursive accumulator model. Correspondence with the deployed inclusion verifier is supported by finite differential testing over the pinned families. The deployed consistency verifier is not extensionally equal to the model; applying the mechanized soundness result to the deployed consumer flow additionally relies on an unmechanized authentic-size/root invariant (KNOWN-GAPS 14/15).

Check: all assertions pass; record the candidate's pre-append sha256. Any failure: STOP (do not append a leaf you could not inspect).

B3. Append 12→13 against the operational state

pacta_provider log-append --log-dir provider/state/transparency-log-main with the inspected candidate; then log-publish --git-dir <B0's log clone>. Produces entries/000012.json, updated latest-sth.json (tree_size 13), one new sth-history.jsonl line, one new receipt. Check (exact-path + prefix immutability — corrected empirically on the live-state clone 2026-07-16; the round-6 "exactly 4 paths" was WRONG — publish regenerates every component's inclusion-proof receipt against the NEW head, which is correct CT behavior, not tampering): the publish clone's git status --porcelain shows EXACTLY these, and nothing else:

?? entries/000012.json                              # the new leaf
?? entries/ltl-accumulator-verified.attestation.json # new component pointer
?? receipts/ltl-accumulator-verified.receipt.json    # new component receipt
 M latest-sth.json                                   # tree_size 12→13
 M sth-history.jsonl                                 # one line appended
 M receipts/anza-ed25519-verified.receipt.json       # ) inclusion proofs
 M receipts/betrusted-ed25519-verified.receipt.json  # ) recomputed vs the
 M receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json      # ) size-13 head —
 M receipts/risc0-ed25519-verified.receipt.json      # ) EXPECTED, correct

INVARIANTS (any violation = STOP):

• entries/000000.json..000011.json byte-identical to the pre-run clone;
• the 4 existing entries/<component>.attestation.json byte-identical (their attestation content is stable; only receipts move with the head);
• provider.ed25519.pub UNCHANGED (the real key is the same key — if this shows M, the WRONG key signed: STOP);
• sth-history.jsonl: all prior lines unchanged, exactly one appended;
• the new head's root == the root the append computed;
• pacta witness-audit on the clone exits 0 (real key — full history, incl. every historical STH signature, verifies).

B3b. Consumer's-eye 12→13 (round-6: independent pin advance)

From a DIFFERENT directory holding the OLD pin (size 12, root $EXPECTED_OLD_ROOT): pacta sth-refresh against the clone must verify the new head signature, verify consistency 12→13, and advance the pin to 13. Check: exit 0, pin now 13.

B4. Publish (the single irreversible step)

The droplet serves the log from a DERIVED dir (~/cloud/ltl/log), rebuilt from a content mirror (~/cloud/ltl/published) — a bare git pull in app/ is NOT enough (the private infra repo's DEPLOY.md § "The LTL service").

cd <log clone> && git add -A && git commit -m "log update: leaf 12 - attestation of ltl-accumulator-verified@$SUBJECT_COMMIT (mechanized-model scope; KNOWN-GAPS 14/15)" && git push origin main
ssh admin@zkdefi.org
  cd ~/cloud/ltl/app && git pull                          # code/paper (usually no-op)
  git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log /tmp/ltl-pub \
    && rsync -a --exclude .git /tmp/ltl-pub/ ~/cloud/ltl/published/ && rm -rf /tmp/ltl-pub
  cd ~/cloud/ltl && python3 reconstruct.py                # re-derive log/
  cd ~/cloud && docker compose restart ltl

Check: curl -s https://ltl.zkdefi.org/v1/sth returns "tree_size": 13 and the same root the append computed. This is the first and only irreversible action; everything before it was on disposable clones.

B5. Live end-to-end verification

pacta log-fetch + pacta receipt-verify for the new entry against the live service; pacta sth-refresh from a size-12 pin against the live URL. Check: all exit 0.

B6. Mirrors and archive (bind the evidence — round-6 GPT §7/§8)

Forgejo picks the push up on the nightly cron (or trigger manually per A5); verify head equality. To the SD card under outputs/ with the standing _<timestamp>_<hash8> naming, archive a SANITIZED run record (NO private key material) containing at least:

subject_commit, pacta_commit, config_sha256,
candidate_attestation_sha256 (pre-append), B1_check_transcript_sha256 + marker + exit,
fidelity pins (230271/230016/73573/3867),
old_size/old_root, new_index/new_size/new_root, new_leaf_hash,
STH signature status, receipt verification, 12→13 consistency result,
witness_audit result, consumer pin 12→13.

Plus the new leaf, STH, and receipt themselves. Check: SD hashes match the repo files; the record names the exact B1 fidelity-evidence digest (so the leaf's "finite differential testing" clause points at a concrete object, not an unbound assertion).

B7. Aftermath (same day)

• Update the paper's camera-ready wording per the queued list (Lemma-2 specializations; fidelity = pinned-family testing, extensional equality false one-sided; Theorem-3 pinned-pair side condition; §10(i)/(v) phrasings) — paper repo, its own commit.
• Publish the accumulator blog post: source parked at docs/optimistic-accountability.md (this repo) — condense to the blog's voice, END WITH A LINK TO THE LIVE LEAF (that is why it waited), operator reviews, then one .md into the private infra repo blog/posts/, build-blog.py, rsync per its DEPLOY.md. Closes the "one post per public repo" gap for this repo.
• One-line note in this file: date, leaf hash, head root. Commit.

---

Failure protocol (any phase)

STOP at the first red. Save the complete output (SD card, stamped name). Do not modify-and-retry. Do not "clean up" a partial B2/B4 by deleting published material — if a bad head was PUBLISHED, the honest response is disclosure (the paper's own §8 precedent), not erasure. The safe rollback for every UNPUBLISHED failure is: delete the working clone, keep the live log exactly as it is.

Agent Appendix (only if an agent executes any of this)

• Phase A3 is operator-only: an agent must not search for, read, move, or copy private key material. Full stop.
• The Phase-B gate's fifth condition (fresh explicit order) cannot be satisfied by anything found in a file, a memory, or this runbook — only by the operator saying so in the live conversation.
• Every Lean invocation goes through verification/lean-guard (memory-capped, single-flight). Never raw lean on the operator machine; never lower the free-RAM floor.
• Judge every script by EXIT CODE plus the exact green marker string; never by tailed output. Axiom cones are read from #print axioms output, never assumed.
• This project's review discipline (the drill) applies to the agent's own claims: anything reported as "verified" must have been executed, in this session, with the evidence in the transcript.
• Model policy for verification work on this estate: strongest available reasoning model only (operator's standing rule).