saymrwulf/fips205-slhdsa-verified
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fips205-slhdsa-verified/TRUSTED-BASE.md
mrwulf 31f00fe756 SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) campaign skeleton: honest zero-certificate state 
Subject pinned: integritychain/fips205 @ 30bac08 via
saymrwulf/fips205-source @ 5dca0db. Parameter set SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s.
Scope: verify path only (slh_verify -> ... -> chain); six SHA-2 hash
oracles opaque per the standing boundary.

Gate-0 record (2026-07-22): charon clean on the full verify cone;
aeneas translates everything except the Hashers fn-pointer struct
(3 unique errors, the sole obstruction) -> phase 1 = named-opaque-
free-function compat patch in the snapshot repo, the established
dalek sha512-shim pattern.

check.sh exits non-green and says NOTHING PROVEN YET (H5, R3).
lean-guard copied; every future compile runs under it (S1, S2).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 21:00:57 +02:00

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TRUSTED-BASE — what the certificates will NOT cover

Initial statement, written at skeleton time (nothing proven yet); this file is maintained as the campaign proceeds and is part of every claim.

  1. The six hash oracles. h_msg, prf, f, h, t_l, t_len (SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s instantiations over SHA-256) are modeled as opaque functions with assumed functional behavior. Their correctness against FIPS 180-4 is NOT proven here — the same standing boundary as SHA-512 in the ed25519 apex. A collision or misimplementation inside the hash layer is invisible to these certificates.
  2. Signing and key generation. Out of extraction scope entirely. A verified verify path says nothing about the safety of signature or key production (including randomness).
  3. The transpilation pair. Charon and Aeneas (pinned versions in the toolchain) are trusted to preserve semantics from Rust (MIR) to the Lean model. Divergence between rustc's semantics and the extracted model is trusted base.
  4. The Lean kernel and its three axioms (propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound).
  5. Build correspondence. No reproducible-builds claim: the proof is about the pinned source, not about any particular compiled binary (the estate's R5 gap, stated everywhere it matters).
  6. Parameter-set scope. Claims will bind SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s only; other parameter sets are unverified until separately extracted and proven (R2).
  7. Aeneas-compat patch surface. The fn-pointer-to-named-oracle rewrite in fips205-source (phase 1) is part of the verified surface: the certificate covers the patched verify path, and the patch commits are the auditable delta from upstream 30bac08.