| .. | ||
| src | ||
| build.rs | ||
| Cargo.toml | ||
| README.md | ||
Graphical Abstraction Manager (GAM)
The GAM provides abstract UI primitives to other modules.
The goal is to have this module work in close conjunction with the
graphics-server, and all other modules would route abstract UI
requests through this module.
Structure
Canvas
A Canvas is a minimal data structure that defines a physical region of the
screen that will display a set of primitives. Canvas structures are domiciled
in the UI server, and are considered trusted by default, although there is
a flag that can be cleared to make everything within it untrusted.
Each Canvas has a 128-bit GUID. Application processes that wish to draw
something to the screen must refer to a Canvas by its 128-bit GUID; it is up
to the GAM to not share secure GUIDs with insecure processes.
The Canvas selection is modal on a per-connection basis. In other words,
an application can request several Canvas objects to draw on, but it
must first send a SelectCanvas command first to pick the right Canvas.
By default, the last requested Canvas is the default Canvas for a
given connection to the GAM.
The region of the physical screen that can be drawn on by a Canvas is
defined by a clip_rect. The coordinate space of the clip_rect is fixed
to the screen's coordinates, that is, (0,0) in the top left, X increasing
to the right, Y increasing down.
A Canvas stores a pan_offset. If the pan offset is (0,0), then the top left
corner of the clip_rect corresponds to data drawn at location (0,0) inside
the Canvas. The pan_offset is added to every coordinate inside the objects that
refer to a Canvas at render time; this allows for easy implementation
of panning and scrolling.
A Canvas has a trust_level associated with it. Higher numbers are more
trusted; 255 is the highest level of trust. Rules for drawing are as follows:
- More trusted
Canvasobjects always render on top of lower trusted object - When a higher trusted
Canvasobject overlaps a lower trusted object, the lower trusted object is:- defaced using hatched lines with a random angle and spacing
- further updates to the lower trusted object are disallowed.
Thus, a Canvas should not be thought of like a "window", as windows in
typical UIs are allowed to freely overlap and clipping is handled
by simply drawing over lower layers of content.
Canvas makes it strongly preferred to render trusted and untrusted data
side-by-side, rather than one on top of each other.
This policy is partially to help users be very clear as to e.g. where a password box is vs. an image that looks a lot like a password box; but the policy is also informed by the limitations of the underlying hardware. In particular, the underlying memory LCD strongly relies on "dirty bits" for good performance, and doing full-region redraws to handle dirty rectangles on window movement is not an efficient use of dirty bits. Reducing time spent redrawing partially obscured windows is also good for performance and helps to simplify the code base, but these last two considerations are quite minor compared to the primary concern of a "least confusing" UI when it comes to differentiating between trustable and less trustable regions of the screen.
Thus, the simple rule is: don't stack content types of different trust levels.
If you require content stacking, this can be done for content within a single
trust level by using multiple objects within a Canvas, as they have a draw_order
attribute and can handle content stacking; but between trust domains, it's both
a trust and complexity issue to allow for simultaneous stacking of trust domains
with live, full-content update of the underlying layers.
TextView
A TextView object is a heavy data structure that contains both a xous::String
and metadata which guides the GAM on how to render the string. Please note
the philosophy of the GAM is to hide the exact details of how anything is
rendered to the calling application. This both allows users to have greater
control over customizing their interfaces, and also helps introduce a layer
of protection against phishing; however it also means that UX designers will not
be able to have exquisite control over the "look and feel" of their applications.
TextView objects are domiciled on the application process. Process-local API
calls can "simulate" certain properties (such as figuring out the dynamic
width or height of a text box based on the size of the string within) to assist
with laying out TextViews. Once the layout is finalized, the TextView objects
are then immutably lent to the GAM using an rkyv lend wrapper;
the calling thread then blocks until the GAM completes the rendering operation.
One can think of a TextView as a text bubble, that can have rounded or square
corners, and its content string can be rendered with a selection of options
that specify the glyph style (not a font -- it's more of a hint than a specifier),
aligment, and the size of the text bubble. The text bubble can either be of a
fixed size (such that the string will show ellipses ... if it overruns the
bubble), or of a dynamically growable size based on its content.
TextView can both be directly rendered to a Canvas, or managed by secondary
object such as a Menu or List to compose other UI elements.
TextView supports a draw_order attribute, which allows multiple TextViews
within a single application to be stacked on top of each other.
Note that draw_order can only be respected within the context of a single application;
if two applications are drawing to the same Canvas, then who gets the last
draw depend on who sends the last update request. This might be fixable later
on with a bit to "mutex" the drawing of other applications to enforce an order,
but for MVP we simply avoid having multiple applications contend for access to
the same Canvas.
The problem is:
- you don't have access to the drawing objects; they are domiciled in the apps
- you don't want to just clear large regions of the FB; that will slow things down. You want to take advantage of dirty bits as much as possible for good performance.
- It would be nice to be able to have a more trusted "pop-up" on top of a less trusted app, and have it obscure the lower app.
Options include:
- A bitmap that stores the drawable mask based on a trust level. This would have to be recalculated from the priority queue for each Canvas every time the queue is updated. This structure consumes 24kiB per canvas in this case...
- Coming up with an arbitrary polygonal region (that can also support holes) and then doing maths to figure out if a point may or may not be updated. This would be memory efficient but rather time and CPU-inefficient to compute.
- Disallowing overlapping Canvas features??
- Maintaining each Canvas with a bitmap that has the latest drawing on it, updating only that bitmap, and then doing compositing and dirty bit computation before sending off to the graphics engine?