mrwulf
52179bdaf1
Round-12 review found two artifact-claim gaps: --all never touched receipts, and receipt mode checked fingerprint/leaf_hash only when present. Now: - --all enumerates receipts/*.receipt.json and runs the full binding list on each (type tag, STH signature, REQUIRED key fingerprint, log_id vs log-metadata, STH membership in the published history, REQUIRED leaf_hash vs the named entry, tree_size agreement, receipt hash_algorithm + log_id consistency, inclusion proof). - --receipt FILE routes through the same function. - Malformed values (bad hex, missing sizes) are failures, not crashes. - NEW verify_selftest.py: 11-case adversarial battery (mutated real receipts must be REJECTED: no fingerprint, no leaf_hash, wrong type, forged root, size mismatch, wrong log_id; honest controls pass; structural-only never claims full; no-openssl exits 2). GREEN. One bug caught by the honest controls during development: the new hash-algorithm check assumed 'sha256' but deployed heads carry 'RFC9162_SHA256' - fixed against reality, plus receipt-level hash_algorithm/log_id binding added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2.6 KiB
Lean Transparency Log — published mirror
This repository is the git-published face of a transparency log of
formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs
of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their
documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic
Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of entry 13 (2026-07-16)
the log also attests its own accumulator machinery — a kernel-checked
mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries
kernel-checked proofs about the accumulator model underlying its own
inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject
ltl-accumulator-verified;
scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty,
signing, or execution provenance). Current head: tree size 13, root
3488a2d0….
Layout:
| Path | Content |
|---|---|
entries/NNNNNN.json |
one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history) |
entries/<component>.attestation.json |
the newest attestation per library, for convenience |
receipts/<component>.receipt.json |
inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head |
sth-history.jsonl |
every Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
latest-sth.json |
the current head |
provider.ed25519.pub |
the provider's public key (the sole trust anchor) |
verify.py |
standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the openssl binary; fails closed without them; --all covers every published receipt) |
verify_selftest.py |
adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts |
Verify everything locally, no installation:
python3 verify.py --all
python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json
The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation): https://ltl.zkdefi.org
The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials: https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent
Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust source at a pinned commit (clone it — the git hash is the content hash — and build it yourself; compilers are declared trusted base). The log deliberately retains early leaves recording a failed audit run: an append-only trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized, proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf.