mirror of
https://github.com/saymrwulf/lean-transparency-log.git
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mrwulf
130d5b305a
Doc-freshness audit (2026-07-19): the homepage received these two round-10 scope corrections in Tier 2 but the mirror README kept the old wording — 'sole trust anchor' -> sole cryptographic identity anchor (truth rests on each leaf's stated assumptions); 'the git hash is the content hash' -> the commit identifies the committed git tree, not dependencies or toolchains. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
50 lines
2.7 KiB
Markdown
# Lean Transparency Log — published mirror
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This repository is the **git-published face** of a transparency log of
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formal-verification attestations: signed statements that the Lean 4 proofs
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of specific software, at specific git commits, re-check with exactly their
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documented assumptions. Its first twelve leaves attest four cryptographic
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Rust libraries (Ed25519 implementations); as of **entry 13 (2026-07-16)**
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the log also attests **its own accumulator machinery** — a kernel-checked
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mechanization of the log's security analysis, so the log carries
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kernel-checked proofs *about the accumulator model* underlying its own
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inclusion and consistency reasoning, as one of its own entries (subject
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[`ltl-accumulator-verified`](https://github.com/saymrwulf/ltl-accumulator-verified);
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scoped to the mechanized model — it does not prove operator honesty,
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signing, or execution provenance). Current head: tree size 13, root
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`3488a2d0…`.
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Layout:
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| Path | Content |
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|---|---|
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| `entries/NNNNNN.json` | one log leaf per file, append-only (git history mirrors log history) |
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| `entries/<component>.attestation.json` | the newest attestation per library, for convenience |
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| `receipts/<component>.receipt.json` | inclusion proof binding that attestation to the latest signed head |
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| `sth-history.jsonl` | **every** Signed Tree Head ever issued — the witness channel: all cloners see the same heads |
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| `latest-sth.json` | the current head |
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| `provider.ed25519.pub` | the provider's public key — the sole cryptographic identity anchor; each statement's truth additionally rests on the assumptions stated in its leaf |
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| `verify.py` | standalone verifier (Python stdlib + the `openssl` binary; fails closed without them; `--all` covers every published receipt) |
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| `verify_selftest.py` | adversarial self-test: proves the verifier's fail-closed paths reject mutated receipts |
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Verify everything locally, no installation:
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```bash
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python3 verify.py --all
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python3 verify.py --receipt receipts/dalek-ed25519-verified.receipt.json
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```
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The online service (same data, live endpoints + customer documentation):
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**https://ltl.zkdefi.org**
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The provider tooling, agent tooling, and course materials:
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**https://github.com/saymrwulf/proof-aware-crypto-tooling-agent**
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Honesty notes, always in force: attestations cover Rust **source** at a
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pinned commit (clone it — the commit identifies the committed git tree,
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not dependencies or toolchains — and build it yourself; compilers are
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declared trusted base). The log deliberately
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retains early leaves recording a **failed** audit run: an append-only
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trust ledger keeps its history. Tree heads are signed by the merkleized,
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proof-attested Ed25519 library itself, and each signature embeds the
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provider's own Merkle self-check of that library's leaf.
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