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0976239ebd crisis_agents: drop the wall-clock, drive asynchronously to quiescence
The previous driver imposed a synchronous turn-counted clock that the
Crisis paper explicitly forbids — Crisis is supposed to work in
asynchronous P2P networks, with any synchronicity being virtual and
derived inside the consensus algorithm from the DAG structure, not
imposed externally by a coordinator. This commit removes the wall clock.

What changed in the engine:

  - `Mothership.run_crisis_phase(num_turns, gossip_rounds_per_turn)`
    is replaced by `run_until_quiescent(max_steps=200)`. The loop
    interleaves three concerns on each iteration — emissions, gossip,
    and alarm emissions — until none make progress. Termination is by
    quiescence, not by a fixed turn count. `max_steps` is a safety
    bound (loop-iteration cap), not an exposed clock.

  - `Mothership.run_closed_phase(num_turns)` becomes
    `run_closed_phase(max_steps=50)`. Same quiescence model — the
    closed-phase conversation runs until no agent has more to say.

  - Agents grew `pending_alarm_claims()`: each agent checks its own
    graph for un-alarmed mutations and produces AlarmClaims directly.
    The driver loop calls this every iteration, so alarms emit and
    propagate in the same loop as regular emissions and gossip — no
    separate "alarm phase."

  - `Mothership.emit_alarms_from_detectors()` and the explicit
    `run_gossip_round()` step are no longer needed by callers; both
    are subsumed by the async loop. `run_gossip_round()` stays as a
    helper but tests no longer call it externally.

What changed in the agent interface:

  - `CrisisAgent.next_turn(turn, received_claims)` becomes
    `try_emit()` — no arguments. Agents in an async network don't see
    a global tick. They decide based on their own internal state.

  - `CrisisAgent.observe(claim)` is the new optional callback the
    closed-phase loop uses to feed context into agents that care
    (overridden by LiveClaudeAgent to populate its prompt buffer).

  - `pending_alarm_claims()` is idempotent: an internal
    `_already_alarmed` set tracks claims this agent has emitted, so
    the loop calls it every step without flooding the network with
    duplicate alarms.

What changed in the dataclass schema:

  - `AlarmClaim.detected_at_turn` -> `emitted_at_step`. The word
    "turn" implies a global clock; "step" is a per-agent sequence
    number used only for log ordering — local, not networked.

  - `ClosedPhaseEntry.turn` and `CrisisPhaseEntry.turn` -> `step`.
    Same rename, same reasoning.

  - `Scenario.closed_phase_turns` and `Scenario.crisis_phase_turns`
    are gone. The scenario no longer prescribes how many turns; it
    just provides agents and lets the async loop run them out.

What changed in the CLI:

  - Phase 3 reports "drove to quiescence in N step(s)" with a
    breakdown of regular emissions / gossip transfers / alarm
    emissions, instead of "ran N turns".

  - `QuiescenceReport` (new dataclass) carries the run statistics
    back from `run_until_quiescent`/`run_closed_phase` — steps taken,
    emissions made, gossip transfers, alarm claims emitted, plus
    whether termination was via quiescence or max-step cap.

New regression tests (`test_async_quiescence.py`):

  - `test_run_until_quiescent_terminates`: the loop must exit.
  - `test_two_runs_produce_identical_final_state`: determinism check —
    if anything in the loop depended on real wall time, this would
    fail.
  - `test_max_steps_bound_caps_runtime`: setting max_steps=1 exits
    immediately and `QuiescenceReport.reached_quiescence` reflects
    reality.
  - `test_no_turn_argument_exposed_to_agents`: introspects
    `CrisisAgent.try_emit` signature; fails if anyone re-adds a
    `turn` parameter.
  - `test_no_turn_field_on_alarmclaim`: introspects the dataclass
    fields; fails if `detected_at_turn` reappears.
  - `test_alarms_propagate_through_async_loop_alone`: the loop alone
    (no manual emit_alarms / run_gossip_round) ratifies an alarm.
  - `test_quiescence_report_counts_match_logs`: sanity check that
    the report's emission count equals the crisis log length.

Suite: 163 -> 170 tests, all green in 0.79s.

Behavioral end-state is identical to the previous (synchronous)
version: same fact-check scenario, same byzantine equivocation, same
proof JSON shape, same three signers, same quorum-met outcome. The
difference is structural: the protocol now matches the paper's async
shape, and a future port to actual TCP gossip + concurrent agents
needs no change to this engine.

CrisisViz: still untouched. The `crisis_data.json` pipeline that
drives the visualizer is orthogonal.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-14 22:06:56 +02:00
a1064660d5 Decentralize crisis_agents: agents own graphs, detect locally, vote by quorum
The previous design routed every Crisis message through a `Mothership` that
also held every agent's LamportGraph, ran the byzantine scan from a
privileged vantage, and built proofs from its own view. That made the
mothership a chokepoint — exactly what a BFT layer is supposed to remove.
This commit redistributes responsibility along the lines you'd expect from
a real open protocol:

Each `CrisisAgent` now owns:
  - its own `LamportGraph` (the agent's view of the network)
  - `emit_claim(claim) → Message`: wraps a Claim into a fully-valid Crisis
    Message built from the agent's OWN graph state, with chain link + cross
    references + mined PoW nonce
  - `receive(message)`: extends my graph if integrity holds; idempotent
  - `gossip_to(peer) → int`: shares everything I have with peer until
    quiescence (Algorithm 4 in the paper, in-process flavor)
  - `detect_mutations() → list[LocalAlarm]`: scans MY graph for same-id
    spacelike vertex pairs via the existing
    `LamportGraph.find_mutations`, filtered by application-layer
    `statement_id` so cross-detector AlarmClaims canonicalize

The `Mothership` shrinks to coordinator-only:
  - bootstrap (register honest agents; trigger boundary open with a joiner)
  - clock (call each agent's `next_turn()` per turn)
  - first-hop routing (sender's emission → declared target subset)
  - all-pairs gossip rounds between turns
  - emit_alarms_from_detectors(): poll each agent for its LocalAlarms,
    wrap any returned alarms into AlarmClaim payloads, broadcast them as
    Crisis Messages over the gossip layer

Gone (regression-tested in `test_no_chokepoint.py`):
  - `Mothership._graphs`, `Mothership.all_graphs()`, `Mothership.graph_of()`
  - `alarm.scan_for_mutations(mothership)`
  - any path where the mothership reads an agent's internal state

New voting layer (`crisis_agents/vote.py`):
  - `AlarmClaim`: a Crisis-payload dataclass discriminated by `kind="alarm"`.
    Wraps the accused process_id, statement_id, witness_digests, and
    detection turn. Round-trips through JSON same as Claim.
  - `quorum_for(n) = ceil(2n/3)`: classic BFT threshold.
  - `tally_alarms(graph, threshold)`: groups AlarmClaim vertices by
    (accused, statement_id, witness_pair), counts unique signer
    process_ids, ratifies groups meeting the threshold. Deterministic
    ordering so two equal graphs produce equal `RatifiedAlarm` lists.
  - `RatifiedAlarm`: the network-level consensus on byzantine behavior.

Multi-signer proofs (`crisis_agents/proof.py`):
  - schema_version bumped 1 → 2.
  - ProofDocument now embeds every signer's process_id_hex and the
    quorum threshold that was met. Self-consistency check enforces
    distinct signers, witness pairs, and signer count ≥ threshold.

Byzantine scenario rewrite:
  - `MockByzantineAgent` now takes an `intro_claim` for its first turn (a
    benign broadcast). The intro is technically necessary: the agent's two
    contradictory variants both chain to the intro vertex, so they can
    propagate through gossip — without it, the second variant would fail
    the chain constraint in any graph already holding the first.
  - `fact_check` scenario: closed phase still has 3 honest agents emitting
    6 claims each into the closed log; Crisis phase grew to 2 turns (intro
    + equivocation) so the byzantine can establish its same-id anchor
    before equivocating.

End-to-end CLI output reframed around six phases:
  1. closed team (no Crisis)
  2. boundary opens
  3. emission + gossip
  4. decentralized detection (each agent reports its own findings)
  5. alarms emitted + gossiped + ratified by quorum
  6. proof emission

Tests (51 fresh + 5 carried over for boundary):
  - `test_mothership.py`: per-agent graph ownership, broadcast vs.
    targeted delivery semantics, gossip propagation, regression guards
    against the removed centralization attributes.
  - `test_alarm.py`: every honest agent independently detects the same
    mutation; the byzantine doesn't detect itself; witness pairs are
    canonical across detectors.
  - `test_vote.py`: AlarmClaim round-trip, quorum formulas, tally
    determinism, mothership convenience method matches direct tallying.
  - `test_proof.py`: build_proof from RatifiedAlarm; multi-signer JSON
    round-trip; tampered-witness/below-quorum/duplicate-signer rejection.
  - `test_no_chokepoint.py` (the centerpiece): after the full lifecycle,
    every honest agent's ratified-alarm set is byte-identical. A single
    byzantine accuser alone cannot ratify. Forbidden attributes don't
    exist on Mothership.

Full suite: 163 tests, all green in 0.80s.

CrisisViz: untouched by this refactor. The `crisis_data.json` pipeline
the visualizer consumes is produced by the orthogonal
`crisis.demo.Simulation`, which this commit doesn't touch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-14 21:55:49 +02:00
b8684297fa Add crisis_agents — Crisis as a coordination layer for AI agent teams
A new sibling Python package, `crisis_agents`, that lifts the Crisis
protocol from "consensus between machines" to "consensus between AI
agents". Threat model: a team of sub-agents normally talks freely
with its orchestrator (the "mothership"); when the team's boundary
opens and an external agent of unknown trust joins, the mothership
activates the Crisis layer so byzantine equivocation is detectable.

Two-phase orchestration model:

  Phase 1 — closed team, no Crisis: agents emit claims directly, the
  mothership collects them flat.

  Phase 2 — boundary opens: every subsequent claim is wrapped into a
  Crisis Message with the agent's stable process_id and a PoW nonce,
  delivered into per-agent LamportGraphs, and after each turn the
  mothership scans for mutations via LamportGraph.find_mutations.

  Phase 3 — proof: when an alarm fires, the mothership emits a
  replayable JSON proof-of-malfeasance document with the contradictory
  witnesses, their delivery sets, and DAG cross-references showing
  which honest agents saw what.

Modules:
  - claim.py      Claim dataclass + JSON round-trip
  - boundary.py   membership tracker + open() trigger
  - agent.py      CrisisAgent abstract + MockAgent + MockByzantineAgent
                  (the latter equivocates by emitting two variants to
                  disjoint peer subsets at the same logical turn)
  - mothership.py orchestrator driving both phases, building Crisis
                  Messages from Claims, per-agent LamportGraphs, log
  - alarm.py      scan_for_mutations: same-agent same-turn distinct
                  digests with non-identical delivery sets, verified
                  spacelike via LamportGraph.are_spacelike on the
                  honest-agent graphs
  - proof.py      build_proof + ProofDocument + JSON serializer +
                  verify_proof_self_consistent
  - cli.py        `crisis-agents demo` + `crisis-agents verify`
  - scenarios/    fact_check: reference doc + 6 statements + scripted
                  honest/byzantine agents producing a deterministic
                  equivocation on statement s03

Tests: 50 new tests across test_claim, test_boundary, test_mothership,
test_alarm, test_proof, test_demo_fact_check. End-to-end test runs the
fact_check scenario, asserts exactly one alarm raised, proof is built,
re-serialized JSON passes self-consistency. Full suite (existing
crisis + new crisis_agents) green in 0.77s — 145 tests.

Out of scope (deliberately): visualization (separate CrisisViz upgrade
later), real TCP gossip (agents talk via in-process function calls in
the mothership), false-claim detection without equivocation (an
agent that consistently lies but never equivocates is out-voted, not
"caught"; catching it would require a ground-truth oracle).

Reuse from existing crisis package: Message, Vertex, LamportGraph,
LamportGraph.find_mutations, ProofOfWorkWeight, digest. The new code
is a thin adapter layer; the protocol substrate did the heavy lifting.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-14 16:38:11 +02:00