mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log.git
synced 2026-09-04 20:03:43 +00:00
mrwulf
3d7c125789
Six new leaves (tree 13 -> 19, root 7ee23940…):
[13-16] dalek/anza/risc0/betrusted-ed25519-verified — re-attested at 44
certificates each (27 main + 4 apex + 13 scalar; the leaf 8-11
generation recorded 16). The delta is the P0-P2 hardening
campaign: scalar statements bound, kernel-side axiom gate,
driver surface with cones, declaration coverage both directions,
the accounting identity.
[17] ltl-accumulator-verified — 61 certificates; the log again carries
proofs of its own Merkle machinery, at the hardened state.
[18] fips205-slhdsa-verified — FIRST post-quantum leaf: 11 certificates
over the SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s verify path, apex
fips205.slh_verify_128s_accepts_iff.
Heads from tree 14 on carry a second, ADDITIVE signature:
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (FIPS 205), deterministic, over the same payload as the
Ed25519 signature. provider.slhdsa.pub ships beside the Ed25519 key.
Ed25519 remains the signature consumers must check; verify.py now judges
slh_dsa fail-closed where present (INVALID/WRONG-KEY/NO-PUBKEY fail; older
heads report ABSENT, allowed; pre-3.5 OpenSSL degrades loudly, never
silently). The ml_dsa slot stays not_configured — truthfully.
Honesty, unchanged by any of it: the certificates cover VERIFICATION paths
of the extracted Lean models; no signing operation is proven for any
algorithm; leaves are Ed25519-signed at issuance only.
Append-only law checked byte-for-byte before this commit: entries
000000-000012 identical, the six prior heads an exact prefix of the
history. verify.py --all: RESULT OK [full]. verify_selftest.py: GREEN (13
cases). Quorum gate: 5-way Ed25519 + 2-way SLH-DSA (incl. the verifier
built from the pinned proven source), all accept, all reject corruption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
62 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
62 lines
3.8 KiB
Markdown
# Lean Transparency Log — published mirror
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This repository is the **git-published face** of a transparency log of
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formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs
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of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their
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documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic
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Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of **entry 13 (2026-07-16)**
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the log also attests **its own accumulator machinery** — a kernel-checked
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mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries
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kernel-checked proofs *about the accumulator model* underlying its own
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inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject
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[`ltl-accumulator-verified`](https://github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified);
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scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty,
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signing, or execution provenance). As of **2026-08** the log also attests
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the **SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) verify-path proofs**
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([`fips205-slhdsa-verified`](https://github.com/saymrwulf/fips205-slhdsa-verified))
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and its heads carry an **additive post-quantum SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature**
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beside the required Ed25519 one. The current head is `latest-sth.json` —
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this README deliberately names no tree size, so it cannot go stale.
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Layout:
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| Path | Content |
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|---|---|
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| `entries/NNNNNN.json` | one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history) |
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| `entries/<component>.attestation.json` | the newest attestation per library, for convenience |
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| `receipts/<component>.receipt.json` | inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head |
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| `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
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| `latest-sth.json` | the current head |
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| `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's Ed25519 public key — the REQUIRED identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf |
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| `provider.slhdsa.pub` | the provider's SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s public key (FIPS 205) — checks the ADDITIVE post-quantum head signature; needs OpenSSL >= 3.5, and verify.py degrades honestly below that |
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| `verify.py` | standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the `openssl` binary; fails closed without them; `--all` covers every published receipt) |
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| `verify_selftest.py` | adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts |
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Verify everything locally, no installation:
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```bash
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python3 verify.py --all
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python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json
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```
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The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation):
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**https://ltl.zkdefi.org**
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The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials:
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**https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent**
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Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust **source** at a
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pinned commit (clone it — the commit identifies the committed git tree,
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not dependencies or toolchains — and build it yourself; compilers are
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declared trusted base). The log deliberately
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retains early leaves recording a **failed** audit run: an append-only
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trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized,
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proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the
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provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf. Heads additionally
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carry a **deterministic SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s signature** over the same payload:
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additive, so Ed25519 remains the signature a consumer must check, and honest
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about scope — the estate's certificates cover the *verification* path of both
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algorithms; no signing operation is proven for either, and leaves themselves
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are Ed25519-signed at issuance only. Heads published before 2026-08 have no
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SLH-DSA signature and verify.py reports them as `slh_dsa:ABSENT`, which is
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allowed — an append-only log keeps its history.
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