looks like about 9 crates will be affected by this. Point them
all to the latest version of the API, and specify the
"precursor" feature (which activates our patch)
- make the "base" field no longer public. It is accessible, but only
through an `unsafe` method, because, it is unsafe.
- add accessors to offest/mask fields. Because, it's not at all
unsafe to access these, and it can be useful for bit-ops that are
not part of the generic set of UTRA.
- add Arc to AtomicCSR, and require `std` for AtomicCSR types.
This should not break anything, I checked inside @foundation-devices
keyOS and they don't seem to be using AtomicCSR anywhere.
The Arc makes it a bit safer to clone the AtomicCSR base pointer
and share it between threads, but it will have an impact on performance.
The USB stack (which requires AtomicCSR) was regression testing and the
impact seems minimal.
Recall that the main purpose of AtomicCSR is to provide a CSR accessor
that does not require a mutable reference to the base object. This
can make certain Rust idioms a bit cleaner. We wrap the base accessor
in Arc+Atomic to try and improve the safety of throwing the borrow
checker under the bus, but it's still not perfect because hardware
mutable state can have side-effects within hardware itself that cannot
be modeled or checked by Rust's borrow checker.
Sections of the MiniElf are now aligned as required by the
source ELF requirements. This is required for direct-mapping
with XIP.
the overhead is just a few bytes every couple of programs, so it's
a small price to pay for XIP.
This experimental tool can be used to create all-in-one images based
on precomputed file lists. It generates "test images" using just the
bare minimum number of processes.
This program includes all the keys, kernel, and initial images required
to support a simple program.
Signed-off-by: Sean Cross <sean@xobs.io>
Each Cargo.toml now includes a comment which remnids maintainers
of the dependency policy for Xous (that is, nail down every dependency
to the minor number).
these are secondary attack surfaces -- code that isn't directly
in the kernel, but involved in the manipulation, handling, grooming
and preparation of source and binary files
Versions are pinned down to the minor number. Yes, this means that
we don't automatically pull in features and bug updates from crates.io,
but it also means we don't pull in new attack surfaces and code that
hasn't been tested or reviewed. I'd like this process to be very deliberate
and not automatic for Xous.
The `rand` crate is almost pinned down to a single version, except
for an odd dependency that's pulled in by hosted mode that depends
on rand 0.8.4 via a subordinate dependency via the `tempfile` crate.
Pondering if it's worth it to try and eliminate that, because the
0.8.4 version doesn't get compiled into any version that touches
real hardware. It just makes it harder to analyze the Cargo.lock
file, mostly. I think I'll leave it as-is.
