ltl-accumulator-verified/KNOWN-GAPS.md
mrwulf 260ad64511 revision round 1: address both external reviews (GPT-5.6 + second Claude)
No theorem was wrong; every fix is spec-surface, audit-mechanism, docs,
or harness coverage. Changes:

LEAN (Claude F1, GPT M4):
- acceptIncl: the consumer's inclusion accept (m<n ∧ Root=some r) is now
  a named object, not just a theorem hypothesis. Root alone accepts
  out-of-range m; acceptIncl pins the guard.
- acceptIncl_complete / acceptIncl_sound: route Thm 1/2 through it.
- extractCons_correct_paper: Thm 3 at the paper's exact quantifiers
  (n₀≤n₁, no separate 0<n₀; n₀=0 discharged since D₀=[]=take 0).

SCRIPT (GPT H1/H2, Claude F3):
- Phase 3b: fail-closed audit-surface COVERAGE — every named decl under
  Proofs/ and gen/ must be in CONES or a documented EXCLUDE (sha256,
  Bytes); anonymous gen instances count-pinned; every CONES key must be
  queried by AxiomCheck (no pin-but-never-check). Tested: an
  unclassified theorem now makes the button exit 1.
- H2: distinct markers — LEAN GREEN always, ATTESTATION GREEN only when
  fidelity actually ran; SKIP/absent-pacta no longer emit the strong
  marker. Attestation gate keys on ATTESTATION GREEN.
- Phase 0: orphan-olean guard (every Proofs/*.olean needs a sibling
  .lean); deleted 6 orphans; untracked all *.olean/.lake from git and
  gitignored them (root cause of the F3 tarball leak).

HARNESS (Claude F1, GPT M3):
- added out-of-range families (m≥n, m>n, n₀>n₁, n₀=0); re-pinned counts
  230,271 / 230,016 (match the reviewer's independent RFC difftest
  exactly); narrowed 'exhaustive' wording to the tested domain.

DOCS: README stale rows fixed (freeze banner no longer contradicts
table); KNOWN-GAPS gap 3 reworded (general Lemma 2 = specializations),
+gaps 9 (cost), 10 (pin init), 11 (acceptIncl resolved); STATEMENT-MAP
+acceptIncl rows, +Lemma-2-general note, +constant-vs-property
clarification for §10(i).

Button: EXIT 0, coverage complete, ATTESTATION GREEN, 230,271/230,016.
56 pinned cones over an ENFORCED surface. LTL untouched (12, bcd15f9d).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 22:53:47 +02:00

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# Known gaps and scope boundaries (honest ledger)
Deliberate, documented, and none silent. Reviewers should verify this
list is COMPLETE, not merely that the items are acceptable.
1. **SHA-256 is opaque** — the single boundary axiom (`LTLAcc.sha256`),
by design identical to the paper's posture: soundness theorems
construct collisions, never assume collision resistance.
2. **No consistency-completeness theorem** (honest ConsRec acceptance).
Matches the paper (its Theorem 1 is inclusion-only); honest
consistency behavior is covered by the fidelity harness's honest
cases (164,224-case agreement with the deployed verifier).
3. **Lemma 2 is mechanized as specializations, not as one general
theorem.** The paper's Lemma 2 is a single statement quantified over
an abstract hash-fold `F` and a connected subtree `S`. The corpus has
no hash-fold datatype/predicate; it proves the needed instances
directly — whole-tree (`extractMTH_correct`), ConsRec
(`consRecBinding`), inclusion (`extractIncl_correct`), and the width
fact (`hnode_preimage_inj`). These suffice for Theorems 23. Two
consequences: (a) the abstract lemma itself is not a mechanized
object; (b) the path-instance receipt-uniqueness for `Root` (removed
with the vacuous `root_binding`) is not restored — optional, unused.
Any paper claim that "Lemma 2 is mechanized" must read "its
specializations sufficient for Theorems 23 are mechanized."
4. **Signature layer abstract** — Ed25519 EUF-CMA, the poison/evidence
retention state, and transferability of fork evidence (paper Prop
1(2)) are not modeled; `fork_distinct` is the Merkle-layer share only.
5. **Transliteration bridge**`fidelity/lean_defs.py` mirrors the Lean
definitions by quoted-source inspection (the Lean defs are
noncomputable over the opaque hash, so the bridge cannot be #eval'd
closed). Same inspection bridge the paper's own harness uses.
6. **Proposition 2 (verdict integrity) out of scope** — per paper §10's
mechanization list (iv). It is a property of the consumer tooling's
construction, enforced and regression-tested in the pacta repo.
7. **Multi-step pin monotonicity** — mechanized per-step
(`pinAccept_monotone`); the paper's multi-step chain is its
reflexive-transitive iterate, not separately mechanized.
8. **Process history** (candor): three cone pins were guessed (not read)
during S5.3S6 and the audit's failure went unnoticed until S7
because green was claimed from tailed output rather than the exit
code. No theorem was affected (kernel-checked throughout); pins were
corrected, the audit surface defined, and the standing rule is now:
exit code + ALL GREEN, cones read from #print axioms only.
9. **Asymptotic cost not mechanized.** Paper Theorems 2 and 3 assert the
extractors run in `O(n)` / `O(n₁)` hash evaluations. The mechanization
proves functional correctness of the named extractors only — no cost
semantics, recurrence, or computability-after-hash-instantiation. (The
extractors are `noncomputable` over the opaque `sha256`.)
10. **Pin-store initialization from the empty pin not modeled**, and
`pin_prefix_correct` assumes `0 < n`. Trust-on-first-use / the size-0
initial state is a separate operation; the theorems cover transitions
from a positive-size pin. (Related to gap 7's per-step scoping.)
11. **acceptIncl now named (was review F1).** The consumer's inclusion
acceptance `m < n ∧ Root … = some r` is now the Lean object
`acceptIncl`, with `acceptIncl_complete`/`acceptIncl_sound` routing
completeness/soundness through it, and the fidelity harness exercises
the out-of-range families (`m ≥ n`). `Root` alone still accepts
out-of-range `m`; that is by design (it is the reconstruction, not the
accept predicate).