anza-ed25519-verified/verification/GEN-MODEL.sha256
mrwulf 21f80d29eb verification: bind the statements, the specifications, and the model (P1-a)
Phases 3/3b establish what each certificate RESTS ON. Neither says what it
SAYS, nor what it is ABOUT. A certificate gutted to a tautology of the same
axiom cone passes both; so does one whose reference definition has been
redefined to BE the extracted code, at which point the theorem reads
`loop = loop` and every cone is byte-identical.

Phase 3c closes that. Proofs/Audit.lean emits a canonical block holding the
policy constants, every certificate's fully-elaborated statement (pp.all, so
implicit arguments, instances and universe levels are visible), and the body
of every specification constant transitively reachable from those statements.
Its SHA-256 is pinned in check.sh and the block itself is committed as
AUDIT-MANIFEST.txt, so a mismatch is DIFFED, not merely reported. 31
certificates, 68 specification constants per repository.

Two tiers, not one. These forks have an arithmetic tier that must stay
oracle-free and an apex tier carrying this fork's hash and wire-format axioms,
and the apex boundary genuinely differs per fork (dalek 8 extra names, anza 4,
risc0 and betrusted 5). One shared constant would have widened the arithmetic
tier to accept hash oracles, which is the most valuable property these repos
have. Each auditor is generated from its own repository's policy.

Phase 0b pins the extracted model. This was not a precaution: risc0 and
betrusted were observed emitting BYTE-IDENTICAL audit-manifest digests
(6c821b8e…) while shipping demonstrably different extracted models, their
point-doubling routines differing in operation order. A statement names an
extracted function; it does not contain that function's body. Binding
statements is not binding the subject. Membership derives from the filesystem,
so a new model file fails closed.

selftest-statements.sh attacks both phases with ten cases, each asserting a
specific diagnostic: an edited model body, an unlisted model file, a widened
policy, a hand-edited committed block, a certificate dropped from the auditor
WITH the digest refreshed to match, and a gutted statement whose cone is
unchanged. It lifts the phases out of check.sh at run time, so it attacks the
shipping gate rather than a copy.

Two bugs found and fixed during that testing, both mine: Phase 3c read `$0`
after `cd "$AENEAS_LEAN"`, and $0 is the caller's relative path; and the
axgate self-test compared the tree against a pristine checkout rather than
against how it found it. A third expectation was wrong rather than the code —
widening the apex boundary is caught by the exact-cone requirement before the
digest ever runs, which is a stronger rejection, and the test now says so.

All sixteen runs green at these commits: four main buttons, four axgate
self-tests, four binding self-tests, four scalar buttons.

TRUSTED-BASE.md records what this binds and, at equal length, what it does
not: a digest binds identity, not meaning; an author can rotate the pins in
one commit and is caught by review, not by the script; and pinning the model
says nothing about whether Charon and Aeneas translated the Rust faithfully.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 00:38:19 +02:00

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7f173f9ead5b88f2b5444130d906d7b4a3c1c44f960845ad236c9aab796e2c82 CurveField/FunsExternal.lean
e0aa7f126fe8e4a2dd4ef083f076192a2db98dc4e723f69cf204c3019a87f7c4 CurveField/FunsExternal_Template.lean
6aebc152991c3b82fd2b7b576d59ab1524d8ff3e9002264dc84a74b379b3ba74 CurveField/Funs.lean
127b84e0aff8b079f4d74b4f5e898b7f031f740b836a22519069cee99a3e5f2a CurveField/TypesExternal.lean
4e7f6ddbcd6ec88c30365fa2430e1f1ed2b155219c7a867c7d9cab20f30ba0c1 CurveField/TypesExternal_Template.lean
6f166999a2300f39e7359a45199ee73b765e8712544839314de5cda2536db572 CurveField/Types.lean