Formally verified ed25519 (anza-xyz solana-ed25519): field + complete Edwards addition law proven in Lean 4 via Charon/Aeneas; axiom-audited certificates
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mrwulf b3f4ee0d33 verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c)
Every gate this repository has was executed by scripts that nothing pinned.
Round-5 review of the companion SLH-DSA repository stubbed the compiler
wrapper alone and its button printed ALL GREEN in 3.6 seconds over
deliberately destroyed proofs; flipping two guards in the audit driver
disabled every check with the digest byte-identical. Depth of checking is
worth nothing if the thing doing the checking is unbound — and every gate
added this week made that gap more valuable to an attacker, not less.

Phase 0c requires every harness file to match HARNESS.sha256. Two design
points carry the weight:

  - WHICH files must be pinned is POLICY and lives in check.sh, never in the
    map being consulted. If the required set were read from the pin file,
    deleting an entry would silently un-pin that file. It is instead derived
    from the filesystem, so a deleted entry is a set mismatch and a build
    failure. That is the exact defect SLH-DSA round-6 found, closed here by
    construction.
  - Membership self-derives from the executable bit: anything this script can
    shell out to must be pinned, so a NEW script fails closed until someone
    pins it deliberately. Load-bearing files that are not executable — the
    audit driver, the committed manifests, the policy tables — cannot be
    discovered that way and are listed explicitly.

lean-guard is inside the set, which finally makes the standing "lean-guard
stays hash-pinned" rule a property of the repository rather than a convention.

selftest-harness.sh replays five cases, each asserting a specific diagnostic:
an edited lean-guard, a new unpinned executable, a deleted pin entry, a
missing pin file, and a positive control. It was itself negative-tested — with
the hash comparison removed it goes red on exactly that case while cheerfully
reporting "10 harness files match their pins".

TRUSTED-BASE.md states the limit at equal length to the claim: pinning a
harness from inside that harness is circular, and an author who edits a script
and refreshes its pin in the same commit passes every phase. What the pin
changes is that the edit can no longer be SILENT — it must appear in the diff
at the commit being reviewed. A green button says "this is the apparatus that
was reviewed", never "this apparatus is trustworthy".

Also fixed, found by this sweep: both self-tests compared the working tree
against its starting state with `diff <(echo "$VAR") <(command)`, which is
asymmetric — for a clean tree the variable is empty and `echo` emits a blank
line the command does not. It reported a difference precisely when nothing was
wrong, and only surfaced once P1-a was committed and Proofs/ became clean.
Both now compare as strings.

Verified green: 20 runs across the four ed25519 repositories (four buttons,
four harness self-tests, four axiom-gate self-tests, four binding self-tests,
four scalar buttons), zero red.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-29 20:12:58 +02:00
verification verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c) 2026-07-29 20:12:58 +02:00
.gitignore skeleton: proof-pyramid layout, honest status table, trusted-base doc 2026-07-02 13:10:26 +02:00
README.md Coherence pass 4 (the closing pass): 4-tier apex documentation + hygiene 2026-07-06 04:01:17 +02:00
TRUSTED-BASE.md verification: pin the harness, the audit drivers and the policy files (P1-c) 2026-07-29 20:12:58 +02:00

anza-ed25519-verified

Formal verification of the ed25519 implementation in anza-xyz/cryptography (Solana, solana-ed25519 crate), built as a coherent proof pyramid in Lean 4 via the Charon/Aeneas transpilation pipeline:

        ┌──────────────────────────────┐
        │  Signature (EdDSA verify)    │   accepted ⇔ decompress(R) = [k](A)+[s]B
        ├──────────────────────────────┤
        │  Scalar arithmetic mod      │   Scalar52 ops correct mod 
        ├──────────────────────────────┤
        │  Group law (twisted Edwards) │   point ops = complete addition law
        ├──────────────────────────────┤
        │  Field 𝔽_p, p = 2²⁵⁵  19    │   FieldElement51 ops correct mod p
        └──────────────────────────────┘

Every layer states its theorems about the actual Aeneas-transpiled Rust code (never about a hand-written re-model), and every claim in the status table below is backed by a compiled proof plus an axiom audit of the named certificate. Files that do not compile under verification/check.sh are not in this repository.

Layer status

Layer Certificate Status Axioms of certificate
Field 𝔽_p fieldImplementation proven [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]
Group law (Edwards) edwardsImplementation proven [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]
Scalar mod scalarImplementation (add sub mul ) proven [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound]
Signature (EdDSA) verify_accepts_iffverify_accepts_iff_decompress (4 tiers) proven (phases 1+2) standard three + the button-enforced SHA-512/wire-format boundary — see The signature apex

Status legend: proven & axiom-audited · in progress · not started. This table is updated only when verification/check.sh passes for the layer.

The signature apex (phases 1 and 2)

The apex certificate CurveFieldProofs.verify_accepts_iff is the literal EdDSA acceptance criterion, proven about the extracted verifier:

For a signature that parses, the verifier returns Ok(()) iff the recomputed compressed point compress([s]·B [k]·A) equals the signature's R, byte-for-byte — where k is whatever scalar the opaque SHA-512 oracle produces from (R, A, msg).

The recomputation runs entirely through the proven model: anza's verify code lives in the same crate as the curve (src/ed_sigs), so the whole verify path joins the one merged gen/CurveField extraction directly — no glue layer, no name-welding. The Error enum and the parse/filter helpers are real extracted code; only the SHA-512 oracle (sha512_hash3) and the foreign ed25519::Signature type with its two byte accessors stay opaque — the tightest boundary of the four sibling repos.

Which verifier is verified? The certificate is about VerificationKey::verify_sha512, which is semantically identical (documented, pure refactor) to VerificationKey::verify_dalek — the dalek-style canonical-R byte-comparison path, including this crate's legacy filters (all-zero key, excluded-R list) and the strict s < check. The crate's default verify() uses the HEEA-accelerated Zebra/ZIP-215 path, which is a different acceptance criterion and is not covered by this certificate.

check.sh has a dedicated audit phase (Phase 3b) that fails the build unless each apex-tier certificate's axiom cone is exactly

[propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound] + {ed25519.Signature, ed_sigs.sha512_hash3, ed25519.Signature.r_bytes, ed25519.Signature.s_bytes}

— i.e. the three Lean foundations plus the documented SHA-512/wire-format boundary. Zero curve, scalar, or backend axioms. The companion certificate verify_loop_full (the 32-byte comparison loop computes array equality) carries the standard three axioms only.

Phase 2 (complete): the point-level lift. Phase 3b enforces the SAME axiom boundary on three further tiers that lift the byte equation to points:

Tier Certificate Statement
half-lift verify_accepts_iff_point accepted ⇔ R = the canonical encoding of [k]·minus_A + [s]·B (compress semantics + as_bytes canonicity + hash-to-scalar, recompute chain inverted)
point equation verify_accepts_iff_point_eq for any valid on-curve Q canonically encoded by R: accepted ⇔ Q = [k]·minus_A + [s]·B as points (encoding-injectivity: d non-square + parity root-selection)
full lift verify_accepts_iff_decompress R decompresses to a valid on-curve Pt, and accepted ⇔ Pt = [k]·minus_A + [s]·B — the constructive capstone

The full lift runs through the extracted CompressedEdwardsY::decompress itself, proven end-to-end: from_bytes parses the y-residue exactly below bit 255 (from_bytes_spec), sqrt_ratio_i returns the even square root of (y²1)/(dy²+1) (sqrt_ratio_i_sq_spec, Fermat-exponent square root), and the sign bit selects the x-parity (decompress_of_canonical, standard three axioms). Byte comparison ↔ encoding equality ↔ point equality ↔ decompressed-point equality: every link is machine-checked over the extracted code, and check.sh fails the build if any of the four tiers' cones deviates from the boundary above.

Source

  • Upstream: anza-xyz/cryptography, commit 0a54cca
  • Pinned/patched source: saymrwulf/anza-cryptography-source, commit 5f8e70e (adds the decompress step_2 negate-then-assign patch)
  • Patches: minimal Aeneas-compatibility only (documented in the source repo)
  • Closest relative of the reference solution (same crate layout as solana-ed25519).

Toolchain (pinned)

Component Version
Aeneas bf13c42e
Charon 9dd7f23c
Lean v4.30.0-rc2
OCaml 5.3.0

Reproducing

source ~/aeneas-toolchain/env.sh
cd verification
./extract.sh    # Rust → LLBC → Lean (regenerates gen/)
./check.sh      # compiles EVERY shipped file + axiom-audits EVERY certificate

The gen model is ONE merged universe (gen/CurveField: field + curve + scalar + the verify path's reachable code), regenerated in full by extract.sh. The scalar layer keeps its own check button:

./check-scalar.sh     # compiles the merged gen + all scalar proofs (add, sub,
                      # Montgomery mul, byte-parsing) and kernel-audits the
                      # scalar certificates, incl. the scalarImplementation
                      # aggregate

Trusted base

See TRUSTED-BASE.md for the complete list of assumptions (Lean kernel, mathlib, Charon/Aeneas semantics, external-function models, and — in the signature layer only — an opaque SHA-512 model).